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INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court (the "Court") changed the role
of federal law in regulating securities transactions in a series of re-
cent cases limiting the reach of Rule 10b-5.' In 1985 the Court ex-
t Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law. B.A., 1976, North Texas
State; J.D., 1979, Harvard. The author is grateful to Larry Bush and Marc Steinberg
for reading and commenting upon a preliminary draft of this article and to Greg
Aleshire and Harold Hudson for research assistance.
1 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
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tended the reasoning of these cases to its logical conclusion, holding
that conduct is not manipulative within the meaning of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 19342 (the "Act") unless it is deceptive.3 These
decisions substantially constrain the authority of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to regulate conduct under section
10(b) of the Act.4 The Court did not examine the structure of the
Act or the history of federal regulation of manipulative practices in
any of its Rule 10b-5 cases. Instead it grounded its decisions on the
"fundamental purpose of the. . .Act 'to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.' "5
This article is about the meaning of the word "manipulative" in
section 10(b). It concludes that the term must be given independent
interpretive significance as part of a broader re-discovery of the
original and most logical agenda for the statute
- that of ensuring that securities are in a certain sense appropri-
ately priced. This is a more far-reaching goal than the one the Court
ascribes to the Act, which is essentially only the institution of a sys-
tem of disclosure of corporate earnings and profits. If the statute is
correctly understood in this way, the authority granted to the SEC
by section 10(b) is seen as extending to contemporary practices as
diverse as program trading, arbitrage, poison pills, stock-parking,
and corporate abuses of control over dividend policy. This article
begins by discussing the importance of market prices to the framers
of the Act and to the market system and all participants in it. There
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a - 78kk (1982 & Supp. III 1985) [hereinafter the Act].
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
As the Act explains:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange ... [t]o use or employ, in con-
nection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national
securities exchange or any security not so registered, any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regula-
tions as the SEC may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j.
5 Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 6-7 (quoting Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476-
77 (1977), quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972),
quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963)). In most
recent cases interpreting the federal securities statutes the Court has been guided by
this supposed congressional concern with disclosure. The inadequacy of the philoso-
phy of full disclosure as a guiding principle for interpreting various provisions of the
federal securities statutes is suggested by Karjala, Federalism, Full Disclosure, and
the National Markets in the Interpretation of Federal Securities Law, 80 Nw. U.L.
REv. 1473 (1986), and Chang, Meaning, Reference, and Reification in the Definition
of a Security, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 403 (1986).
[Vol. 1988
MANIPULATION UNDER SECTION 10(b)
follows a discussion of the process by which the Court came to the
conclusion that section 10(b) reaches only deceptive conduct. The
article then examines section 10(b) in the light of both the substan-
tive provisions of the Act and of the "express recital of evils"8 found
in section 2 of the Act,7 concluding that much of the Act, including
section 10, cannot be explained in terms of disclosure. The article
suggests that what ties the Act together is a concern with the public
interest in security prices.
It is hard to define the word manipulative concisely for the pur-
pose of the Act.8 It is not simply "a general term comprising a range
of misleading practices." 9 The substantive provisions of the Act and
the public policy forcefully enunciated in section 2 indicate that ma-
nipulative practices are those that undermine the proper functioning
of the securities markets. Section 10(b) gives the SEC the authority
to regulate almost any conduct toward the end of restraining prac-
tices that influence security prices. It authorizes the SEC to do
whatever it concludes is necessary to prevent speculation from un-
dermining the proper functioning of the securities markets. Section
10(b) is a broad mandate to the SEC to implement the basic anti-
speculative policy behind the Act. Congress itself required some dis-
closure in the Act, and presumably the SEC can also do so. How-
ever, the Act does much more than merely require disclosure, and
the SEC should be permitted to do more as well. 10 Most limits on
I American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946).
15 U.S.C. § 78b.
' Professor Loss, after an extensive analysis of the regulation of market manipula-
tion, concluded that the word manipulative has no precise meaning in § 10(b). 3 L.
Loss, SEcuRrrIEs REGULATION 1573 (3d ed. 1988); see also L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF
SECURITIES REGULATION 998 n.75 (1983) [hereinafter FUNDAMENTALS].
In both treatises Professor Loss said the matter of market manipulation is
"[r]elated to the field of fraud - but not altogether a part of it." SECURITIES REGULA-
TION, supra, at 1529; FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURrrIEs REGULATION, supra, at 982; see
also Loomis, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Advisers Act
of 1940, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 214, 241 (1959) ("Manipulation, like fraud,. . . takes
a variety of forms and cannot be exactly defined."). The judicial and administrative
regulation of manipulation under the Act is thoroughly covered in Professor Loss'
treatises and in A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES
FRAUD (1986).
" Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 6.
10 An elaborate discussion of the nature of manipulative conduct under § 10(b) is
contained in Norman Poser's article on the application of the anti-manipulative pro-
visions of the Act to corporate control transactions. Poser, Stock Market Manipula-
tion and Corporate Control Transactions, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 671 (1986); see also
Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349 (N.D. Tex. 1979). Poser
concludes that the Court is correct in holding that deception is an essential element
No. 2:359]
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the SEC's authority are to be found outside section 10(b).
I. THE EXCHANGE ACT AND THE SCOPE OF SECTION 10(b)
The Act was a response to the general public perception that
stock market activities and the prices prevailing on the market pro-
foundly affected the welfare of the country. By 1934 there was a
broad consensus that stock market speculation had contributed to
the stock market crash of 1929 and to the Great Depression that
followed.1 While almost everyone agreed that this warranted gov-
ernment intervention, or at least that such government intervention
was inevitable, there was no consensus on what was to be done.
In 1934 the public was concerned with the exchange market, par-
of manipulation under § 10(b). See also Loomis, supra note 8, at 241 ("The principal
element ... of manipulation in general . . . is deception."). Poser's argument is
based on both the statutory scheme and his understanding of the meaning the word
manipulation had in financial circles in 1934. This article reaches a different conclu-
sion on the statutory scheme but does not attempt to reconstruct the meaning of
manipulative conduct except by reference to the statute.
Although he might not agree with the article's conclusions on the SEC's role in
market regulation, in his book on insider trading Henry Manne used the word manip-
ulation in the way it is defined in this article. H. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE
STOCK MARKET 147-58 (1966); see also Manne, Insider Trading and the Administra-
tive Process, 35 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 473, 492 (1967) ("It should be noted that there is
no suggestion in this interpretation [i.e. one focused upon the statute] that section
10(b) was in any way concerned. . with the general philosophy of disclosure."); cf.
Ruder, Civil Liability Under Rule 10b-5: Judicial Revision of Legislative Intent? 57
Nw. U.L. REv. 627, 658 (1963) ("[S]ection 10(b) was not to provide an all-inclusive
private weapon against fraud.... but to allow the Commission to prevent market
manipulations and speculations by persons seeking to take advantage of loop-holes in
the statutes.").
11 "The New Deal was born of the Great Depression and, to the naked eye of the
ruined investor and the unemployed apple-seller, the depression had been touched off
by the stock market panic of October, 1929." T. TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 65 (1953);
see also First Inaugural Address of Franklin D. Roosevelt (Mar. 4, 1933), reprinted
in 2 DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 239, 240 (H. Commager 9th ed. 1973); Letter
from Franklin D. Roosevelt to Sam Rayburn (Mar. 26, 1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLA-
T'vE HISTORY OF THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 AND SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934,
item 18 (J. Ellenberger & E. Mahar eds. 1973) [hereinafter LEGISLATIVE HISTORY]
("The people of this country are, in overwhelming majority, fully aware of the fact
that unregulated speculation in securities and in commodities was one of the most
important contributing factors in the artificial and unwarranted 'boom' which had so
much to do with the terrible conditions of the years following 1929."); cf. T. McCRAw,
PROPHETS OF REGULATION 180 n.49 (1984) ("This connection between the crash and
the depression, though valid in the minds of New Dealers, has been challenged by
modern scholars."); M. PARRISH, SECURITIES REGULATION AND THE NEW DEAL 109
(1970).
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ticularly the New York Stock Exchange (the "NYSE").12 The ex-
changes were powerful institutions, however, and proposals to regu-
late them encountered intense opposition. In the end, the Act
regulated stock exchange credit and trading practices and the affairs
of issuers that sought to have their securities traded on exchanges.13
The Act was the product of extremely involved compromise. Many
controversies were resolved by giving the SEC the authority to de-
cide how to proceed, 4 or by ordering it to study the matter fur-
ther. 15 In addition to its specific prohibitions and delegations, the
Act included two sections that subjected broad areas of activity to
SEC rules. One was section 15, which forbade unlawful participation
by any broker or dealer in any securities market other than an ex-
change whose internal rules provide investors protection equal to or
exceeding that provided by the Act and by regulations prescribed by
the SEC."6 The other was section 10(b).
The Act was "a tremendous experiment in governmental regula-
tion of business."1 7 Congress itself did not require many changes in
the way that the securities business worked, but it empowered ad-
ministrators to insist upon fundamental change. 8 Although the lan-
guage of section 10(b) does not itself make clear what problems the
12 The exchanges were thought to account for most equity trading and the New
York Stock Exchange [hereinafter the NYSE] for most exchange trading. R.
DEBEDTS, THE NEW DEAL'S SEC 20 (1964); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., THE SE-
CURITY MARKETS, ch. 7 (1935).
,S The Act has been amended extensively. The Act as originally enacted is de-
scribed in Tracy & MacChesney, The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 32 MICH. L.
REV. 1025 (1934).
14 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 11, 48 Stat. 881,
891 (for the current version, see 15 U.S.C. § 78k) (segregation and limitation of func-
tions of exchange members, brokers and dealers); § 13, 48 Stat. at 894 (for the current
version, see 15 U.S.C. § 78m) (form and timing of reports); § 14, 48 Stat. at 895 (for
the current version, see 15 U.S.C. § 78n) (proxy solicitation); cf. §§ 7 and 8, 48 Stat.
at 886, 888 (for the current versions, see 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 78h) (credit regulation).
15 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 11(e), 48 Stat. 881, 891
(repealed 1975)(study of segregation of broker and dealer functions); § 12(f), 48 Stat.
at 894 (repealed 1936)(study of unlisted trading); § 19(c), 48 Stat. at 899 (repealed
1975) (study of exchange governance); § 211, 48 Stat. at 909 (15 U.S.C. § 78jj (omitted
from U.S.C.)) (study of protective and reorganization committees).
"e Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 15, 48 Stat. 881, 895. Section 15 has been repeatedly and
substantially amended. For the current version, see 15 U.S.C. § 78o.
17 Tracy & MacChesney, supra note 13, at 1037.
15 On the expanded role played by administrators in New Deal legislation, see gen-
erally J. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIvE PROCESS (1938); R PIERCE, S. SHAPIRO & P.
VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 32-34 (1985); Stewart, The Reformation
of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1667 (1975).
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administrators are supposed to solve or what they may do to solve
them, the rest of the Act does.
A. The Justification for the Exchange Act - The Importance of
Prices
Congress itself explained why it regulated securities-market trans-
actions and related practices in the Act. Section 2 of the Act lists
reasons that transactions in the securities markets are affected with
a public interest necessitating federal intervention. The section fo-
cuses almost exclusively on the importance of market prices. Section
2 emphasizes the role of the market as an appraiser of value, the
importance of market prices (to investors, creditors and the public
treasury), and the widespread quotation of the prices established in
market transactions. 9 Market prices "are susceptible to manipula-
tion and control, and the dissemination of such prices gives rise to
excessive speculation, resulting in sudden and unreasonable fluctua-
tions in the prices of securities," undermining the credit, tax and
banking systems and precipitating, intensifying and prolonging na-
tional emergencies, like the Depression. Significantly; section 2 fails
to mention full and honest disclosure or the importance of informa-
tion about issuers.
It is perhaps possible to overemphasize the importance of section
2. It was included primarily to establish that Congress had the
power to regulate stock exchange practices and institutions that had
been carefully designed so as not to operate across state lines.2 0 The
constitutional basis for federal regulation of security transactions
was uncertain in 1934, and section 2 was included in the Act because
the Court had earlier indicated it would respect the judgment of
Congress, expressed in a statute, that intrastate transactions bur-
" The Securities Acts Amendments of 1975 directed the SEC to facilitate the es-
tablishment of a national market system for securities. As part of this initiative, the
Act was amended to reflect further congressional findings on the public interest in the
securities markets. Pub. L. No. 94-29, §§ 2, 7, 84 Stat. 97, 97, 111-17 (codified as
amended in §§ 2, 11A, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78k-1). Section 11A(a)(1) expresses the find-
ing that there is a public interest in assuring broad dissemination of information
about securities quotations and transactions.
2 Stock Exchange Regulation: Hearing Before the Comm. on Interstate and For-
eign Commerce, House of Representatives, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 8
LEGISLATIVE HisTORy, supra note 11, at 16-20 and 28-34 (testimony of James Landis).
See generally Hanna, The Federal Regulation of Stock Exchanges, 5 S. CAL. L. REV.
9, 18-24 (1931); Hanna & Turlington, Protection of the Public Under the Securities
Exchange Act, 21 VA. L. REV. 251, 282 n.27 (1935).
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dened interstate commerce.21 Nonetheless, the section fairly summa-
rizes contemporary public sentiment and the problems said to jus-
tify federal intervention in the debate over the Act. It is therefore
remarkable that the Court ascribes a fundamental purpose to the
Act that Congress failed to mention in this preamble.22
Congress appropriately expressed its concern about the securities
markets in terms of securities prices. The value of a security lies
largely in the income stream that its owner is entitled to receive
from its issuer.23 Most investors buy securities in hopes of making
money. They do not need or use them for anything else. An owner
who sells her or his security simply trades her or his right to future
payments for a current payment. The income a security produces for
its owner thus consists of distributions from the issuer while she or
he owns it and of proceeds from the buyer when she or he sells it.
Since a security is essentially the right to a stream of issuer pay-
ments, and since the price of a security is the amount others will
pay for that income stream, for many purposes a security is nothing
more than its price.24
"2 Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1, 37-38 (1923).
22 Section 16(b) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78p, gives "preventing the unfair use of
information" as the reason for allowing issuers to recover short-swing trading profits
of control persons. Even this limited reference to information does not directly ad-
dress disclosure.
23 R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 3 (2d ed. 1984); J.
LORIE, P. DODD & M. KIMPTrON, THE STOCK MARKET - THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 88 (2d
ed. 1985). See generally V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
CORPORATE FINANCE 133-372 (3d ed. 1987) (rights of security holders); K. GARBADE,
SECURITIES MARKETS 1 (1982). Owners of debt securities receive payments in the form
of periodic interest payments and reimbursement of the principal at maturity. The
owner of common stock is entitled to periodic distributions such as dividends and a
portion of the residual value of the issuer upon liquidation of the issuer.
Some people value securities for reasons beyond the passive income they receive.
The most important alternative source of value is the right to participate in the con-
trol of the issuer accorded to the owners of most securities. Investors who value vot-
ing rights will presumably pay for them, and accordingly the right to control carried
with a security probably affects its price. See generally Bhagat & Brickley, Cumula-
tive Voting: The Value of Minority Shareholder Voting Rights, 27 J.L. & ECON. 339
(1984); Easterbrook & Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law, 26 J.L. & ECON. 395 (1983);
Fischel, Organized Exchanges and the Regulation of Dual Class Common Stock, 54
U. CHL L. REV. 119, 144-46 (1987); Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory
Corporate Disclosure System, 9 J. CORP. L. 1, 710-12 (1983).
24 Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 559-60 (1982) (unique agreement to
share profit not designed to be traded publicly not security); FitzGibbon, What is a
Security? A Redefinition Based on Eligibility to Participate in the Financial Mar-
kets, 64 MINN. L. REV. 893 (1980); Karjala, supra note 5, at 1508-15.
Morton Horwitz argues that the modern law of contracts evolved in response to
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Investors who value securities because of the income they produce
make trading decisions by comparing the cost of a security with the
present value of the income that they expect it to produce. An inves-
tor will buy a security if he or she values the income which he or she
expects it to produce more than the amount that he or she will have
to pay for the security, and will sell the security if he or she values
the expected income from the security at less than what he or she
can sell the security for. When one person's estimate of the present
value of the income that a security will produce is less than a second
person's, then the two may trade the security at a price between
their estimates.2 5 The range of prices at which trades occur narrows
as the number of potential buyers and sellers of a security who know
about each other increases, since the buyer bidding the most will
trade with the seller offering to accept the least.2"
Section 2 and the rest of the Act reflect a concern less with prices
per se than with prices on organized markets. The price at which a
security trades in a particular transaction is obviously important to
the buyer and to the seller, but it is not obvious why that price
should interest anyone else. The prices reported from securities ex-
changes are essentially different from the prices posted by
merchants. Exchange prices are the records of completed transac-
tions; no one necessarily stands ready to trade at those prices. None-
theless, information about trades on the securities exchanges, in-
cluding prices and volume, is promptly and widely disseminated.2 7
The fact that there is sufficient demand for such information to jus-
this unique attribute of securities. M. HORwITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN
LAW 173-74 (1977). Contra Simpson, The Horwitz Thesis and the History of Con-
tracts, 46 U. CHL L. REv. 533, 547-61 (1979) (stock cases refined existing rule); cf.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 360 comment b (1979) (specific performance
of contract to sell control shares).
22 A buyer will not pay a price higher than the value of the income that he or she
thinks that the security will produce. Conversely, a seller will not accept less than the
amount that he or she believes necessary to acquire an alternative investment that
will yield an equally attractive income.
2 See generally K. GARBADE, supra note 23, at 417-66; Lipton, Best Execution -
The National Market System's Missing Ingredient, 57 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 449
(1982); Niederhoffer & Osborne, Market Making and Reversal on the Stock Ex-
change, 61 J. AM. STATISTICAL A. 897 (1966).
27 See K GARBADE, supra note 23, at 449; Gilson & Kraakman, The Mechanisms of
Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REv. 549, 609 (1984). Transactions in many securities
that are frequently traded "over the counter" [hereinafter OTC] are also widely re-
ported, as are bid and asked quotations for even more OTC securities. See generally
Schedule D to NASD By-Laws, NASD Manual (CCH) 1 1754; K. GARBADE, supra
note 23, at 438-42; SEC, Report of Special Study of Securities Markets, H.R. Doc. No.
95, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 42-45, 355-56, 595-610, 630-45 (1963) [hereinafter
Special Study].
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tify its publication is itself probably the best evidence of the impor-
tance of the prices at which trades occur on securities exchanges.
On developed markets, including American stock exchanges,
trades occur at prices that reflect the collective judgment of market
participants of the value of the traded securities, with each partici-
pant's judgment carrying the weight of the money that she or he is
willing to commit to the market. The price at which a security
trades is idealized as:
an appraisal of the value of that stock due to a series of actual sales
between various persons dealing at arm's length ... and so . .. a
true chancering of the market value of that stock thereon under the
process of attrition due to supply operating against demand.28
Inasmuch as market prices are the products of the prices at which
investors have been willing to buy and sell, anyone interested in
knowing what investors will pay or accept for securities can find val-
uable information in market prices. Owners of securities and indi-
viduals who are obligated to buy securities are obviously interested.
Their wealth is a function of the prices at which they can sell or
buy,29 and these prices are in turn a function of the prices which
others are willing to pay for the securities, or which others are will-
ing to accept in exchange for the securities. The prices at which the
securities have recently traded are extremely useful sources of infor-
mation. Potential traders have presumably been in the market, and
in a large market it is likely that a substantial number of traders
value any security at approximately the price at which it is trading.
Thus, prices at which trades have recently occurred are good indica-
tors of the prices that will obtain in the next trades, and security
owners can use recent prices to calculate the market values of their
holdings and so too their wealth.
Reported prices may also interest people who are trying to decide
whether or not to trade a security. Most participants in exchange
markets are price-takers. Instead of deciding what price to ask for or
28 United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81, 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), aff'd, 79 F.2d 321 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650 (1935). The appraisal of value was often cited in the
1930's as an important and valuable function of exchanges. See S. REP. No. 1455, 73d
Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATwE HISTORY, supra note 11, item 21, at
30; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., supra note 12, at 26-32; J. KEYNEs, THE GENERAL
THEORY O1F EMPLOYIENT, INTEREST AND MONEY 152 (1936) (characterizing conven-
tional view); Berle, Liability for Stock Market Manipulation, 31 COLUM. L. REv. 264,
267 (1931); Moore & Wiseman, Market Manipulation and the Exchange Act, 2 U.
CHL L. REv. 46, 51 n.26 (1934); Legislation, 21 VA. L. REv. 103, 108 (1934).
29 K. GARBADE, supra note 23, at 449.
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to pay, they decide whether they will buy, sell or simply hold their
positions at the market price.30 Leaving aside temporarily the possi-
bility that a trade may reveal information relevant to value, no indi-
vidual's trades will affect the market price of a security unless these
transactions constitute a substantial part of total market activity for
the security. This will seldom be the case, and thus usually a sub-
stantial amount of an exchange-traded security can be bought or
sold at or very near the price at which it last traded.3 1 Therefore
most investors can make their decisions knowing that they will be
able to trade at or very near recent prices.32
Reported prices are not independently significant to people who
are deciding whether or not to trade. Potential traders are interested
in reported prices simply because they reveal something about the
state of the market. On the other hand, investors sometimes "bor-
row" reported prices and use them in their own transactions. Inves-
tors may borrow reported prices because they reflect relevant infor-
mation, but when reported prices are used derivatively, they are
given independent significance, and thus become important in and
of themselves, apart from any information that they are thought to
contain. Section 2(2) of the Act recognizes that the prices at which
exchange transactions occur are used by outsiders as prices for their
transactions. For example, securities are sometimes traded in negoti-
ated transactions at prices based on those reported from ex-
changes. 3 Regional stock exchanges serve largely as alternative mar-
kets for securities traded on the NYSE, and securities trade on
3' See generally id. at ch. 11.
31 In 1986, 90.2% of all trades on the NYSE were within one-eighth of one point of
the previous trade's price. NYSE FACT BOOK 1987 at 15. See generally K. GARBADE,
supra note 23, at 449; cf. the Act, § 2(2) (reported transactions set prices); Levmore,
Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REV. 645, 647 (1984) (mar-
ket clearing price is best indicator of future price). But cf. R. BREALEY & S. MYERs,
supra note 23, at 278-79 (substantial sellers believe they must cut price); Carney,
Signalling and Causation in Insider Trading, 36 CATH. UL. REv. 863, 884-85 (1987)
("conventional... wisdom"); Scholes, The Market for Securities: Substitution ver-
sus Price Pressure and the Effects of Information on Share Prices, 45 J. Bus. 179,
179-81 (1972) (characterizing one view). See generally infra notes 243-45 and accom-
panying text.
31 People trying to decide whether to sell can condition their orders on receiving a
certain price, but investors who assume market prices fairly reflect supply and de-
mand may be willing to trade at whatever price they can get in the market. Many
investors are willing to accept market prices and accordingly order their brokers to
trade at the best price available rather than at a set price. Current data are not avail-
able, but in 1966 about sixty percent of executed orders on the NYSE were market
orders. Niederhoffer & Osborne, supra note 26, at 904. These investors rely on the
market to fairly price securities, not on its having done so in previous trades.
33 See, e.g., Scholes, supra note 31, at 185 (secondary distributions).
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regional exchanges at prices derived from the NYSE.34 During the
boom market of the 1920s, several issuers took advantage of the will-
ingness of some investors to buy securities at reported prices.",
People who have an interest in a security often base investment
decisions upon its value, and much important business turns on the
value of securities. As section 2(2) of the Act notes, when market
prices are available, they are often used as governors of conduct.
People sometimes agree to trade securities at prices based on their
market prices at later dates. A corporation trading its own stock for
a business or other asset may agree to deliver more stock if its mar-
ket price drops.36 In a public offering of securities without an ex-
isting market the seller might guarantee that a market will develop
and that the market price will remain above the sale price.3 7 Em-
ployee compensation may be tied to the price of the employer's com-
mon stock or to the market value of a portfolio of securities that the
employee manages.3 If the market value of securities serving as col-
lateral for a loan declines, the lender may require the borrower to
provide further security.39 Finally, the market price of securities is
also used in calculating a variety of taxes.40
34 Special Study, supra note 27, pt. 2, at 12, 932 and 949-50; Poser, Restructuring
the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 883, 892-93 (1981).
35 One of the great outrages disclosed during the debate over the Act involved an
oil company's sale of over one billion dollars of its stock by means of widespread
personal solicitations. The stock was sold at a price one-eighth of one point higher
than its closing price on the New York Curb Exchange the previous day. During the
distribution, the company bought back most of its stock sold on the Curb, and used
most of the money from its stock sales to support the market price of the stock. 8
LEGISLATiVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 833-35 (testimony of Robert Healy).
3' See infra notes 269-72 and accompanying text. Price changes affect parties to
transactions in securities even if they do not trigger contractual obligations. Thus
someone planning to acquire assets with securities would like the price of the securi-
ties to rise. See, e.g., Putka, Overseas Scandal: Guinness Affair Makes British Likely
to Curb Corporate Acquisitions - Unusual Stock Buying Aided Firm in Its Bitter
Battle To Take Over Distillers, Wall St. J., Jan. 19, 1987, at 1, col. 1.
37 Cf. Dlugash v. SEC, 373 F.2d 107 (2d Cir. 1967) (organizer would repurchase
from broker at profit); In re Associated Investors Secs., Inc., 41 S.E.C. 160, 167-69
(1962) (promise to maintain successively higher market price).
38 E.g., Rustin & Putka, Merrill Lynch Unit Fires Two Executives In Risk Arbi-
trage for Violations of Policy, Wall St. J., Jan. 21, 1982, at 4, col. 2.
" E.g., SEC v. Guild Films Co., Inc., 279 F.2d 485 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S.
819 (1960); see also sources cited infra note 257.
10 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 2031 (1982) (estate tax); Treas. Reg. § 20.2031-2 (1986); see
llB BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS - FEDERAL TAXATION OF SECURITIES TRANSACTIONS §§
1.04-.05 (1987). Securities must be valued in order to determine wealth-transfer and
property taxes, income from exchanges and the basis of property acquired in ex-
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Presumably, drafters of contracts and statutes use market price as
a standard of value because they think that market price reflects
value, or at least that it cannot be controlled by someone trying to
avoid his or her obligations. 41 If, as stated in section 2(3) of the Act,
market prices are susceptible to manipulation and control, or if they
fluctuate suddenly and unreasonably, then they will be unsuitable
for use in governing conduct or in computing value.42 If in fact re-
ported prices do not reflect value or can be controlled, then those
who persist in defining contractual obligations by reference to mar-
ket prices and those subject to statutes or to regulatory schemes
that contemplate market efficiency and integrity will find that their
rights and obligations fluctuate in response to irrelevant influences. 4s
These contracts use future prices in order to set the precise terms
of obligations currently undertaken. Reported prices, and especially
changes in reported prices, may also induce people to act. As men-
tioned above, some investors search for and trade securities that
trade at a market price that they think does not correspond to its
true value. Investors who think that the market is wrong are almost
change for securities.
Security prices probably had a greater relevance to tax collections in 1934 than
they do now. James Bonbright wrote that "Federal income-tax cases... along with
those arising under the state and Federal death taxes, furnish the greatest mass of
legal precedents on the appraisal" of corporate stock. 2 J. BONBRIGHT, THE VALUATION
OF PROPERTY 1019 (1937). There was a federal tax on the capital stock of corporations
from 1916 until 1926, and market price was an important factor in valuing the capital
stock of corporations with actively traded common stock under the capital stock tax.
Id. at 577-95.
41 Many states deny shareholders appraisal rights in connection with fundamental
corporate changes if there is a public market for their stock, "apparently ... based
on the premise that [publicly traded stocks] are traded in an efficient market that
systematically values the stock in an accurate manner . . . ." Steinberg, Stock Ex-
change Exception to Appraisal and Its Ramifications for the Constitutionality of
State Takeover Statutes, 15 SEc. REG. L.J. 105, 105 (1987).
42 When no market is available or when the security is too thinly traded to ade-
quately indicate value, judicial, administrative or private valuation, formula valuation
or consensus mechanisms are substituted as measures of value. See generally J.
BISHOP & A. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL TAx VALUATION DIGEST (cum. ed. 1981); J. BON-
BRIGHT, supra note 40; F. H. O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS ch. 7 (1986). The imperfec-
tions of non-market methods of valuing securities have been widely noted. E.g. V.
BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 23, at 1-132; Levmore, supra note 31, at 656
("[V]aluation techniques that do not rely on market prices are notoriously arbi-
trary."); Roe, Bankruptcy and Debt: A New Model for Corporate Reorganization, 83
COLUM. L. REV. 527 (1982).
"2 See Hanna, supra note 20, at 15 ("The manipulated quotations ... are the basis
for bank loans, they are a guide to the appraisal of estates for tax and distributive
purposes.").
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always wrong themselves, 4 and accordingly the fact that so many
investors persist in trying to outguess the market is a matter of
some interest.45 Perhaps even more interesting are investors who
trade in response to changes in market prices, sometimes in studied
disregard of value. Some investors attempt to predict future prices
from past price changes.4 6 For example, when market prices are ris-
ing, some people buy simply because they think that prices will con-
tinue to rise.47 "[S]ecurities markets are unusual in that price rises
often attract buyers, while price declines attract sellers.
148
Finally, security prices may affect people who do not own or trade
securities at all. Substantial market-wide price declines are often
blamed for declines in the levels of employment and economic activ-
ity.49 Although changes in security prices are now usually seen as
results rather than as causes of changes in underlying business activ-
ity,50 many people still regard declining stock prices as a cause of
business contractions. When stock prices fell precipitously on ex-
changes and on over-the-counter markets on October 19, 1987, there
was widespread concern that the decline would result in a contrac-
tion of overall productive activity.5 1 Many still attribute the depres-
sion of the 1930s at least in part to the collapse of prices on the
4 See generally J. LORm, P. DODD & M. KIMPTON, supra note 23, at 73-76 (mutual
fund performance).
4' Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 622-26.
46 It appears that in fact prices move randomly and thus that the pattern of price
changes in the past cannot predict future changes. See generally J. LoRIE, P. DODD &
M. KiMPToN, supra note 23, at 55-65.
47 S. LEE & P. PASSELL, A NEw ECONOMIC VIEW OF AMERICAN HISTORY 365-67
(1979); see P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 74 (10th ed. 1976).
18 Poser, supra note 10, at 696 n.140; see also Friend, The SEC and the Economic
Performance of Securities Markets in ECONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF COR-
PORATE SECURITIES 185, 201 (H. Manne ed. 1969) [hereinafter ECONOMIC POLICY] (rea-
son for most trades during price movements is to trade with trend); Kryzanowski,
Misinformation and Security Markets, 24 McGmL L.J. 123, 125 (1978).
"1 Cf. Hanna, supra note 20, at 10 ("The hostile feeling toward stock markets is
always translated during depression into a demand for some kind of governmental
action.").
'0 E.g., P. SAMUELSON, supra note 47, at 75 ("It is reasonably clear that business
activity, national income, and corporate earnings determine stock prices and not vice
versa. . . ."). But see Galbraith, The 1929 Parallel, THE ATLANTIC, Jan. 1987, at 62.
51 E.g., Bennett, Who Gets Hurt?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 2; Gelman,
Does 1987 Equal 1929?, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 2 ("Yesterday, after a
plunge reminiscent of the worst days of 1929, the most pressing question was whether
the aftershocks would be as devastating to individuals and the nation at large."); N.Y.
Times, Oct. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 6 (headline: "Stocks Plunge 508 Points, A Drop of
22.6% ... Frenzied Trading Raises Fears of Recession").
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NYSE that began in 1929.52 During the 1930s, the market's crash
and whoever was responsible for it were even more widely blamed
for the Depression. In justifying federal control of the market with
the Depression, Section 2 of the Act merely repeats the popular
wisdom.
National emergencies, which produce widespread unemployment and
the dislocation of trade, transportation, and industry, and which bur-
den interstate commerce and adversely affect the general welfare, are
precipitated, intensified, and prolonged by manipulation and sudden
and unreasonable fluctuations of security prices and by excessive
speculation on such exchanges and markets .... 13
The Act should be read in the light of the terrible times in which it
was written. There is no doubt that the Act was enacted because
most people blamed the Depression on the speculative excesses of
the 1920s.
Even if stock market activity does not directly affect the amounts
of goods and services produced, security prices may influence the
types of goods and services produced, by virtue of their effect on the
allocation of capital."' It is often said that the most important thing
about securities markets is their influence in moving money from
savers to users.55 If security prices affect the cost of capital or other-
'1 J. GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 191 (3d ed. 1972) ("The role of the stock mar-
ket crash in the great tragedy of the thirties ... is one of respectable importance.")
S. LE & P. PASSELL, supra note 47, at 372-83 (1979) (decline in consumption result-
ing from decline in wealth resulting from decline in stock prices may have contrib-
uted to the Depression); Galbraith, supra note 50, at 64.
53The Act, § 2(4). See also id. at § 2(3) (price fluctuations cause unreasonable
expansion and contraction of the volume of credit available for trade, transportation
and industry).
4See generally J. VAN HORNE, FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT AND POLICY 560-65 (7th ed.
1986).
55 See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, THE STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY Vii (1965);
Friend, supra note 48, at 190 ("Traditionally, allocational efficiency has been re-
garded as the most important economic function performed by the securities markets
.... "); cf. Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis, Economic Theory and
the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031, 1034 (1977)
("[Slecurities regulation may harm the primary and socially useful economic function
of capital markets, which is the allocation of capital to its most productive uses.").
But see Stout, The Unimportance of Being Efficient: An Economic Analysis of Stock
Market Pricing and Securities Regulation, 87 MICH. L. REv. 613 (1988).
Although the protection of the pricing mechanism was the central goal of those who
enacted the Act, the allocation of capital is not mentioned in § 2. During the debate
over the Act little was made of the need to protect the capital-allocating function of
the stock market. But see J. KEYNES, supra note 28, at ch. 12; TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND, supra note 12, at 13-16, 21-25. References to allocational efficiency may have
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wise influence the investment decisions of security issuers, then any-
thing that influences security prices will also affect the allocation of
capital to the production of goods and services.
The availability of a trading market itself reduces the cost of capi-
tal to issuers selling securities to the public, since investors value the
liquidity that the market gives to their investments .5  The level of
public confidence in the integrity of the market influences the cost
of capital to businesses that raise capital in the market. Investors
will demand a premium for participating in volatile markets57 or in
markets in which they believe that others are better able to predict
future prices.58 Thus, the cost of raising money by selling securities
will increase with investor unease about price volatility and investor
suspicion that the market is a rigged game. Reducing this unease
will reduce the cost of raising money in the market. Reformers made
a great deal of the need to restore investor confidence in the markets
in the wake of the 1929 crash,59 and the restoration of confidence
was an important goal of the Act."0 Although section 2 of the Act
does not mention investor confidence specifically, it characterizes
the Act as a measure "to insure the maintenance of fair and honest
markets" and it repeats the popular belief that stock prices are sus-
ceptible to manipulation, control, and unreasonable fluctuation. 1
The price at which a security trades may affect the business prac-
tices of its issuer. To the extent that firms raise capital by selling
securities, capital will flow to firms with relatively high security
prices. This direct impact may be relatively unimportant since most
businesses seldom issue new securities,62 but the market price of a
been infrequent because few issuers were raising capital in 1934 or because the termi-
nology was not then in wide use. See Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflec-
tions on Investment Management Treatises, 94 HARv. L. REv. 561, 571 n.28 (1981)
("Perhaps the typical legislator voting for the securities laws would have formulated
his objective as that of promoting 'honest' securities markets, rather than in today's
jargon, 'efficient capital markets.' But I think that my revision is more terminological
than substantive.").
56 Cf. K. GARBADE, supra note 23, at 1; Berle, supra note 28, at 266-67 ("IT]he
function of the market is to supply... liquidity.").
'7 Donnelly, Efficient-Market Theorists Are Puzzled by Recent Gyrations in Stock
Market, Wall St. J., Oct. 23, 1987, at 7, col. 1 (comments of Fischer Black). See gen-
erally R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 23, at ch. 8.
5 K GARBADE, supra note 23, at 476-78 (bid-ask spread in block trades).
59 Seligman, supra note 23, at 51-52.
60 Cf. Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 555 (1982) ("The [Exchange] Act was
adopted to restore investors' confidence in the financial markets ....
61 The Act, § 2(3).
62 See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHMELSTEIN, supra note 23, at 516 n."d;" R. JENNINGS &
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security may influence the investment decisions of its issuer's man-
agers even if they do not intend to issue more securities. Although
the extent to which managers are concerned with shareholder inter-
est is a much debated question, managers may cancel or avoid
projects that will reduce the market price of the firm's securities."3
And if holders feel that a security's price is low relative to its poten-
tial earnings, they may force management to change investment
practices in order to realize those earnings. 4
If security prices do, as discussed above, influence issuer invest-
ment decisions, and if security prices accurately reflect the profit-
ability of their issuers, then capital will flow to profitable issuers and
profitable issuers will expand operations. Assuming that profitable
issuers are efficient producers, this will be for the greater good of
society. Capital will flow to those who will use it best and the cost of
production will be minimized. On the other hand, if price does not
accurately reflect issuer profitability, then capital will be allocated
poorly and production will be accomplished inefficiently.6 5
B. Protecting the Public Interest in Security Prices and the
Meaning of Manipulation
Reported security prices may well be viewed as nothing more than
the record of transactions undertaken on the market by self-inter-
ested traders. Even if market prices affect employment levels, the
H. MARSH, SECURITIES REGULATION 1-2 (6th ed. 1987); Meltzer, On Efficiency and
Regulation of the Securities Industry in ECONOMIC POLICY, supra note 48, at 217,
219-20.
" See generally J. VAN HORNE, supra note 54, at chs. 7 & 8; Rappaport, Stock
Market Signals to Managers, HARv. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1987, at 57.
1 V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 23, at 592, 830-43 (tender offers to
displace management); R. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
371-86 (1986).
"' Regulation of the markets rests on stronger ground if securities markets do not
serve to allocate capital well. If security transactions produce wealth or lead to the
efficient allocation of resources then the suffering of those who make bad deals serves
a good end, and any effort to ameliorate their suffering risks harming society by ren-
dering ineffective a valuable institution that allocates capital perfectly. See Hier-
onymous, Manipulation in Commodity Trading: Toward a Definition, 6 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 40, 52-53 (1977) (exchange-imposed settlement prices in congested commodity
markets are manipulative); cf. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65-69 (2d ed.
1977). If the efficient allocation of capital is not a by-product of an unregulated mar-
ket in securities, then society has little to lose from interfering with the market in
response to the pleas of those who have lost money. One might conclude that a secur-
ities market that does not benefit society should be closed. See J. KEYNES, supra note
28, at 159 ("It is usually agreed that casinos should, in the public interest, be inacces-
sible and expensive.").
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allocation of capital or the investment decisions of managers, it is
not at all clear that the SEC would be able to protect jobs or im-
prove the quality of investment by intervention in the market.
Nonetheless, the Act reflects a congressional judgment that federal
intervention is necessary and appropriate. The wisdom of such in-
tervention is thus not a question open to courts reviewing SEC ac-
tions under section 10(b) of the Act. The way in which the SEC
intervenes is another matter. Courts appropriately ask whether in
intervening, the SEC is acting within the authority that Congress
gave it, and that question is not easily answered by reference to sec-
tion 10(b) or to the statement of purpose in section 2.
Congress could have addressed the public concern about the se-
curities markets and market prices in the 1930s by closing the ex-
changes or by regulating them. There was talk of shutting down the
stock market in the early 1930s, but all of the influential partici-
pants in the debate over the Act preferred that the country continue
to rely on the market to set security prices. However, although se-
curity prices were to be set on the market, it was to be a regulated
market.
The Court has concluded that the Act is basically nothing more
than a complicated scheme to require issuers to disclose relevant in-
formation. This is in keeping with most contemporary discussions of
securities regulation, which begin from the assumption that security
prices are a function of information and focus on some problem in
the regulation of the flow of information.66 These discussions are
usually informed by the substantial evidence which indicates that it
is impossible to profit by trading on the basis of publicly available
information, and thus that market prices reflect all publicly availa-
ble information that is relevant to price.67 The Act cannot be ex-
plained fully in terms of information or disclosure, however, and the
insistence on doing so has resulted in an inappropriately narrow
reading of the scope of section 10(b).
Most of the substantive provisions of the Act have nothing to do
with full disclosure. It would be surprising if they did. After the de-
bacle of 1929 there was little confidence in stock market institutions.
People trying to correct market failures that they saw as the cause
of the depression would hardly have been satisfied with nothing
more than a prescription of full disclosure. Few suggested that the
crash would have been avoided had investors been better in-
"6 Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 549-53; Levmore, supra note 31, at 645
n.1.
67 See generally P. LoRiE, S. DODD & M KIMPTON, supra note 23, at 55-87.
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formed. 8 Influential commentators criticized the Securities Act of
1933, which is a disclosure statute, as soon as it was adopted, on the
ground that full disclosure was not enough to protect the interests of
investors and the public in the proper functioning of the stock
market. 9
The Act was addressed to the problem of speculation and the dis-
location thought to attend stock market cycles.70 All of the provi-
sions enacted in 1934 are directed at conduct that was at the time
thought to influence security prices. The Act deals with almost eve-
rything that affects the prices at which securities trade on ex-
changes, including the development of public opinion, the transla-
tion of public opinion into trading decisions, the matching of trading
decisions in completed transactions and the publication of the prices
at which these transactions occur.
Several provisions of the Act, including the reporting provisions of
section 13, regulate the pricing process by regulating the flow of in-
formation that will affect investors' expectations about the income
that securities will produce. These provisions do not require full dis-
closure, however. They do not require disclosure of all material in-
formation, they do not all require disclosure of the information with
which they are concerned, and they even make it illegal to tell the
truth about some things. More to the point, other provisions of the
Act do not have anything to do with information. They reflect a con-
cern with the effect that trading itself has on price.
If section 10(b) shares with the rest of the Act the purpose of
curbing excessive speculation, then the Court has given it an unduly
narrow reading. Redefining or rediscovering the purpose of the Act
is not a real solution to the problem of defining the SEC's authority
to intervene in the market, though. In the end, any construction of
section 10(b) grounded on a statutory philosophy or on a fundamen-
tal purpose will depend on the philosophy and purpose of the person
construing the statute.
In hard cases, the end that a statute is intended to accomplish
11 There is an ongoing debate about whether issuers had to be compelled to dis-
close information or whether by 1933 they were now willing to do so voluntarily, but
even those who conclude compulsion was necessary do not argue its earlier adoption
would have prevented the depression. See generally Seligman, supra note 23.
"' 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1982). Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REy.
(n.s.) 521 (1934); Douglas & Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YAE L.J.
171 (1933); Jennings, Mr. Justice Douglas: His Influence on Corporate and Securi-
ties Regulation, 73 YALE L.J. 920, 928-31 (1964); ef. Berle, High Finance: Master or
Servant, 23 YALE REv. (n.s.) 20 (1933) (speculative markets).
70 H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 5 LEGISLATV HiSTORY,
supra note 11, item 18, at 6.
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may be a good interpretive guide. This is surely so in the case of a
statutory provision as vague as section 10(b). 71 The SEC should con-
sider the reasons for the Act's enactment in deciding whether to
bring an action or promulgate a rule under the section. Nonetheless,
identifying the problems that Congress wanted solved when it en-
acted section 10(b) only shows what the SEC is supposed to use its
power for. It cannot show what that power is. Section 10(b) itself
states its end - the SEC is to protect investors and the public.
Honest people disagree about what is in the public interest of
course, and this statutory goal hardly limits the range of protective
actions that the SEC can use. Almost any rule can be justified as
insuring full disclosure or protecting the public from excessive
speculation."2
However well it is known, the purpose of a grant of administrative
discretion cannot alone define the scope of that discretion. The key
to understanding the SEC's role under section 10(b) is to identify
both the task that Congress gave to the SEC and what Congress
authorized the SEC to do in order to accomplish its task. Once
again, the language of the section is not very helpful. The SEC is to
accomplish the section's ends by regulating the use of "manipulative
or deceptive devices and contrivances." A great deal of conduct can
be said to qualify as a deceptive device or contrivance. No one seems
to doubt that a lie is a deceptive device or contrivance, and before
the Court spoke to the issue several lower courts had acted as
though a negligent misrepresentation was also one.7 3 The word "ma-




The Court has responded to the almost limitless potential of the
71 See Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & ECON.
7, 7 (1966); Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term - Foreword: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. R.v. 4, 15 (1984); Fuller & Perdue, The Reli-
ance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 52 (1936); see also Macey, Pro-
moting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory Interpretation: An Interest
Group Model, 86 COLUm L. REv. 223 (1986).
712 Cf. NAACP v. FPC, 425 U.S. 662, 669 (1976) ("public interest" takes meaning
from purposes of statute).
73 See, e.g., SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979), rev'd, 446 U.S. 680 (1980);
SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976); Hochfelder v. Ernst
& Ernst, 503 F.2d 1100, 1104 (7th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 425 U.S. 185 (1976); White v.
Abrams, 495 F.2d 724, 730 (9th Cir. 1974).
' The Court itself has noted that the word does not always carry the connotation
of deception. Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 7 n.4; see Fiflis, Of Lollipops and Law - A
Proposal for a National Policy Concerning Tender Offer Defenses, 19 U.C. DAVIs L.
REv. 303, 321 (1986) ("stultifying faux pas"); Poser, supra note 10, at 683 n.68.
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language of section 10(b) by delineating the SEC's role in terms of
candor. It has defined both the purpose and the method of the Act
as full disclosure. The Court has not examined the substantive pro-
visions of the Act in determining the tools available to the SEC
under section 10(b), any more than it examined section 2 in defining
the purpose of the Act. In fact, the Court has defined the method of
the Act by reference to disclosure, which it takes to be the Act's
purpose. This is unfortunate, for the substantive provisions of the
Act make it clear that Congress intended to authorize the SEC to do
much more than perfect a regime of full disclosure.
Section 10(b) was the only original provision of the Act that made
conduct illegal on the basis of its being manipulative. It is impossi-
ble to determine what the word manipulative means by reading sec-
tion 10(b) alone. Since 1934, the federal securities statutes have
been amended to proscribe manipulation in a variety of contexts,"5
"' Section 15(c) was added to the Act in 1936. Act of May 27, 1936, ch. 462, § 3, 49
Stat. 1375, 1377 (current version at § 15(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1)). It forbad bro-
kers and dealers to effect or induce OTC transactions "by means of any manipulative,
deceptive, or other fraudulent device or contrivance," and directed the SEC to "de-
fine such devices or contrivances as are manipulative, deceptive, or otherwise
fraudulent."
Section 15(c) was amended in 1938 as part of the Maloney Act, which provided the
framework under which the NASD operates. The amendment forbad brokers and
dealers to engage "in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative act or practice, or
make any fictitious quotation" in connection with an OTC transaction. The SEC was
directed to "define, and prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent, such acts
and practices as are fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative." Act of June 25, 1938, ch.
677, § 2, 52 Stat. 1070, 1075 (current version at § 15(c)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2)).
In 1960, § 206(4) was added to the Investment Advisers Act. Act of Sept. 13, 1960,
Pub. L. No. 86-750, § 9, 74 Stat. 885, 887 (codified in the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(4)).
The amendment applied substantially the language of the 1938 Amendment to § 15
of the Act to investment advisers.
In 1968 the Williams Act added § 14(e) to the Act. Pub. L. No. 90-439, § 3, 82 Stat.
454, 457 (for the current version, see 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)). Section 14(e) makes it un-
lawful to engage in any fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or practice in con-
nection with a tender offer. The Williams Act also made it illegal for issuers with
equity securities registered under the Act to repurchase their equity securities in con-
travention of such rules as the SEC might adopt to define or to prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent acts and practices which are fraudulent, deceptive or
manipulative. § 2, 82 Stat. at 454-55 (codified in § 13(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78m(e)(1)).
In 1970, § 14(e) was amended to direct the SEC to define and prescribe means
reasonably designed to prevent such acts and practices. Pub. L. No. 91-567, § 5, 84
Stat. 1497, 1497-98 (codified in § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e)). The same year § 17(j) was
added to the Investment Company Act. Investment Company Amendments Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-547, § 9(c), 84 Stat. 1413, 1421 (codified in § 17(j), 15 U.S.C. §§
80a-17(j)). Section 17(j) makes it illegal for an affiliate of an investment company to
engage in any act, practice or course of business in connection with his or her trades
in securities held or proposed to be acquired by the investment company in contra-
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but these amendments do not shed much light on section 10(b). The
word may not even mean the same thing in every place that it ap-
pears in these statutes. 6 For example, it seems particularly inappro-
priate to give the word the same meaning in section 14(e), which
makes manipulative conduct illegal, as one would give to it in sec-
tion 10(b), under which nothing is illegal unless it contravenes an
SEC rule. Presumably only unmanageable misconduct is contem-
plated by the term "manipulative" in section 14(e), or Congress
would not have outlawed it. However, it seems that a broader range
of conduct, including some innocent - if not innocuous - conduct,
is contemplated by the term in section 10(b), or Congress would
have outlawed the use of all manipulative devices itself rather than
leaving it to the SEC to decide which ones to regulate and how to do
so. Moreover, the rule-dependence of section 10(b) serves to insure
that an expert agency will define the section's effective scope,
whereas the scope of section 14(e) will be determined primarily by
the decisions of private litigants and the courts,77 which are beyond
vention of such rules as the SEC adopts to define and prescribe means reasonably
necessary to prevent acts, practices or courses of business that are fraudulent, decep-
tive or manipulative.
The 1975 amendments to the Act added § 6(b)(5), which provides that an exchange
shall not be registered unless the SEC determines that its regulations are designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices. Securities Acts Amendments
of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 4, 89 Stat. 97, 104-05 (codified in § 6(b)(5), 15 U.S.C. §
78f(b)(5)). The 1975 amendments also added § 11A(c)(1)(A), which forbids regulated
persons to transmit information about securities transactions in contravention of such
regulations as the SEC shall prescribe to prevent the distribution of fraudulent, de-
ceptive or manipulative information with respect to transactions. § 7, 89 Stat. at 114-
15 (codified in § 11A(c)(1)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(c)(1)(A)). They also required the
SEC to establish a Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board with rules designed to
prevent fraudulent and manipulative acts and practices, § 13, 89 Stat. at 131-37
(codified in § 15B(b)(2)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-4(b)(2)(C)), and extended the proscrip-
tions of §§ 15(c)(1) and (2) to municipal security dealers, § 11, 89 Stat. at 125-26
(codified in the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1),(2)).
7' The language enacted in these amendments and the record of their adoption
provides evidence to support almost any reading of the word manipulative. For exam-
ple the language of § 15(c)(1) of the Act, first adopted in 1936, suggests that manipu-
lative devices are a subgroup of fraudulent devices. The language of § 15(c)(2) of the
Act, first adopted in 1938, is closer to that of §§ 10(b) and 14(e) of the Act, and
suggests that manipulation and fraud are distinct problems. See generally J. SFLI-
MAm, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL ST 138-44, 183-89 (1982) (1936 and 1938
amendments). The 1975 amendments employed the language of both sections to regu-
late municipal securities dealers. See infra note 114.
7 See Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 12 ("Inviting judges to read the term 'manipulative'
with their own sense of what constitutes 'unfair' or 'artificial' conduct would inject
uncertainty into the tender offer process.").
No. 2:359]
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW
the controls of Congress and the SEC.78 In any case, the considera-
tions of fair notice that indicate a narrow reading of open-ended
terms in section 14(e) and perhaps in SEC rules are not so compel-
ling when interpreting an enabling provision like section 10(b).79
A good guide to the meaning of the word manipulative in section
10(b) is available from sections 9 and 10(a) of the Act, which were
enacted in 1934 along with section 10(b).80 Sections 9 and 10 are
entitled "Prohibition against manipulation of security prices" and
"Regulation of the use of manipulative and deceptive devices," re-
spectively. Congress labeled the practices that it addressed in these
sections as manipulative, and taken together the two sections give
the word meaning for the purpose of construing section 10(b). 1
" The requirement of administrative action in § 10(b) of the Act made it unneces-
sary for the Court to focus on the meaning of manipulative in its Rule 10b-5 cases, in
which manipulation was never thought to be in issue. Those who feel that the Rule
10b-5 cases should not govern the interpretation of § 14(e) have emphasized the off-
hand treatment of manipulation in those cases. Fiflis, supra note 74, at 312-22; Note,
Target Defensive Tactics as Manipulative Under Section 14(e), 84 COLUM. L. REV.
228, 246 (1984). The lack of administrative guidance in the development of § 14(e)
was underscored by the SEC's failure to participate as amicus curiae in Schreiber.
" See Schreiber, 472 U.S. at 8 ("the term 'manipulative' provides ... guidance to
those who must determine which types of acts are reached by the statute"); cf. §
32(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78ff ("no person shall be subject to imprisonment under this sec-
tion for the violation of any rule or regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge
of such rule or regulation.").
80 Section 9(f) of the Act, was amended and § 9(g) of the Act, id., was added as
part of the 1982 SEC-CFTC jurisdictional accord. Securities-Commodities Accord
Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-303, § 3, 96 Stat. 1409. This part of the accord
expanded the SEC's authority over options.
81 The Court has looked to § 9 of the Act, to define manipulation. E.g. Santa Fe,
430 U.S. at 476; Hochfelder, 425 U.S. at 201-07; see also Poser, supra note 10, at 700-
11 (§ 9(a)(1)-(5) as source of meaning). The legislative history of the Act and § 10(b)
is beyond the scope of this article, but it is fair to say that §§ 9 and 10 were usually
treated as related in the debate over the Act. But see 5 A. JACOBs, LITIGATION AND
PRACTICE UNDER RULE 1OB-5 § 5.01, at 1-176 n.14 (2d ed. 1987) (legislative history
uninformative on relationship between §§ 9 and 10). An index listing most references
to §8 9 and 10 in the hearings on the Act is contained in 4 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 11, at xv and xvii.
It seems settled that conduct with respect to OTC securities that would violate §
9(a) if it involved exchange-registered securities violates Rule 10b-5 and § 15(c)(1).
The reasoning is usually that manipulated prices are somehow misleading, but there
seems to be a sense that § 15(c)(1) and Rule 10b-5 incorporate the proscriptions of §
9(a). See SEC v. Resch-Cassin & Co., Inc., 362 F. Supp. 964, 975 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) ("It
is well settled that the manipulative activities expressly prohibited by § 9(a)(2) with
respect to a listed security are also violations of § 17(a) of the Securities Act and §
10(b) of the Act when the same activities are conducted with respect to an over-the-
counter security."); In re Barrett & Co., 9 SEC 319, 328-30 (1941); cf. Crane Co. v.
Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787, 792-99 (2d Cir. 1969) (manipulation and
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Sections 9 and 10, like the rest of the Act, contemplate extensive
regulation of the market toward the end of protecting the public
from speculative and manipulative conduct. Section 9 starts by de-
claring a variety of trading practices and communications unlawful
if they are motivated by certain purposes or have certain conse-
quences."2 The rest of sections 9 and 10 make it unlawful to do a
variety of things in contravention of SEC rules.83 Section 9 gives the
SEC the authority to regulate stabilizing transactions and the use of
exchange facilities in connection with options." Section 10(a) gives
the SEC the authority to regulate short sales of exchange-registered
securities and the use of stop-loss orders on such securities. Finally,
there is section 10(b).
Part IH of this article discusses section 10(b) and related provi-
sions of the Act in the context of four broad categories of activity
that may influence security prices in ways that damage the public:
the business activities of security issuers, the dissemination of infor-
mation, speculative trading, and disruptive trading. Before proceed-
failure to disclose it), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970). See generally 3 L. Loss, SE-
cuRrrms REGULATION, supra note 8, at 1563-68; Bloomenthal, The Case of the Subtle
Motive and the Delicate Art - Control and Domination in Over-the-Counter Secur-
ities Markets, 1960 DUKE L.J. 196 (1960); Jacobs, Regulation of Manipulation by
SEC Rule 10b-5, 18 N.Y.L.. 511 (1973); Hirshowitz, Proof of a Manipulation of the
Market of a Security Traded Over-the-Counter (April 1, 1965) (memorandum availa-
ble in SEC library). It might be argued that Congress intended the SEC to have
power under § 10(b) to extend the proscriptions of § 9 of the Act to OTC securities,
regardless of whether those proscriptions related to manipulative or deceptive devices
or contrivances. Cf. Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1361-
62 (N.D. Tex. 1979); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 8, at 998 n.75; Karjala,
supra note 5, at 1483-84; Poser, supra note 10, at 706-07. However, there is no indica-
tion of this in the legislative history, and as originally enacted, § 15 gave the SEC
more than ample authority to accomplish regulation of the OTC market.
82 Each of the subparts of § 9(a) is limited by its terms to exchange-registered
securities. Section 9 was not amended in 1964 when § 12 of the Act was amended to
require issuers to register most publicly traded securities with the SEC. Securities
Act Amendments of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-467, § 3(c), 78 Stat. 565, 566-68 (codified in
§ 12(g), at § 78 (1982)). When the Act was first enacted, § 9(f) provided that § 9 did
not apply to exempt securities, but now exempt securities are subject to all of § 9
except § 9(a).
3 Section 9(e), provides that any person who willfully participates in any act or
transaction in violation of §§ 9(a)-(c) is liable to any person who traded any security
at a price affected by the violation for "the damages sustained as a result of... such
act or transaction."
" Sections 9 (b)-(d), which give the SEC the authority to regulate the guaranteeing
of options by exchange members and the use of exchange facilities to effect options
transactions. Section 9(g), added in 1982, expands the SEC's authority to regulate
option trading. See supra note 81.
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ing to that discussion, it may be useful to examine in some detail the
way in which the Court has defined the word manipulative in sec-
tion 10(b).
II. THE SUPREME COURT AND THE SCOPE OF SECTION 10(b)
Rule 10b-5 has become the most important provision of the secur-
ities laws."5 Although it is entitled "Employment of Manipulative
and Deceptive Devices," the rule speaks in terms of fraud.86 The
word manipulative does not appear in the rule except in its title,
and the closest that the rule comes to reaching conduct that might
not be deceptive is to make it unlawful to engage in any act, practice
or course of business that operates as a fraud. Most discussion about
the reach of the rule have been framed in terms of the law of fraud,
and controversies over the rule's scope have centered on the ques-
tion of whether to free the rule from various constraints of tradi-
tional fraud doctrine.
Rule 10b-5 was not enacted by Congress. It was prescribed by the
SEC and has the force of law only because the Act authorized the
SEC to promulgate it. Although recently the SEC has tried to ob-
scure the source of its authority to promulgate rules, the sanction of
section 10(b) is the foundation for the tremendous body of law that
has grown up around Rule 10b-5. The sanction of section 10(b) may
be critical to any effective SEC regulation of the market . 7 Most dis-
cussion of section 10(b) has been in connection with Rule 10b-5,ss
85 11A Pt. 1 BusINss ORGANIZATIONS - FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT v
(A.A. Sommer, gen. ed. 1987) (Rule 10b-5 "has been the basis for more litigation than
all other sections of the federal securities laws taken together."). See generally A.
BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS, supra note 8; A. JACOBS, supra note 81.
86 The rule is modeled on § 17 of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1982),
which is entitled "Fraudulent Interstate Transactions."
87 See, e.g., Short Sales in Connection with a Public Offering, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 26,028, [Current] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,315 at 89,385 (Aug. 25,
1988); Proposed Rule 10b-21 on Short Sales in Connection with a Public Offering,
Exchange Act Release No. 24,485, [1987] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,127 at 88,683
n. 19 (May 20, 1987); Adoption of Amendments to Rule 10b-6, Exchange Act Release
No. 24,003, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 84,055 at 88,415-
16 (Jan. 16, 1987); cf. Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1, 45-46 (1977)
(SEC suggests that it promulgated Rule 10b-6 under § 9(a)(6), as well as under §
10(b)). Compare Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One
Common Share, One Vote Controversy, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 687, 714-19 (1986)
with Dent, Dual Class Capitalization: A Reply to Professor Seligman, 54 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 725, 726-37 (1986) (power to forbid trading in common stock with unequal
voting rights).
" There was a great deal of discussion of stock market manipulation and its treat-
ment in the Act around the time of the Act's adoption, but very little was said about
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and perhaps because the rule principally addresses deception, sec-
tion 10(b) has usually been discussed in terms of deception.""
The Court has explored the scope of section 10(b) in a series of
important opinions involving alleged violations of Rule 10b-5. In
each of these cases the Court concluded that section 10(b) did not
authorize the SEC to regulate the challenged conduct. The Court
assumed in each case that if the challenged conduct fell within the
scope of section 10(b), it was because it was deceptive. The Court
did not ignore manipulation, though. It repeatedly supported its
narrow construction of the section by citing the sinister connotation
that it found implicit in the word manipulative. The language that
the Court used in doing so suggested that the word has no indepen-
dent significance in section 10(b).
The plaintiffs in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder" contended that an
accounting firm was liable to them under Rule lOb-5 for aiding and
abetting a fraudulent securities scheme perpetrated by the president
§ 10(b), beyond an occasional mention of its vague and potentially broad language.
See generally J. FLYNN, SECURITY SPECULATION (1934); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND,
INC., supra note 12; (1935); Berle, supra note 28; Berle, Stock Market Manipulation,
38 COLUM. L. REv. 393 (1938); Hanna, supra note 20; Hanna & Turlington, supra note
20; Herlands, Criminal Law Aspects of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 21 VA.
L. REV. 139i 153-64, 177-80 (1934); Mathias, Manipulative Practices and the Securi-
ties Exchange Act (pts. 1 & 2), 2 U. Pirr. L. REv. 7, 104 (1936); Moore & Wiseman,
supra note 28; Seligman, supra note 23, at 25-31; Tracy & MacChesney, supra note
13; Note, Illegality of Stock Market Manipulation, 34 COLUM. L. REV. 500 (1934);
Comment, Market Manipulation and the Securities Exchange Act, 46 YALE L.J. 624
[hereinafter Comment] (1937); see also Note, Manipulation of the Stock Markets
Under the Securities Laws, 99 U. PA. L. REv. 651 (1951); Comment, Regulation of
Stock Market Manipulation, 56 YALE L.J. 509 (1947).
Until recently there has been very little discussion of the SEC's authority to regu-
late manipulation under § 10(b) of the Act. Cf. supra note 10. Several commentators
have described manipulative practices in the over-the-counter market and their regu-
lation under Rule 10b-5 and § 15(c), but most of this commentary was written when
Rule 10b-5 was being accorded wide scope and the problem of authority was not so
pressing. See infra note 120. There has been a great deal of discussion of the meaning
of manipulation in the context of statutory provisions that of themselves forbid ma-
nipulation of commodities markets, see infra notes 311-19 and accompanying text,
and in connection with tender offers, see infra note 40.
11 Section 10(b) does not explicitly authorize the SEC to promulgate rules. It sim-
ply makes it unlawful to employ any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance
in contravention of such rules as the SEC may prescribe. While 15 U.S.C. § 78w au-
thorizes the SEC to make rules necessary to execute the functions vested in it by the
Act, it is conventional to treat § 10(b) as conferring authority on the SEC to regulate
manipulative and deceptive devices and contrivances. E.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S.
680, 687-88 (1980).
90 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
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of a brokerage firm that it audited. The plaintiffs alleged that if the
accountants had conducted their audits properly, they would have
reported certain irregularities to the SEC and to the Midwest Stock
Exchange, which would have investigated and discovered the
scheme.9 The Court held that "a private cause of action for dam-
ages will [not] lie under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 in the absence of any
allegation of 'scienter' - intent to deceive, manipulate, or de-
fraud.19 2 Writing for the Court, Justice Powell consciously focused
on section 10(b) rather than on Rule lOb-5. He explained that the
SEC does not have the power to make law but has only the power to
effectuate the will of Congress as expressed in the statute. He rea-
soned that if Congress had intended the SEC's authority to extend
beyond such misconduct, then the statute would not speak "so spe-
cifically in terms of manipulation and deception, and of implement-
ing devices and contrivances - the commonly understood terminol-
ogy of intentional wrongdoing.""
This much of the Court's opinion might have had little impact on
the regulation of manipulation under section 10(b). Most of the non-
deceptive conduct that the SEC has undertaken to regulate under
section 10(b) probably qualifies as intentional misconduct.9 ' How-
ever, in response to the argument of the SEC amicus curiae brief,
that the language of section 10(b) should be read broadly since Con-
gress was concerned with ends and not means, Justice Powell wrote
'1 425 U.S. at 190. The principal irregularity was the rule that only the president of
the brokerage firm could open mail addressed to his or her attention.
92 Id. at 193.
3 Id. at 212-14; see also id. at 197. Justice Powell had emphasized the controlling
importance of the language of § 10(b) earlier in his concurring opinion in Blue Chip
Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975), where the Court, explicitly relying
upon policy considerations, limited standing to sue for violations of Rule 10b-5 to
buyers and sellers. Justice Powell felt the result was compelled by the language of §
10(b) of the Act, 421 U.S. at 756-57. See generally 1 A. BROMBERG & L. LOWENFELS,
supra note 8, § 2.1, at 2:11 to :12.
The dissenting opinion in Blue Chip Stamps treated false statements as a type of
manipulation, characterizing the conduct alleged of the defendants, an overly con-
servative prospectus designed to discourage offerees from buying, as "a deceptive and
manipulative scheme designed . . . to enhance the value of [the defendants'] own
shares in the subsequent offering." 421 U.S. at 762; see also id. at 770 ("no reason for
denying standing to sue to plaintiffs. . . injured by novel forms of manipulation").
'4 However, in some instances it may not. For example, the SEC has relied at least
in part on its § 10(b) power in promulgating Rules 10b-4, 10b-7 and 10b-18, which
regulate short tendering, stabilizing transactions and issuer repurchases respectively.
These practices are not necessarily wrongful. See infra notes 266-82, 296-304 and ac-
companying text; cf. the Act, §§ 13(e)(1)and 14(e), 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e)(1) and 78n(e)
(authority to prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent manipulative practices);
Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. at 11 n.11 (1985) (discussing § 14(e)).
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that Congress'
[u]se of the word 'manipulative' is especially significant. It is and was
virtually a term of art when used in connection with securities mar-
kets. It connotes intentional or willful conduct designed to deceive or
defraud investors by controlling or artificially affecting the price of
securities.95
By this narrow definition, made on the authority of the dictionary,
the Court deprived the word manipulative of any independent sig-
nificance. Manipulative is a term of art now, but it encompasses
only a few trading practices that are independently prohibited by
other provisions of the Act and by stock exchange rules and that the
SEC could forbid as deceptive devices even if it had no power over
manipulative ones.96
The Court focused on the statute again in Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green,9 7 when in the context of a challenge by minority
shareholders to a short-form merger it held that more than a breach
of fiduciary duty must be shown in order to establish a violation of
Rule 10b-5 and section 10(b).9 8 It was "readily apparent" to the
Court that a short-form merger that treats cashed-out shareholders
unfairly is not manipulative within the meaning of section 10(b). 9
The Court volunteered that interpreting the term "manipulative" in
section 10(b) "in this technical sense of artificially affecting market
activity in order to mislead investors - is fully consistent with the
fundamental purpose of the 1934 Act 'to substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.' "1
By 1980, through force of repetition, deception had been made
into an element of manipulation. In Chiarella v. United States,10 1
the Court reversed a printer's conviction for violating section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5. The printer deciphered the identity of several take-
o 425 U.S. at 199.
96 See, e.g., Pin v. Texaco, Inc., 793 F.2d 1448 (5th Cir. 1986) (sanctions imposed
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 for alleging manipulation without alleging misrepresenta-
tion). Cf. Levine, Mathews & Callcott, The Carpenter-Winans Case, 21 REV. SEC. &
COMMODITIEs REG, 55, 61-62 (1988).
- 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977) ("the language of the statute must control the interpre-
tation of the Rule").
" The Court accepted the district court's finding that all relevant information had
been disclosed to the minority shareholders, 430 U.S. at 474.
99 430 U.S. at 476.
100 430 U.S. at 477, quoting Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128,
151 (1972), quoting SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963).
101 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
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over targets from documents that he had handled, bought stock in
the target companies, and then sold the stock after the takeover at-
tempts were announced and the stock price had risen. Holding that
silence is not actionable under section 10(b) absent a duty to
speak, 02 the Court reversed the conviction because the jury had
been instructed that it could find the defendant guilty even if he did
no more than trade without first disclosing material non-public in-
formation in his possession.103 The decision could have rested on the
language of Rule lOb-5, which by its terms deals with actual and
constructive fraud, but of course the Court did not limit itself to the
rule. Chiarella followed Hochfelder in emphasizing the statute,104
but unlike Hochfelder it did not focus on the statute's language.
Manipulation disappeared from the statute. "Section 10(b) is de-
scribed as a catchall provision, but what it catches must be
fraud. ,"10 5
The Court extended Hochfelder's scienter requirement to actions
brought by the SEC in another important 1980 opinion, Aaron v.
SEC.106 The majority recognized that the reasoning of Hochfelder
compelled this result, and its opinion does not belabor the point.107
Nonetheless, three Justices dissented from "the Court's technical
linguistic analysis."108 It was "quite unclear" to them that the words
"manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" in section 10(b)
connote knowing or intentional misconduct.109
The Rule 10b-5 opinions played an important role in defining the
SEC's power to regulate manipulation, but they did not confront the
issue directly. The first securities cases in which courts recognized
that the meaning of the term manipulative was of controlling signifi-
cance arose under section 14(e) of the Act.110 Section 14(e) forbids
101 Id. at 235.
103 Id. at 236.
104 Id. at 226.
o Id. at 234-35; see also id. at 226 ("Section 10(b) was designed as a catchall
clause to prevent fraudulent practices."). But see id. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
("I think [Chiarella's] brand of manipulative trading ... lies close to the heart of
what the securities laws are intended to prohibit.").
101 Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680 (1980).
107 Id. at 689-91, 694. Most of rest of the opinion deals with other matters
presented by the case, including the scienter requirement for actions under § 17(a) of
the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982), and the argument that
Hochfelder should not apply to requests for equitable relief.
o 446 U.S. at 715.
109 Id. at 705. The dissenting opinion focused on the meaning of the word device,
which figured prominently in the majority's analysis of § 17(a) of the Act. Id. at 695-
96 (majority), 707-08 (dissent).
110 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e). The meaning of manipulation has long been acknowledged
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the employment of manipulative devices in connection with tender
offers. While nothing violates section 10(b) unless it contravenes an
SEC rule, any manipulative conduct in connection with a tender of-
fer violates section 14(e). In Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co.111 a
tender offeror challenged the propriety of options on valuable corpo-
rate assets that the target had granted to a friendly suitor in order
to defeat the tender offer. The Sixth Circuit concluded that exercise
of the options should have been enjoined, reasoning that the options
were manipulative, and thus that they violated section 14(e), be-
cause they effectively set a ceiling on the price of the target's
stock.112
Mobil attracted a great deal of attention.11 3 It did not attract a
following in other courts however, 4 and the Court finally repudi-
ated its reasoning in Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc.'15 In
Schreiber the Court held that rescinding a hostile tender offer and
replacing it with a negotiated offer was not a manipulative act even
though target shareholders who tendered in response to the original
offer would have received more had it not been rescinded. The
Court refused to read "the phrase 'fraudulent, deceptive, or manipu-
lative acts or practices' to include acts which, although fully dis-
as a problem in commodities law. See infra notes 311-19 and accompanying text.
669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 982 (1982).
112 669 F.2d at 374-75.
Is E.g., Nelson, Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co. - The Decision and Its Implica-
tions for Future Tender Offers, 7 CoRp. L. REv. 233 (1984); Prentice, Target Board
Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can Federal Law Be Mobilized to Overcome the Busi-
ness Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337 (1983); Profusek, Tender Offer Manipulation:
Tactics and Strategies After Marathon, 36 Sw. L.J. 975 (1982); Rosenzweig, The Le-
gality of "Lock-Ups" and Other Responses of Directors to Hostile Takeover Bids or
Stock Aggregations, 10 SEC. REG. L.J. 291 (1983); Weiss, Defensive Responses to
Tender Offers and the Williams Act's Prohibition Against Manipulation, 35 VAND.
L. Rav. 1087 (1982); Note, Target Defensive Tactics, supra note 78; Note, Tender
Offer Defensive Tactics - Federal Regulation of Management's Prerogative, 10
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 633 (1981); Note, Lock-Up Options: Toward a State Law Stan-
dard, 96 HARv. L. REv. 1068 (1983); Note, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act: Can
There Be Manipulation with Full Disclosure or Was the Mobil Court Running on
Empty?, 12 HOFSTRA L. REV. 159 (1983); Note, Tender Offer Defenses: The Need for
National Guidelines in Light of Mobil, 21 SAN DIEao L. REv. 159 (1984); Note, Swal-
lowing the Key to Lock-Up Options: Mobil Corp. V. Marathon Oil Co., 14 U. TOL. L.
REV. 1055 (1983); Note, Hostile Tender Offers and Injunctive Relief for 14(e) Manip-
ulation Claims: Developments After Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 40 WASH. &
LEE L.J. 1175 (1983).
114 See Feldbaum v. Avon Prods., Inc., 741 F.2d 234 (8th Cir. 1984); Buffalo Forge
Co. v. Ogden Co., 717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983).
115 472 U.S. 1 (1985).
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closed, 'artificially' affect the price of the takeover target's stock." '
The Court cited Hochfelder and Santa Fe as cases reflecting the use
of the word manipulative "as a general term comprising a range of
misleading practices"11 and quoted from them extensively in ex-
plaining its "conclusion that 'manipulative' acts under § 14(e) re-
quire misrepresentation or nondisclosure." '
In light of the Court's heavy reliance on its Rule 10b-5 decisions,
Schreiber unquestionably defines the term "manipulative" for the
purposes of section 10(b). 119 Indeed Schreiber will probably limit
the reach of every provision of the federal securities statutes that
proscribes manipulative conduct or provides for its regulation. If
nothing is manipulative unless it is deceptive, then the SEC cannot
regulate non-deceptive conduct under section 10(b). If this is so,
some of the SEC's most important rules are unauthorized or irrele-
vant and the SEC may be powerless to address new problems, in-
cluding novel trading practices that many people believe have a det-
rimental impact on the public.2 0 Instead of being a broad mandate
to the SEC to ensure a regime of appropriate pricing, the Act is re-
duced to an enabling statute for a system of disclosure.
116 Id. at 6.
117 Id.
"$ Id. at 6-8. See also id. at 8 (congressional concern with disclosure is core of
Act), 12 (disclosure is core mechanism of the Act). The Court also relied on the "fa-
miliar principle of statutory construction that words grouped in a list should be given
related meaning." Id. at 8 (quoting Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of Governors, 468
U.S. 207, 218 (1984).
1I The Court said it had "interpreted 'manipulative' in [§ 10(b)] to require mis-
representation" in Santa Fe, Piper and Hochfelder. 472 U.S. at 7-8. Schreiber has
been read to remove any doubt that misrepresentation or nondisclosure is an element
of manipulation under § 10(b) of the Act. Poser, supra note 10, at 682; see also T.
HAZEN, Ta LAW OF SEcumrrEs REGULATION § 12.1, at 84 (1987 Supp.).
11 See T. HAZEN, supra note 119, at § 12.1 (1987 Supp.) (listing rules that would be
invalidated by extending Schreiber to § 10(b)). Sections 13(e)(1) and 14(e) of the Act,
15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(e)(1), 78n(e), give the SEC authority to prescribe rules reasonably
designed to prevent manipulative acts. In Schreiber, the Court said that under this
provision of § 14(e) the SEC has the power to "regulate non-deceptive activities as a
'reasonably designed' means of preventing manipulative acts." 472 U.S. at 11 n.11.
Nonetheless, several commentators have read the opinion to limit the SEC's § 14(e)
rulemaking authority to requiring disclosure. T. HAZEN, supra, at 119; Pitt & Cherno,
Williams Act Rejected as Tool to Ensure Fairness, Legal Times, June 17, 1985, at 27.
See also Note, The Impact of Schreiber on the SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules, 57
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 77 (1988).
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III. PRICES AND THE CONTROL OF MANIPULATION
A. Income and Price - The Control of Issuer Behavior
Since the primary value of a security is the income that it will
produce for its holder, the price that people are willing to pay or to
accept for a security is likely to change when the income that it is
expected to produce changes. Issuer distributions are an important
source of income to security holders,'21 and so perhaps the surest
way to change a security's price is to change the issuer distributions
that it will in fact produce.
Recently, a former brokerage-house clerk undertook a pernicious
scheme to injure a security issuer's earning capacity so that he could
profit from the drop in the price of its securities that he thought
would follow. After buying options to sell a substantial amount of
the common stock of a corporation that manufactured pharmaceuti-
cals, he put rat poison in capsules of medicine produced by the com-
pany, put the capsules on store shelves, and called television sta-
tions and the manufacturer and told them what he had done. The
company recalled the capsules, at substantial expense, and as the
clerk had hoped, the price of its stock fell, although not enough for
him to profit by exercising his options."'
The clerk was trying to tamper with the stock market,' 23 and he
succeeded in compromising the public interest in the integrity of the
market. In doing so he perpetrated a wrong independent of the
wrong he did to the owners and employees of the manufacturer and
independent of the wrong he would have done to any consumer who
used the poisoned capsules. The language of section 10(b) plainly
gives the SEC power to regulate schemes like this one. The clerk
intended to manipulate the price of the manufacturer's securities
and of the derivative securities that he owned, and the various acts
that he undertook in furtherance of his scheme were surely "manip-
ulative." Had he acted in contravention of an SEC rule, he would
have violated section 10(b).
Strangers to corporations do not often destroy assets in order to
221 The other source of income is the price a holder will receive on resale, which
may be the consensus view of the present value of all expected future issuer
distributions.
122 N.Y.Times, Aug. 27, 1986, at A9, col. 1; id., June 21, 1986, at 32, col. 1; id., June
8, 1986, at 28, col. 1; id., May 31, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
232 The New York Times reported that he was "accused of poisoning over-the-
counter drugs in an attempt to make a killing in the stock market." Id., June 28,
1986, at 28, col. 1.
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depress corporate security prices, and when they do so they are per-
haps best made to account for their actions under rules against de-
stroying assets. 124 The managers of security issuers have much more
regular opportunities to manipulate corporate assets toward the end
of influencing security prices. One of the reasons that managers of
publicly held corporations undertake and publicize profitable activi-
ties is that they recognize that they will thereby increase the price of
their employers' securities. While profitable projects should be en-
couraged, presumably managers should not undertake losing
projects with a view to profiting personally from the publication of
their losses.1 5
Section 16 of the Act makes it difficult for people who control
publicly held companies to profit by manipulating the firm's affairs
toward their own ends."26 Section 16(b) provides that any profits
that the officers, directors or substantial shareholders of a publicly
held company realize from short-swing trading in the company's eq-
uity securities shall inure to the company. Section 16(c) forbids such
officers, directors and shareholders from selling short the company's
equity securities.
Section 16(b) recites "preventing the unfair use of information" as
its purpose, but the provisions of section 16 do not function well as
disclosure rules. They are under-inclusive in several respects. They
do not cover everyone who has access to inside information, or who
is likely to have access to such information, but only those persons
who control issuers. Moreover, section 16(b) leaves officers and di-
rectors free to profit from the price appreciation that will result
when the good work that they are paid to do is publicized.127 Section
16(b) is of no consequence to a controlling person who buys while in
possession of good, non-public information, but who is prepared to
hold for the long haul; nor to one selling securities that he or she has
owned for six months or more on the basis of bad news, so long as
he or she does not intend to repurchase as soon as the bad news is
released. Section 16 is also over-inclusive for a disclosure rule, pri-
marily because it covers short-swing trading and short sales regard-
less of the trader's knowledge or motivation.
124 The clerk pleaded guilty to product tampering, wire fraud and giving false in-
formation about the tampering and was sentenced to prison. Com. Appeal (Mem-
phis), Oct. 31, 1986, at 1, col 1.
125 Cf. H. MANNE, supra note 10, at 154-56 (insider trading on bad news).
126 15 U.S.C. § 78p.
' Section 16(b) of the Act, supra note 2, does not even forbid the trading that it
covers, and the SEC cannot bring an action under it. It merely provides that any
trading profits shall inure to the issuer. The person on the other side of the affiliate's
trade is not protected by this section.
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These frequently made criticisms are on the mark if section 16 is
directed toward achieving informational parity. They may, however,
simply show that section 16 "is not a disclosure rule at all."' 28 Sec-
tion 16 is well tailored to altering the behavior of corporate manag-
ers."" It only applies to people likely to control corporations, and it
removes much of their incentive to mismanage corporate affairs for
the purpose of producing personally profitable trading opportuni-
ties. Section 16(c) makes it unlawful for managers to sell short, on
the theory that management should not be able to profit from its
own mistakes. 1"0 Section 16(b) may have been intended to discour-
age managers from trading on inside information, but it was also
intended to discourage them from profiting by manipulating corpo-
rate affairs in order to create short-swing price changes or unfair
distributions of corporate assets.'3 By forbidding key insiders from
selling short and by denying them any profits from short-swing
trades, section 16 makes it impossible for them to profit by trading
the issuer's stock except by buying and holding for long-term appre-
ciation, which they can presumably best insure by managing the is-
suer's business well.
The Court recognized the public interest in keeping managers
from manipulating corporate affairs for the purpose of influencing
security prices when it upheld the SEC's refusal to approve a plan of
reorganization for a holding company under the Public Utility Hold-
ing Company Act"' in its celebrated second decision of SEC v. Che-
128 Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the
Production of Information, 1981 S. CT. REv. 309, 319; cf. Yourd, Trading in Securi-
ties by Directors, Officers and Stockholders: Section 16 of the Securities Exchange
Act, 38 MICH. L. REv. 133, 143-44, 147-48 (1939).
129 ABA Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Secs., Report of the Task Force on Regulation of
Insider Trading - Part II: Reform of Section 16, 42 Bus. LAW. 1087, 1092 (1987)
("[Siection 16 remains a useful tool for preventing speculative abuses by insiders and
for focusing their attention on their fiduciary duty and on long-term corporate health,
rather than on short-term trading profits."); see also id. at 1093 (§ 16 of the Act was
response to revelations of businessmen profiting "by means of short-swing trading
and manipulation of corporate events to enhance their trading profits.").
120 Id. at 1097-99; see also H. MANNE, supra note 10, at 153 n.13; Easterbrook,
supra note 128, at 319 n.50.
131 S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 11, item 17, at 9 (manipulation of dividend policy); H. MANNa, supra note
10, at 8-10; A.B.A. Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Sees., supra note 129, at 1093-94
("[S]ection 16(b) was designed to eliminate the temptation for insiders to manipulate
corporate events so as to maximize their own short-term trading profits."); Yourd,
supra note 128, at 133; D. VAGTS, BASIC CORPORATION LAW 551 (3d ed. 1989).
122 15 U.S.C. §§ 79 to 79z-6 (1982).
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nery Corp.138 The SEC had refused to approve the plan because it
gave members of management common stock in the reorganized
company on the basis of the preferred stock that the managers had
purchased in the market while the SEC was considering the firm's
various proposed reorganization plans."4 As the SEC saw it, by vir-
tue of its control of the holding company's business, management
could affect the market price of outstanding securities and had "a
formidable battery of devices that would enable it, if it should
choose to use them selfishly. . . to influence the market for its own
gain...".. ,,s5The SEC concluded that it would be unfair and det-
rimental to the public interest or the interest of investors within the
meaning of the statute to allow the managers to receive common
stock in the reorganized company on the basis of securities that they
had bought at prices they might have influenced, by the way they
managed the business of the company or by the way they shaped the
reorganization process."s6 The Court sustained the decision as con-
sistent with the authority that Congress had granted to the SEC,
even though it was "plain that there was no fraud or lack of disclos-
ure in" the managers' purchases."
87
The Public Utility Holding Company Act and section 16 of the
Act cannot stop managers from destroying their own firms for per-
sonal ends. The drafters of the Act were sensitive to the likelihood
that they would be accused of trying to socialize business, and by
and large they avoided matters of corporate governance in their
drafting."' State law remedies for breaches of fiduciary duties of
care and loyalty may be the best protection that the law affords
13 332 U.S. 194 (1947); see also SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). The
Court's two opinions focus on the role of adjudication in administrative decision mak-
ing and the scope of judicial review of administrative orders.
'34 332 U.S. at 197-99; see also 318 U.S. at 81-85.
135 332 U.S. at 205 (quoting SEC order, Holding Company Act Release No. 5584).
130 Id. at 204.
137 Id. at 197; see also 318 U.S. at 91-92 (1943) (short-swing trading proscription of
Public Utilities Holding Company Act is not a limit of SEC power over conduct of
holding company management).
138 Kripke, The SEC, Corporate Governance, and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW.
173, 173-74 (1981). Compare Anderson, The Meaning of Federalism: Interpreting the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 70 VA. L. REv. 813 (1984) with Kitch, A Federal
Vision of the Securities Laws, 70 VA. L. REv. 857 (1984). This is not to say that the
Act was not intended to regulate management behavior. Critics of self-interested
management of public corporations had long called for the disclosure of information
about compensation, see L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY ch. 5 (1914), and the
regulation of proxy solicitation in § 14 of the Act was directed at controlling
management.
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against mismanagement. 39 Nonetheless, while the Act was not pro-
moted as a way to regulate managements' business decisions, revela-
tions of abusive management practices were a driving force behind
its enactment.140 A manager who mismanages a corporation for the
purpose of causing the price of its securities to drop has employed a
manipulative device, 41 and it seems that a manager who contra-
venes an SEC rule in doing so has also violated section 10(b).' 4
Dividend policy is one area of management that the drafters of
the Act may have contemplated that the SEC might regulate under
section 10(b). Managers are often accused of coordinating their trad-
ing and changes in corporate dividend policy in order to take advan-
tage of the changes in share prices that are likely to follow an-
nounced changes in dividends, or in order to secure corporate
distributions for themselves.'4" Instances of prominent executives
abusing their controls over dividend policies were well known by
1934, and abusive dividend policy was one of the problems that the
Act was intended to address. The Senate Banking and Currency
Committee's report on the bill that became the Act cited several ex-
139 Cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 107 S. Ct. 1637, 1647 n.9 (1987)
("In the unlikely event that management were to take actions [in response to a hos-
tile tender offer] designed to diminish the value of the corporation's shares, it may
incur liability under state law .... Neither the [Williams] Act nor any other federal
statute can assure that shareholders do not suffer from ... mismanagement .... ).
140 See Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informational Advantages Under the
Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARv. L. REV. 322, 335 n.50 (1979) ("Evidence of the
connection of insider trading with such manipulation of corporate affairs was fre-
quently alluded to in congressional hearings.").
14 See H. MANNE, supra note 10, at 147 ("The first form of manipulation is the
publication of untrue good or bad news with the intention the others in the stock
market rely upon the statement. The second form of manipulation is the intentional
production of bad news ...... "); id. at 150-51, 153-54; Kryzanowski, supra note 48,
at 124 ("Some effective manipulative techniques include . . . manipulation of the
generation and release of information on company activity.").
142 Cf. Atchley v. Qonaar Corp., 704 F.2d 355, 356-59 (7th Cir. 1983) (financial
statements misleading in light of management scheme to depress earnings). Existing
rules may adequately deal with mismanagement. On the other hand the interests of
those charged with the care of corporate assets may diverge from those of others with
an interest in the assets, and the sanctions likely to be applied when a manager
wrongly acts in his self interest may not be sufficient to protect security owners or the
public.
1E.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 680 F.2d 933 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1056 (1982) (withholding notice of common stock dividend so
as not to prompt conversion of debentures into stock); Mutual Shares Corp. v.
Genesco, Inc., 384 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1967); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins. Co.,
465 F. Supp. 1349, 1354, 1355 (N.D. Tex. 1979). See generally Jacobs, supra note 81,
at 549-50; Poser, supra note 10, at 725-26 (discussing cases).
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amples of dividend-related trading by management in support of
section 16.'
Dividend policy could be regulated as a disclosure issue. Changes
in dividend policy may affect prices because of the information that
they convey, and management might be required to explain its rea-
sons for changing its policy clearly and completely.14 5 Trading by a
corporation's managers in the firm's securities immediately prior to
a dividend announcement might be labeled deceptive on the basis of
a fiduciary duty to disclose before trading. However, full and
prompt disclosure might not be enough to eliminate the potential
for abuse of dividend policy. There is some question about why and
to what extent dividend policy affects security prices.14 8 If dividend
policy influences share prices for some reason other than the infor-
mation that it conveys, then management can use a change in divi-
dend policy to manipulate the price of stock for its own ends, even if
it publicly, honestly and convincingly explains its new policy imme-
diately upon adopting it. Dividend policy was seen as independently
significant in 1934; the abuse was the improper dividend policy it-
self, not lying about it. 47 While a fully disclosed policy intended to
change share prices so that management could trade profitably
would not be deceptive, it might fairly be characterized as manipu-
lative conduct of corporate affairs in connection with a securities
transaction, and thus within the literal scope of section 10(b).14 8 The
Senate Committee at least intended section 10(b) to be a supple-
ment to section 16 in discouraging such conduct. It described sec-
tions 9, 10 and 16 together and placed them all under the heading of
144 S. REP. No. 792, supra note 131, at 7-9.
145 See Brudney, Dividends, Discretion, and Disclosure, 66 VA. L. REv. 85 (1980).
146 See generally V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 23, at 479-521; R.
CLARK, CoRPoRATE LAW 594-602 (1986).
117 The Senate Report emphasized "instances ... [of trading] profits derived from
the use of information not procurable by the investing public," but its discussion of a
"particularly glaring instance" illuminates the congressional concern with misman-
agement aimed at creating trading opportunities.
[T]he chairman of the executive committee and another director partici-
pated in a pool organized in [sic) trade in the stock of their company when
the stock was paying no dividends. During the operation of the pool, which
continued for a period of 2 years, they caused the company to resume the
payment of dividends, more than 25 percent of which were received by the
pool participants.
S. REP No. 792, supra note 131, at 9.
148 Marsh v. Armada Corp., 533 F.2d 978, 982 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
954 (1977). But see Poser, supra note 10, at 726 n.329 (Marsh does not survive
Schreiber).
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"Manipulative Practices.
1 49
The SEC has not tried to regulate management conduct by calling
it manipulative within the meaning of section 10(b). 15 0 Nor has any-
one spent much time trying to decide whether the SEC has the
power to promulgate a rule against what the clerk did."5 ' The only
sustained interest in the meaning of the word "manipulative" in the
Act has, however, focused on the not dissimilar efforts of manage-
ment to defeat hostile tender offers.'52
Corporate managers who want to discourage or defeat hostile
takeovers have a wide variety of defensive techniques to choose
from, some of which work by insuring that if a party that is unac-
ceptable to management or to shareholders gains control of the cor-
poration, the value of the corporation will automatically decline sub-
stantially.15 ' Potential targets often try to discourage hostile
takeovers by issuing to their shareholders securities which make it
difficult for outsiders to acquire control of the firm. These securities,
which are sometimes (and ironically, given what the clerk did)
known as "poison pills," may also reduce the market value of the
issuer's outstanding securities and thus injure the current owners of
the issuer. 5
4
It was in the context of the charge that a management response to
a tender offer was manipulative that the Court finally held that ma-
nipulation entails deception. Perhaps it was appropriate for the
19 S. REP. No. 792, supra note 131, at 7-9; see also Special Study, supra note 27,
pt. 3, at 5 (§ 16(c) of the Act directed at manipulative techniques); Mathias, supra
note 88, at 106-14 (§ 16 eliminates insider manipulation).
150 Most disputes over the SEC's power to regulate management conduct of busi-
ness have arisen in the context of tender offers. Section 14(e) of the Act, supra note
2, gives the SEC independent authority to regulate manipulative practices in tender
offers. See Loewenstein, Section 14(e) of the Williams Act and the Rule 10b-5 Com-
parisons, 71 GEO. L.J. 1311 (1983); See also supra notes 80-84 and accompanying
text.
"5 See supra text accompanying note 122.
12 See supra text accompanying notes 37-45.
113 See generally A. FLEiscHER, TENDER OFFERS: DEFENSES, RESPONSES, AND PLAN-
NING (Supp. 1985).
I See generally, Concept Release on Takeovers, Exchange Act Release No.
23,486, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,018, at 88,203-206
(July 11, 1986); V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 23, at 847-49; A.
FLEISCHER, supra note 153, at 44.5-44.22; Office of the Chief Economist, SEC, The
Effects of Poison Pills on the Wealth of Target Shareholders (Oct. 12, 1986); Office of
the Chief Economist, SEC, A Study on the Economics of Poison Pills, [1985-1986
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 83,971 (Mar. 5, 1986); Note, Protecting
Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Pre-
ferred, 97 HARv. L. REv. 1964 (1984).
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Court in Schreiber to reject a construction of section 14(e) that
would have allowed private litigants to strike down most defensive
tactics.155 However, the Court's rationale in Schreiber leads inescap-
ably to the conclusion that the SEC cannot regulate managerial or
clerical poison pills, manipulative dividend policies or any other
non-deceptive conduct under section 10(b), even if it is undertaken
for no purpose other than influencing security prices.156 This conclu-
sion is as unfortunate as it is inescapable. Section 10(b) easily per-
mits the regulation of such practices, if the word manipulative is
accorded independent interpretive significance. The SEC must have
the authority to regulate such practices if the statute's expressed
purpose of protecting the public's interest in stock prices is to be
achieved.
B. Information and Price - Required Disclosure and Honesty
Poison pills and dividend policy will not affect market prices un-
less the public knows about them. In a market in which investors
buy and sell the income-producing potential of securities, prices will
reflect market participants' judgments of the present value of the
income that they expect each traded security to produce. The collec-
tive prediction of market participants of the income that a security
will produce may be better than that of any one participant,15 7 but
there is no reason to think that even as a group, market participants
can accurately predict the future. The most that their collective
forecast can do is to reflect the best analysis of all available informa-
tion which may have a bearing on what actually happens.
Various forces work toward the development of a consensus view
that incorporates all information that is worth producing or discov-
ering. The managers of successful security issuers have an incentive
to release information, and market participants have an incentive to
1l See Karjala, supra note 5, at 1504-06. Schreiber did not involve any SEC rule
defining manipulative acts or prescribing means reasonably designed to prevent them.
See supra text accompanying notes 75-81.
'I' Even if the Court had to base its decision in Schreiber on the meaning of the
word manipulative, it could have held that issuer conduct is not manipulative unless
its purpose is to influence market price. Management's purpose in employing defen-
sive tactics is to lower the value of the issuer's stock only to the bidder, and any
reduction in market value is inadvertent. See Poser, supra note 10, at 688-89. The
ideal defensive tactic would discourage unattractive suitors or coercive offers without
reducing the value of the corporation to current shareholders. Cf. V. BRUDNEY & M.
CHIRELSTEIN, supra note 23, at 846-49 (3d ed. 1987) (collecting sources).
See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 580-85.
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search out and analyze information. 158 Nonetheless, private initia-
tive is not sufficient to insure that all relevant information is publi-
cized 0 9, and thus security prices may not reflect all of the informa-
tion that is available to some traders, or the best possible analysis of
all information.6 "
Since security values depend on future events that cannot be pre-
dicted with certainty, and since market prices will not necessarily
reflect even the best possible prediction of the future, market prices
will change as events come to pass and are disclosed to market par-
ticipants or as market participants come to see the information
which they already possess in a new way."61
Participants in the market presumably focus on news they think
to be relevant to issuer profits, since profits are the source of distri-
butions and distributions are the ultimate source of income - and
'68 The profit available to those who discover new information is a key to market
efficiency. Someone who discovers new information relevant to the value of a security
or a better way to make sense of outstanding information may well be able to profit
by the discovery. Someone who discovers an issuer will be more profitable than any-
one expects can buy the issuer's common stock and wait for the issuer to distribute
its income or sell after publication of the discovery when market price will presuma-
bly reflect the good news. If on the other hand he or she discovers an issuer will be
less profitable than expected, then he or she can sell its securities and buy them back
at a lower price after the information is disclosed.
159 Some valuable investigation and analysis will not be undertaken since the dis-
coverer of new information relevant to a publicly traded security or the best analyst
of public information cannot always appropriate the full value of the discovery or
analysis. Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection
of Investors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 680-90 (1984) with Coffee, Market Failure and the
Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure System, 70 V& L. REv. 717 (1984) (infor-
mation as public good).
160 J. LoRm, P. DODD & M. KIMPTON, supra note 23, at 73-77; cf. Merton, A Simple
Model of Capital Market Equilibrium with Incomplete Information, 42 J. FIN. 483,
485-86 (1987) (evaluation). For example, an investor who buys a novel form of deben-
ture that he or she figures out is more likely to produce income than anyone expects,
will realize his or her profit only after others share in his or her discovery. See id. at
486; 1 J. BONBRIGHT, supra note 40, at 25; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 613-
16.
101 It seems clear that prices prevailing on larger security markets reflect all gener-
ally available information market participants feel is indicative of the income a secur-
ity holder will receive from his or her security. See J. LoRiE, P. DODD & J. KIMPTON,
supra note 23, at 55-79 (collecting evidence). But see Wang, Some Arguments that
the Stock Market Is Not Efficient, 19 U.C. DAvis L. REv. 341, 349-59 (1986) (collect-
ing contrary evidence). However, market prices may change with the disclosure of
new developments or previously unknown facts that indicate the income from a se-
curity will be different from that expected. The more difficult it is to acquire and
analyze information, the further market price will be from the price that would pre-
vail if there were no secrets. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 609-13.
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thus value - for security holders. 162 The most familiar provisions of
the federal securities laws are directed at insuring that information
about issuer profits is made available to investors. The Securities
Act conditions the sale of securities on the issuer disclosing specific
information, most of it relating to the issuer's operations. The Act
el'ectively compels the issuers of most publicly traded securities to
disclose similar information on an ongoing basis.2
63
Prices may change in response to false or misleading communica-
tions since security prices reflect what investors believe, even if
those beliefs are wrong. People may make false statements by mis-
take,16 4 or they may make them knowingly. Corporate agents may
postpone disclosure or may even lie in order to protect a valuable
corporate opportunity, 65 to hide criminal activity,6 6 or simply to
buy time in which to trade securities issued by the corporation
before the truth is published.
6 7
62 It is difficult to determine what information investors feel is important. The
failure of a statement to affect price does not mean the information discussed is not
material; it may mean that the information was already available to the market. See
R. GmsoN, supra note 64, at 235-38; Fischel, Use of Modern Finance Theory in Se-
curities Fraud Cases, 38 Bus. LAW. 1 (1982); Givoly & Palmon, Insider Trading and
the Exploitation of Inside Information: Some Empirical Evidence, 58 J. Bus. 69, 72
(1985).
163 See § 12(g), the Act, 15 U.S.C. 9 781(g) (registration of widely held equity secur-
ities); § 13, id. at § 78m (reports on § 12 securities); § 15(d), id. at § 781(d) (reports on
securities registered under Securities Act); cf. §§ 14(a) and (c), Id. at §§ 781(a) and (c)
(proxy and information statements). Section 12(a), id. at § 781(a), and Rule 15c2-11,
17 C.F.R.§ 240.15c2-11 (1988), effectively forbid brokers and dealers from participat-
ing in the market for a security unless information about the issuer is available to
investors. Cf. § 12(b), 15 U.S.C. § 781(b) (registration of exchange-traded securities).
See generally L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 8, at 459-567 (history of Act issuer-
reporting requirements).
It is sometimes suggested that the federal securities laws require issuers to disclose
all important information. The exchanges encourage issuers of listed securities to dis-
close material developments as soon as practicable, and given the possibility of a
court assuming there is such a duty and the likelihood that material developments
will render recent issuer statements misleading it is certainly wise to do so, See gen-
erally Affirmative Disclosure Obligations Under the Securities Laws, 46 MD. L. REV.
907 (1987); Block, Barton & Garfield, Affirmative Duty to Disclose Material Informa-
tion Concerning Issuer's Financial Condition and Business Plans, 40 Bus. LAW. 1243
(1985). Nonetheless, neither the statutes nor the rules require the disclosure of all
material information. Indeed there would be no need for the detailed disclosure re-
quirements of the statutes and rules if there were such a requirement.
I" E.g., Aaron v. SEC, 446 U. S. 680 (1980); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S.
185 (1976).
16I E.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 976 (1969).
166 E.g., Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
'e Cf. GAF Corp. v. Milstein, 453 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1971) (outsiders alleged to have
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Several provisions of the federal securities statutes forbid the
making of false or misleading statements that may influence inves-
tors. Section 17(a) of the Securities Act 6 " declares it unlawful for
anyone in the offer or sale of a security to obtain money by means of
any untrue statement of a material fact, and sections 11169 and 12170
provide for private actions against the makers of fals4 statements.
Section 9(a)(4) of the Act makes it unlawful for a broker or a dealer
or a person trading a security to make a statement for the purpose
of inducing a trade if he or she knows or has reason to know that the
statement is false with respect to a material fact.171 Section 14(e) of
the Act forbids the making of any untrue statement of a material
fact in connection with a tender offer. 172 The Court interprets sec-
tion 10(b) to be an adjunct to these provisions, and whether or not it
is, Rule 10b-5 is one of several SEC rules forbidding false or mis-
leading statements.173
Information can be conveyed by acts as well as by words, and the
Act would not be a complete full-and-honest-disclosure statute if it
did not deal with the communicative element of acts.174 The act of
trading communicates important information. 75 For example, every
bid conveys information about the demand for a security. Thus, sig-
nificant information about supply and demand is contained in spe-
cialists' order books and in the record of completed trades. 76
disparaged management to depress price to facilitate stock acquisition).
168 The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1982).
169 Id. at § 77k (1982).
170 Id. at § 771 (1982).
1 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(4).
172 Id. at § 78n(e).
17 See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.12b-20 (1988) (reports); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1988)
(proxy statements); 17 C.F.R. § 240.14c-6 (1988) (information statements); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.15cl-2 (1988) (brokers and dealers).
A good argument that section 10(b) of the Act, supra note 2, does not authorize the
SEC to regulate false statements is that Congress had already done so itself in the
Securities Act of 1933 and in § 9(a)(4) of the Act. See Manne, supra note 10; Ruder,
supra note 10. Interestingly, § 9(a)(4) of the Act is left out of the Federal Securities
Code as redundant. 2 ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1609(c) comment 5 (1978).
174 Cf. Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 472 U.S. 1, 7 n.4 (1985) ("I can see
no substantial distinction between false rumors and false and fictitious acts." (quot-
ing Lord Lopes in Scott v. Brown, Doering, McNab & Co., [1892] 2 Q.B. 724, 730
(C.A.))).
175 Cf. Note, The Inadequacy of Rule 10b-5 to Address Outsider Trading by Re-
porters, 38 STAN. L. REv. 1549, 1565 (1986) ("The underlying principle of the [efficient
capital market hypothesis] is that investors transmit information to the market by
trading.").
116 See generally K. GARBADE, supra note 23, at 469-79; Niederhoffer & Osborne,
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As noted above, the prices and sizes of most trades occurring on
securities exchanges are routinely and quickly reported.' In 1975,
Congress explicitly recognized the public interest in accessible trad-
ing information, and directed the SEC to facilitate the dissemina-
tion of such information as part of its program of establishing a na-
tional market system for securities.1 18 However, as originally
enacted, the Act did not require exchanges to publish trading infor-
mation. 179 This does not mean that Congress overlooked the commu-
nicative aspect of trading or that it was unconcerned with it. As sec-
tion 2 states, by 1934 trading information was already widely
reported, 180 and it probably did not occur to anyone that the govern-
ment had to compel the publication of such information.1 81 In fact,
the efficacy of the Act rested on the interest of market professionals
in continued reporting. The cornerstone of the regulatory system en-
visioned by the Act was the registration of exchanges with the SEC,
but the Act did not require exchanges to register. It effectively
forced the exchanges to register, however, by making it unlawful for
brokers, dealers, or exchanges, directly or indirectly, to report trans-
actions taking place on unregistered exchanges.1s2
Unexecuted orders to buy or to sell will influence future prices,
supra note 26, at 904-08.
177 Cf. K. GARBADE, supra note 23, at 480-91 (price dispersion in markets in which
prices are not costlessly available); Merton, supra note 160, at 486 (price information
may not have been accessible).
178 Securities Act Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, 89 Stat. 97 (1975) (codi-
fied in 15 U.S.C. § 78k-1). See generally J. SELIGMAN, THE SEC AND THE FUTURE OF
FINANCE 1-80 (1985); Calvin, The National Market System: A Successful Adventure
in Industry Self-Improvement, 70 VA. L. REv. 785 (1984); Poser, supra note 10; Si-
mon & Colby, The National Market System for Over-the-Counter Stocks, 55 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 17 (1986); Werner, The SEC as a Market Regulator, 70 VA. L. REv. 756
(1984).
1'l Section 19(b)(8) of the Act, supra note 2, did authorize the SEC to supplement
the rules of an exchange "in respect of such matters as ... the reporting of transac-
tions on the exchange and upon tickers maintained by or with the consent of the
exchange, including the method of reporting short sales, stopped sales [etc.]".
180 Section 2(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78b(2). See generally TWENTIETH CENTURY
FUND, INc., supra note 12, at 251-52.
181 Indeed the New York Stock Exchange [hereinafter the NYSE] had trouble con-
trolling the dissemination of quotations. See N. GRAS & H. LARSON, CASEBOOK IN
AMERICAN BusImEss HISTORY 338-39 (1939). But see W. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND Fi-
NANCE 70-72 (1940) (exclusion of odd-lot trades from market and tape).
181 The Act, § 5. Section 5 also made it illegal to use the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce to effect exchange transactions, but exchanges
were carefully structured so that all their business was conducted in one state. 8 LEG-
ISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 16 (testimony of James Landis), 562-71 (brief of
NYSE).
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and those who know about such orders may be able to use their
knowledge to trade profitably. Investors who want to trade an ex-
change-traded security at a particular price can give limit orders to
that effect to their brokers, who in turn convey the orders to special-
ists in the security. By virtue of their positions, specialists know
more about trading interest in their securities than anyone else, and
they are able to trade profitably by taking advantage of their unique
knowledge."' 3 Operators of manipulative pools depended on access
to specialists' books to find securities with easily dominated supply
and demand. 8 4 Congress was aware of this situation, but it did not
require specialists to publish their books. 8 5 Although the scheme of
the Act contemplated that information on completed trades would
be available, it did not contemplate full disclosure of information
about unexecuted orders. Instead, it adopted a parity of information
rule. Specialists may not disclose information in their books to any-
one other than a regulator, unless the information is available to all
exchange members.8 6
Trades convey information other than the state of the market;
most importantly, they convey the predictions of the traders. The
predictions of people with access to non-public information are valu-
able. Even if such people do not announce their views, their trading
decisions may reveal them. For example, if investors learn that a
corporate officer has sold his or her employer's stock, they may con-
clude that the officer knows about something which is detrimental to
the corporation's prospects, and may then lower their estimates of
the stock's value. The trading of informed traders and of others who
emulate them may move the market price to one reflecting the non-
public information, without the information ever being made pub-
183R. BREALEY & S. MYERs, supra note 23, at 270; Niederhoffer & Osborne, supra
note 26, at 908. See generally Special Study, supra note 27, pt. 2, at 72-78.
"' W. HICKERNELL, WHAT MAKES STOCK MARKET PRICES 62-66 (1932).
'" The related question of specialists' trading for their own accounts was one of
the most difficult that had to be resolved before the Act could be approved. As first
introduced the Act would have forbidden specialists to trade for their own accounts.
H.R. 7852 § 10, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 10 LEGISLATM HISTORY, supra note
11, item 24 § 10 (1934). In the end the question was referred to the SEC for further
study. Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 11(e), 48 Stat. 881, 891 (repealed 1975). See generally
Special Study, supra note 27, pt. 2, at 57-170; J. FLYNN, supra note 88, at 228-43; KL
GARBADE, supra note 23, at 448 n.10; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., supra note 12,
at 402-42.
88 The Act, § 11(b). The SEC has residual power to require disclosure. NYSE rules
forbid specialists to disclose order information. NYSE Rule 115, 2 N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) 1 2115.
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lic.18 7 Traders do not typically volunteer their identities, but the Act
requires some classes of investors to report their trades. Section
16(a) requires control persons to report their trades monthly,188 and
sections 13 and 14 now require persons engaged in substantial acqui-
sition programs to identify themselves. Trading reports relating to
the Act are widely circulated and analyzed.189
Like all statements, trading reports can create erroneous impres-
sions.190 For example, a report that a substantial amount of a secur-
ity has changed hands in a substantial number of trades at the same
price may create the impression that the market for the security at
that price is very deep. If the report is wrong or if the trades are the
product of a peculiar situation, this impression may be wrong.
The Act addresses misleading trading reports. In addition to for-
bidding misleading statements, section 9(a) makes it illegal to em-
ploy certain trading tactics for the purpose of misleading the invest-
ing public about the state of supply and demand. Section 9(a)(1)
deals with the entry of offsetting purchase and sale orders, and
transactions that do not result in a change in beneficial ownership.
Such transactions had been widely criticized before 1934,191 as their
report in a medium purporting to report only real trades is inher-
ently misleading. Section 9(a)(1) forbids such transactions if effected
"[flor the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of
active trading in [the traded security] or a false or misleading ap-
pearance with respect to [its] market."
187 The trades of those in possession of non-public material information may exert
pressure on the price of the security, but this pressure, which is a function of the size
of the trades and not their information content, is likely to be inconsequential. See
infra text accompanying notes 242-46.
I" Although the reporting helps private parties enforce § 16(b)'s forfeiture provi-
sions, Congress viewed the information reported as independently valuable for dis-
couraging inappropriate management behavior. ABA Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Secs.,
supra note 129, at 1099. The version of the Act the House sent to conference required
control persons to report their trades and forbade them to sell short but did not
restrict their short-term trading. H.R. 9323 § 15, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934), reprinted
in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, item 30.
189 See ABA Comm. on Fed. Reg. of Secs., supra note 129, at 1100-01 (§ 16 re-
ports); cf. Carney, supra note 31, at 879-80 (unlikely outsiders can profit from emu-
lating insiders); Givoly & Palmon, supra note 162, at 70.
190 Section 15(c)(2), which was added in 1938, Act of June 25, 1938, ch. 677, § 2, 52
Stat. 1070, 1075 (current version in 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(2)), forbids brokers and dealers
from making fictitious quotations; cf. Special Study, supra note 27, pt. 2, at 605-09
(fictitious quotations).
191 See, e.g., Report of the Governor's Committee on Speculation in Securities and
Commodities (June 7, 1909); Documents of the Senate of the State of New York,
133d Sess. (1910), reprinted in W. VAN ANTWERP, THE STOCK EXCHANGE FROM
WrrHIN 421-23 app. (1913).
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Even true reports of actual trades can convey misleading impres-
sions, especially about the information that traders possess. Al-
though some people likely to possess valuable information are re-
quired to report their trades, many are not. Some investors study
the information available about the prices and sizes of trades re-
cently concluded in the market, in the hope of determining whether
such people have recently been trading.192 Large trades are often
seen as particularly instructive. Insiders with valuable information
profit from their information in proportion to the size of their
trades, so large trades are sometimes considered particularly worthy
of further examination for signs that they have been affected by in-
siders. 193 Even if the large traders are not insiders, they may, by
virtue of their wealth, have access to valuable information or to so-
phisticated analytic techniques capable of producing valuable in-
sights.1 9 4 Thus, investors who learn of large sales may conclude that
the sellers are probably in possession of bad news, and will discount
the value of the traded securities accordingly. 95 Conversely, inves-
tors who believe that no one will buy a large amount of a stock with-
out good news, will read good news into any large trade that is not
made at a discount from the prevailing price. 96
While investors are trying to determine whether or not those par-
ties with better information are trading, the latter can profit by
their trading only so long as they do not reveal that they possess
information, and thus lose its value. Accordingly, traders who be-
192 Carney, supra note 31, at 876-91; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 27, at 572-79;
see, e.g., Rotbart, Market Mover: Arbitrager Mulheren Generates Controversy as His
Fortunes Rise, Wall St. J., July 28, 1986, at 1, col. 6; Stewart, Tracing a Scandal:
Insider-Trading Plot Unraveled as Profits Lured Copycat Buyers, Wall St. J., July
15, 1987, at 1, col. 6. Givoly & Palmon, supra note 162, conclude that insiders earn an
abnormal return on their trading not because they trade on the basis of non-public
information about their companies but rather because their trades themselves cause
others to reevaluate the companies and thus the values of the securities the insiders
have traded.
193 See K. GARBADE, supra note 23, at 476-78; Scholes, supra note 31, at 183. But
see Givoly & Palmon, supra note 162, at 79-85 (large insider trades not more profita-
ble than small).
19' See sources cited supra note 194; cf. § 16(a) of the Act (over 10% shareholders).
195 Market participants may try to figure out the information or just assume it is
there. Disclosed sales by persons in positions with regular access to information do
depress stock prices. K. GARBAZE, supra note 23, at 256-64, 454-60; J. LORIE, P. DODD,
& M. KIMPtoN, supra note 23, at 68-70; Scholes, supra note 31.
199 For example, in examining the non-informational effect of large trades on price,
Scholes focused on block sales rather than purchases in part because "large block
purchases of securities often reflect attempts to acquire control." Scholes, supra note
31, at 184 n.12.
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lieve that revealing their trading will necessarily reveal information
that they possess, including their own trading plans, may try to hide
their identities. 1 7 Given investors' interest in who is trading and
why, and traders' interest in keeping this information secret, trans-
action information is particularly likely to create misleading impres-
sions about the knowledge of traders. The trades of unimportant
traders may be reported in ways that make them appear to be those
of important traders, while genuinely important traders may try to
disguise their trading, for example by having undisclosed agents
trade as though for their own accounts. 198 Inasmuch as information
about the knowledge and motivations of traders is potentially much
more valuable than information about aggregate supply and de-
mand, mistakes about who is trading and why they are trading may
have a much greater impact on market price than mistakes about
the mere fact that a trade has taken place.
The Act also forbids at least one practice that might mislead in-
vestors about important traders' sentiments. Section 16 of the Act
makes it illegal for corporate managers to use one tool that could
help them to hide their sales. Congress was concerned that if insid-
ers could sell their holdings but deliver borrowed securities, inves-
tors might incorrectly believe that the insiders were confident about
the future. 9  Accordingly section 16(c) makes it illegal for insiders
to sell securities and deliver borrowed securities to their buyers.200
Sections 9(a)(1) and 16(c) only begin to cover misleading trading
techniques. Since trading conveys information and often creates
misleading impressions, the Act can hardly be characterized as a full
disclosure statute unless it requires traders to identify themselves,
or at least makes it illegal for them to mislead others about their
identities. However, there is good reason to allow some traders to
conceal their identities. Requiring traders to identify themselves
might make it impossible for the discoverers of new information to
"' See Wall St. J., Mar. 20, 1987, at 3; Smith, Street Hazard: Big-Block Trading
Pits Institutions, Dealers In a Fast, Tough Game, Wall St. J., Feb. 20, 1985, at 1, col.
6; cf. Carney, supra note 31, at 886-87 (several reasons to conceal identity).
'98 E.g., Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 432-33 (1909) (concealing buyer's identity);
cf. Hertzberg, Stock 'Parking' Becomes Big Factor in Insider Scandal, Wall St. J.,
July 9, 1987, at 6, col. 1 (" 'Parking' of stock among securities firms is emerging as a
major factor in Wall Street's widening insider-trading scandal .... Parking occurs
when one investor buys stock, usually a large position, for another who doesn't want
to be identified as the owner.").
9I Letter from the Counsel for the Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d
Cong., 1st Sess. 7-8 (Feb. 18, 1933) (Comm. Print), reprinted in 5 LEGISLATIvE His-
TORY, supra note 11, item 15.
OO 15 U.S.C. § 78p(c).
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profit from their discoveries, and might thereby undercut the pro-
duction of new information. Any policy between the extremes of re-
quiring full disclosure and of leaving disclosure to private initiative
necessarily involves a sensitive balancing of the incentive to produce
information against the value of a fully informed market. If balanc-
ing is to be done, it should be done by an agency better suited than
Congress or the courts to the study and regulation of the wide vari-
ety of circumstances in which persons with information trade. More-
over, the agency should be able to modify unwise or outdated rules
promptly in response to experience and to new situations. The SEC
would seem a natural choice for this role, and section 10(b) gives it
the power and responsibility to supplement sections 9 and 16.201
The Court focused on the value of information and on the prob-
lem of incentive in Chiarella,°2 and held that section 10(b) does not
give the SEC the power to require all traders to disclose what they
know before they trade. If the SEC cannot require traders to dis-
close what they know, then presumably it cannot require them to
reveal their identities either. However, even if section 10(b) only
reaches deception, it reaches deceptive devices and contrivances, not
just misrepresentations. Thus the SEC might require traders to
identify themselves if their trading practices would otherwise likely
be misinterpreted by investors. 20 3 Nevertheless, the Court has fore-
closed even this approach by beginning from the premise that trad-
ing is noncommunicative.
0 4
C. Speculation and Price - Investment Value and Prohibited
Communications
Issuers are required by various provisions of the Act and of the
Securities Act to disclose information relating to their income, assets
and management. Presumably Congress and the SEC have con-
2'1 See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
202 445 U.S. at 230-35.
203 But cf. Carney, supra note 31 (insider trading seldom influences others).
2- 445 U.S. 222, 226 ("This case concerns the legal effect of the petitioner's si-
lence."). The fiction that a purchaser's identity and reason for purchasing are imma-
terial and so may be misrepresented accomplishes a similar result under common law.
See, e.g., Finley v. Dalton, 251 S.C. 586, 164 S.E.2d 763 (1968); see 2 F. HARPER, F.
JAMS & 0. GRAY, THE LAW OF TORTS § 7.9, at 439 (2d ed. 1986); cf. List v. Fashion
Park, 340 F.2d 457, 462-64 (2d Cir.) (reliance: 10b-5 plaintiff would not have been
influenced had he known buyer was insider), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 811 (1965). But
see Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909). See generally Keeton, Fraud - Conceal-
ment and Non-Disclosure, 15 TEx. L. REv. 1, 21-27, 35-36 (1936).
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cluded that the information which they require issuers to disclose is
of interest to investors who are trying to predict the income that
issuers are likely to earn. 05 The narrow reading that the Court has
given to section 10(b) is premised on the assumption that these pro-
visions are at the heart of what Congress sought to accomplish in
enacting the federal securities laws. To assume that Congress was
primarily concerned with insuring that investors received informa-
tion is to assume that Congress thought that investors evaluated se-
curities on the basis of their predictions of issuer income, and were
being denied the information they needed to make their predic-
tions.0 6 Investors may in fact evaluate securities on the basis of the
distributions which they expect issuers to make, but the structure of
the Act reflects a view of the stock market in which investors have
at most only a secondary interest in issuer distributions or the in-
come from which they are derived.
The price that an owner will realize upon the sale of a security is a
significant part of the total income that it will yield. Thus, in decid-
ing whether to trade, investors will try to predict future prices. In-
vestors can take at least two approaches to predicting the future
price of a security. They can try to predict what distributions the
security's holder will receive from the issuer (and thus focus directly
on the issuer's likely income). Alternatively, recognizing that prices
are determined by the activities of market participants, investors
can try to predict the views of market participants.
Investors trying to predict a future consensus may come to con-
clusions about a security's value that differ substantially from the
conclusions of investors trying to predict issuer earnings. Predicting
change in consensus may be more difficult than predicting issuer
earnings, especially if accurate information about the issuer is avail-
able.207 More important, the inquiries may be fundamentally differ-
205 Criticism of the disclosure provisions and their administration by the SEC usu-
ally centers on the charges that they require disclosure of the wrong information and
require issuers to disclose even that in the wrong way. See, e.g., H. K IPKE, THE SEC
AND CoRPORATE DiscLosuR REGULATION IN SEARCH OF A PURPOSE (1979).
20 But compare Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 23, with Coffee, supra note 159
(debating utility of disclosure rules for informing investment decisions but explicitly
rejecting informed investment decisions as sole end of statutes).
207 The predictor of public opinion must bear in mind that other investors are also
trying to predict future consensus valuations, so he or she must predict not what
others will think the value of the security is but what others will think that everyone
else will think, with those others mindful that everyone else will be doing the same
thing and so on. J. KEYNES, supra note 28, at 154-56.
The ability to predict the future price of a security is obviously a valuable skill.
Many people devote a great deal of effort to developing this skill, but very few are
successful. The current price of a publicly traded security is as good an estimate of its
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ent. Even if investors believe that the ultimate source of value is
issuer distributions, if they believe that other market participants
are irrational or are unable to predict distributions correctly, they
will ignore their best estimates of distributions in constructing their
predictions of consensus value.208 To the extent that investors evalu-
ate and trade securities on the basis of their conclusions about fu-
ture prices, prices will move toward their conclusions. Securities
markets that include a significant number of such investors may
perform many of the functions usually credited to the stock market,
especially those relating to capital allocation.209 In addition to incor-
rectly pricing capital and sending the wrong signals, markets in
which investors evaluated securities on the basis of expected
changes in public opinion may produce more volatile prices than
markets in which investors look only to expected issuer profits and
to the time value of money.210 This volatility would increase the cost
of raising capital.
There are certainly forces at work which tend to keep market
prices in line with predicted issuer distributions. Some investors
future price as most people are able to make and very few people can predict price
changes consistently enough to make money. See supra notes 41-48 and accompany-
ing text. This is to be expected so long as it is difficult to predict better than everyone
else whatever matters, whether that is issuer income or collective whim.
208 See V. BRUDNEY & M. CHMELSTEIN, supra, note 23, at 123-30; J. WILuAMS, THE
THEORY OF INvEsTMENT VALUE 33-34 (1938) ("[S]ome old traders think it a handicap
... to let themselves reach any conclusion whatsoever as to the true worth of the
stocks they speculate in."); Gordon & Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Infor-
mation, and Securities Research, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 824-30 (1985); Wang, supra
note 161, at 344-45; cf. Berle, supra note 69, at 31 ("If you expect to be repaid, you
look to your debtor, and constantly wonder what he is doing toward that end. But if
you expect to resell, you look to the market, and wonder how other people feel about
buying. Once in a great while, and that usually is an emergency, you take account of
stock of your debtor and check up on his financial policies.").
Investment decisions based on expected changes in investor opinion may be the
same as those based on expected issuer earnings. For example the effort to identify
likely tender offer targets reflects a concern with what someone will pay for a com-
pany's securities rather than with what they will yield from the company. But if
tender offerors buy securities that are underpriced in view of the income the issuer
can produce, the successful search for likely targets, even if made without conscious
attention to earnings, will move prices toward the collective estimate of yield.
209 J. KEYNES, supra note 28, at 159 ("When the capital development of a country
becomes a by-product of the activities of a casino, the job is likely to be in-done.").
But see Stout, supra note 55, at 706 (concluding that "trading market prices are only
remotely connected to the socially optimal allocation of real resources").
210 See KEYNES, supra note 28, at 154; DeBondt & Thaler, Does the Stock Market
Overreact?, 40 J. FIN. 793 (1985); Law, A Corporation is More than Its Stock, HARv.
Bus. REv., May-June 1986, at 80; Bishop, Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1987, at 31, col. 4.
No. 2:359]
search for and buy securities that trade for less than the present
value of the distributions to which the securities will entitle their
owners.21' They realize that they can profit by holding such securi-
ties until the market recognizes the mistake, or, failing that, by
holding until the issuer distributes its earnings.212 These investors
will bid on the basis of their best estimates of issuer profits, and
prices will reflect the collective best estimate of issuer profitability
to the extent that such "serious" investors commit their capital to
the market.213
However, it is not necessary to decide whether market prices in
fact reflect market participants' best estimates of prospective issuer
distributions in order to interpret the Act.214 It is only necessary to
remember that the Act was written by people who thought that
market prices did not do so. Substantial price swings that cannot be
explained by any substantial change in business conditions under-
mine faith in the market's fidelity to underlying value,215 and after
the 1929 crash many people thought that speculators and manipula-
tors had so dominated the stock market that stock prices had lost
any connection to a rational valuation of the claim on issuer earn-
ings that the securities represented.16
211 J. KEYNEs, supra note 28, at 156-57; J. WILLIAMS, supra note 208, at 33-36.
212 Conversely, investors who own a broad inventory of securities or can sell short,
sell call options or buy put options will search for and sell those securities the market
"overvalues."
2 3 Keynes suggested a number of factors mitigating against the preponderance of
such investors in the market. J. KEYNE S, supra note 28, at 156-58. Two of them - the
lack of reliable information and the pressure on investment managers to produce
profits in the short-run - figure prominently in recent criticism of the market.
214 The random movement of security prices is often interpreted to mean they
quickly and correctly reflect new information about issuer profitability. Note, Broker
Investment Recommendations and the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis: A Pro-
posed Cautionary Legend, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1077, 1089-92 (1977); cf. J. LORIE, P.
DODD, & M. KIMPTON, supra note 23, at 5 ("The value of a corporation's stock is
determined by expectations regarding future earnings of the corporation and by the
rate at which those earnings are discounted."). However, random movement is consis-
tent with prices that are not influenced by issuer earnings at all. Friend, supra note
48, at 201; Meltzer, supra note 62 at 217, 222-23; Levmore, supra note 31, at 647-48;
cf. Law, supra note 210, at 81; Wang, supra note 161, at 344-49, and 359-62 (evidence
stock prices do not reflect issuer earnings).
215 See Donnelly, supra note 57.
2 See, e.g., W. HiCKERNELL, supra note 184, at ix. A recent example of the burst of
a speculative bubble was the collapse a few years ago of the unofficial stock market in
Kuwait after rampant speculation and easy credit pushed prices to spectacular
heights. Cleaning up the Debris of a Stock Market Crash, Bus. Wi., Feb. 28, 1983, at
44; Epstein, Embassy Cables, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, May, 1983, at 16; Surya, Illicit
Securities Market Adds to Financial Crisis, 3 COMPANY LAW. 285 (1983); Surya, Long
Term Effects of the Stock Market Collapse, 5 COMPANY LAw. 197 (1985).
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The Act was in large part designed to insure that securities trade
on the stock market at prices equal to the present value of the issuer
income to which they entitle their owners, that is, to trade at what is
sometimes called "investment value."2 1 Investors cannot trade with
a view to investment value if they cannot get information about is-
suers, and presumably more investors will trade with a view to yield
if accurate information is readily available. Congress recognized this,
and required issuers of publicly traded securities to disseminate in-
formation about their operations and forbade at least some false
statements. But requiring disclosure was only one of several steps
that Congress took toward the larger overall end of curbing the ex-
cessive speculation that moved prices away from investment value.
The response to ruinous speculation centered on discouraging
people who were looking for price changes from participating in the
market. For example, sections 7 and 10(a) authorize administrative
agencies to keep borrowed resources out of the market, 18 and the
short-swing trading and short-sale provisions of section 16 eliminate
the incentive and wherewithal for people in critical positions to
speculate or participate in price manipulation.219 Section 9 is
designed to keep market operators from exciting the speculative im-
pulses of investors. 22
0
In 1934, "the notorious market pools" were frequently blamed for
moving price away from investment value. 2 1 Congress, along with
27 See J. WiLLIs, supra note 208; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., supra note
12, at 27-32 (1935); Note, Illegality of Stock Market Manipulation, supra note 88, at
500 n.3. See generally S. CoTTLE, R. MURRAY & F. BLOCK, GRAHAM AND DODD'S SECUR-
rry ANALYSIS (5th ed. 1988).
21 The margin provisions of § 7 were intended to limit price fluctuations and re-
duce the diversion of credit from commerce into stock market speculation. See Spe-
cial Study, supra note 27, pt. 4, at 2-3, 9-11; 2 L. Loss, SEcuarrms REGULATION, supra
note 8, at 1239-43; Staff of the Board of Governors of the F.R.S., A Review and Eval-
uation of Federal Margin Regulations 44-47, 135-67 (1984). Section 10(a), which au-
thorizes the SEC to regulate short sales, is discussed below in the text accompanying
notes 321-31.
219 Special Study, supra note 27, pt. 2 at 36 (§§ 7, 9, 10(a) and 16 were aimed at
curbing speculative excesses); see also § 11(a) (current version in 15 U.S.C. 78k(a))
(SEC regulation of excessive trading by floor members); Special Study, supra, note
27, pt. 2 at 48-57 (member's trading may unduly influence price or excite excessive
speculation).
'20 The element of inducement in the second through fifth clauses of § 9(a) evi-
dences a concern for the communicative element of the prohibited conduct. Cf. RE-
STATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 476, 479 (1932); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 525, 531
(1938) (fraudulent misrepresentation).
221 3 L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION, supra note 8, at 1529. For discussion and
criticism of pool techniques see also Hanna, supra note 20, at 15 n.7 and sources cited
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everyone else, found the pools to be terribly destructive. The pools
identified a thinly-traded security in which their trading might move
price. They sometimes accentuated the effects of their trades by ob-
taining large holders' promises not to sell while they were in the
market.222 They then acquired a position in the security, often in the
form of an option to buy at a price substantially above current mar-
ket price, and set about moving the price up.223 The pools used a
variety of devices to move price from where they found it - a level
that under the conventional view represents the conjunction of in-
vestment supply and demand, and thus the best judgment of value
- to another level at which they could close out their positions at a
profit. Every one of these devices that had been identified was out-
lawed or subjected to regulation in the Act.
Part of the solution to the pool problem consisted of denying pool
operators the tools that they had used to control supply and de-
mand, including options and the order information that specialists
possessed.224 Another part of the solution was to regulate the prac-
tices the pools used to induce others to trade. The Act's treatments
of publicity and of acts designed to induce trading are particularly
instructive in the context of the supposed centrality of disclosure to
the Act.
Trading by outsiders was crucial to the success of the manipula-
tive pools. For example, bull pools encouraged buying by outsiders
in order to inflate the price of the manipulated security. Outside
buyers were also the market for the pools' previous positions once
their prices reached satisfactory levels. The pools employed a vari-
ety of tools to excite outsiders into trading. It is this inducement of
trading that is sometimes said to be the essence of manipulation.225
Investors who suspected the existence of substantial buying inter-
est in a security could be expected to buy. One way in which the
pools induced outsiders to trade was to convince them that substan-
in 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION, supra note 8, at 1530 n.5.
222 3 L. Loss, SEcuRrrms REGULATION, supra note 8, at 1529-30 (quoting Comment,
supra note 88, at 626-27); Hanna, supra note 20, at 15 n.7.
223 Bear pools might sell short and then set out to depress price so that they could
cover at a profit.
... See §§ 9(b)-(d) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78i(b)-(d) (options), § 11(b), id. at §
78k(b) (specialists' books); supra notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
2I Clark, supra note 55, at 348 ("Manipulation is behavior aimed at creating trad-
ing, or the appearance of active trading, in a security for the purpose of inducing
others to buy or sell the security."); Comment, Regulation of Stock Market Manipu-
lation, supra note 88, at 512 ("Market manipulation refers to widely varying types of
devices used to stimulate or to discourage the buying and selling of securities.").
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tial interests were trading.226 The cheapest way for operators to con-
vince the public that substantial traders were in the market for a
security was to engage in fisk-free trades, such as wash sales. Sec-
tion 9(a)(1) made it illegal to effect such transactions for the purpose
of creating a misleading appearance with respect to the market in
exchange-registered securities. These trades were publicized in a
way that suggested that they involved a change of ownership, and as
such they are fairly characterized as deceptive.227 However, section 9
goes beyond forbidding misrepresentations and acts likely to be mis-
interpreted; it treats some information as an improper subject of
discourse and declares that such information may not be communi-
cated. A variety of actors are forbidden to disseminate even correct
information about market activity if they are acting for the purpose
of inducing others to trade.
The pools used actual trades as well as fictitious ones to create the
market activity and the nascent price movements that excited pub-
lic trading. It will be recalled that for many investors rising prices
are a signal to begin buying.228 Pool operators took advantage of this
in creating a trading record that would induce others to buy. Bull
pools traded vigorously or bid up the price of a security by a small
amount in order to convince outsiders that the security was under-
valued, and to bring in other buyers who would push the security's
price up to a point at which the pool could profitably unload its
holdings. Section 9(a)(2) outlaws these practices.2 It makes it ille-
gal to use trading that creates actual or apparent active trading or
price changes for the purpose of inducing others to trade.230 Section
228 "One sure method of pulling traders into a pool is to show a rising market on
heavy volume." 8 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, at 110 (testimony of T. Corco-
ran); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., supra note 12, at 471.
27 Because of their deceptive nature such trades may have been illegal even before
enactment of the Act. United States v. Brown, 5 F. Supp. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1933), af'd,
79 F.2d 321 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 296 U.S. 650 (1935); Berle, supra note 28.
228 See supra notes 206-212 and accompanying text.
2219 It shall be unlawful for any person ... [t]o effect, alone or with one or
more other persons, a series of transactions in any security registered on a
national securities exchange creating actual or apparent active trading in
such security or raising or depressing the price of such security, for the
purpose of inducing the purchase or sale of such security by others.
Section 9(a)(2) of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)(2).
'0 The SEC insisted on rewriting the codification of § 9(a)(2) in the proposed Fed-
eral Securities Code [hereinafter the Code] "to eliminate the troublesome require-
ment. . . of showing a purpose to induce others to buy or sell." 2 ALI FED. SEC. CODE
§ 1609(c) comment (2d Supp. 1981); see R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 62, at
624. The rewritten Code would forbid anyone to effect transactions or to create active
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9(a)(2) is concerned with the use of trading to communicate gener-
ally, not just with the use of trading to deceive. It forbids the crea-
tion of apparent trading activity, but it also forbids the creation of
real price changes and of actual activity.23'
Investors responded to active trading and to price increases for a
variety of reasons. Some may have suspected that the buyers had
valuable information. Many simply suspected the existence of bull
pools and hoped to profit along with the operators by selling before
trading in a security for the purpose of raising or depressing its price or that of a
related security-
Manipulation by Trading. - It is unlawful for any person to effect (alone
or with one or more other persons) a series of transactions in a security, or
to create active trading (actual or apparent) in a security, for the purpose of
raising or depressing the price of (1) the same security, (2) a security of a
different class of the same issuer, or (3) a security of a controlling, con-
trolled, or commonly controlled company.
2 ALI FED. SEC. CODE § 1609(c) (2d Supp. 1981).
This codification would simply forbid by statute what the SEC already has power
under § 9(a)(6) of the Act to forbid by rule. See generally infra notes 294-307 and
accompanying text. Section 9(a)(6) is codified at § 1610 of the Code. See also 2 ALI
FED. SEC. CODE § 1609(d) (codification of Rule lob-6) (2d Supp. 1981). It leaves unad-
dressed the problem of excited trading that is at the heart of § 9(a)(2). In this the
revised Code reflects the error of viewing the manipulation provisions as directed at
nothing more than arcane deceptive acts; it treats manipulation as nothing more than
interference with the market.
The Code would not forbid all the conduct forbidden by the section either. One can
violate § 9(a)(2) by trading to change price or to create active trading, in either case
for the forbidden purpose of inducing trading. A trader who uses trades to create
price changes to induce trading violates § 9(a)(2) and would also violate the Code,
since such a person by hypothesis intends his trades to cause price changes and pre-
sumably has a purpose of changing price. Someone who creates active trading by
trading in order to induce others to trade would violate § 9(a)(2) but not the Code.
The Code would instead make it unlawful to create active trading for the purpose of
changing price, so under the Code in an active trading case the Commission would
have to prove that the trader acted for the purpose of causing a price change. The
Commission might argue that a person with the purpose of changing price created
active trading to induce others to trade and change price, but this would require
proof of § 9(a)(2) purpose (inducing trades) and more (changing price).
3S1 Cf. Stock Exchange Practices: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 7558-59, 7580 (1934), reprinted in 7 LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY, supra note 11, item 22 (NYSE proposals to limit section to transactions
creating misleading appearance of trading volume or prices not reflecting market
value). Poser insists that § 9(a)(2) of the Act is also directed at deceptive trading
practices, on the theory that a purpose to mislead investors about investment supply
and demand is an element of a § 9(a)(2) violation. Poser, supra note 10, at 703-05; cf.
H. MANNE, supra note 10, at 152-53 (pools allegedly attempted to mislead technical
traders). However, § 9(a)(2) forbids the wrongful creation of actual price changes or
actual or apparent activity, in contrast to § 9(a)(1), which reaches only misleading
appearances. See also infra notes 228-31, 294-98 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1988
MANIPULATION UNDER SECTION 10(b)
the stocks collapsed.132 Pool operations and other manipulations
were well known during the bull market that led up to the 1929
crash.3 Outsiders who treated the market like a chain letter were
the natural allies of the pool operators who were trying to move
prices. Regular reporting of the operations of a pool could greatly
aid in its success, 234 and some operators, in hopes of exciting public
interest and trading, employed agents to inform brokerage firms of
when a pool was about to create a price move. 5
Verbal communications that induce trading or that are intended
to do so are the subject of sections 9(a)(3) through (5). In addition
to making it unlawful to lie in section 9(a)(4), the Act makes it ille-
gal for some people to circulate information about market opera-
tions undertaken for the purpose of influencing price. Section
9(a)(3) makes it illegal for brokers, dealers, or traders to induce
trades of exchange-registered securities by "the circulation or dis-
semination in the ordinary course of business of information to the
effect that the price of any such security will or is likely to rise or
fall because of market operations of any one or more persons con-
ducted for the purpose of raising or depressing the prices of such
security." Section 9(a)(5) makes it unlawful for anyone else to in-
duce a trade by circulating or disseminating such information in ex-
change for a payment from a broker, dealer, or trader.
Sections 9(a)(3) and (5) then make it illegal for many market par-
ticipants to make true statements about price-directed market oper-
ations if they thereby induce trading, 3 and section 9(a)(4) makes it
2W. HICKERNELL, supra note 184, at 67 ("One reason for buying [during price
climb] is the belief that a pool is actually at work .... "); R SOBEL, TnE BIG BOARD
- A HISTORY OF THE NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE 247-48, 251-52 (1965) ("The public
thought that it could not make money without the aid of manipulators."); TWTEmH
CENTURY FUND, INC., supra note 12, at 444; Comment, Regulation of Stock Market
Manipulation, supra note 88, at 512; see also B. GRAHAm, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR
43 (1965).
233 F. PECORA, WALL STREET UNDER OATH 171 (1939) (1968 reprint); R. SOBEL,
supra note 231, at 251-52, 267, 269, 272 (publication of reports of pools); cf. Scott v.
Brown, Doering, McNab & Co., (1892) 2 Q.B. 724, 729, 61 L.J. (N.S.) 738, 741, quoted
in 3 L. Loss, supra note 8, at 1529 n.1. There was even a maxim: "Stocks never go up;
they are put up." Hanna, supra note 20, at 14.
'3 In re Michael J. Meehan, 2 S.E.C. 588, 598 (1937); TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND,
INC., supra note 12, at 477-81.
235 W. HICKERNELL, supra note 184, at 58; TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., supra
note 12, at 466-71; Herlands, supra note 88, at 159, 164.
211 It seems clear that the proscription of true statements in the subsections was
intended and was not the result of poor drafting. Early commentaries noted that § 9
forbad the making of true statements. See J. FLYNN, supra note 88, at 284; C. MEYER.
THE SECuRITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 ANALYZED AND EXPLAINED 73-74 (1934) (§
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illegal for traders to make false statements about material market
operations for .the purpose of inducing trading.5 7 It is particularly
difficult to square sections 9(a)(3) and (5) with the notion that the
fundamental purpose of the Act is the achievement of full
disclosure.2 8
Full and honest disclosure cannot explain even the provisions of
the Act that deal with the dissemination of information. The Act
was intended to do much more than to "substitute a philosophy of
full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor.'121' The provi-
sions of the Act dealing with communication reflect a profound
awareness of the potential effect of information on security prices -
and through prices on the public welfare. Toward the end of creat-
ing a market in which security prices would reflect information re-
lating to issuer profitability, Congress required issuers to disclose in-
formation about their operations. Congress went beyond requiring
those with information to disclose it. Even with accurate informa-
tion available, Congress was apparently unwilling to trust the public
welfare to markets dominated by investors who had just shown
themselves prone to fantastically destructive speculation. The Act
discourages the trafficking in information that Congress did not
want reflected in price. Part (2) of section 9(a) forbids market opera-
tors to employ certain trading signals, and parts (3) and (5) forbid
9(a)(3) "is in part directed at the practices ... [of] recommending the purchase of a
stock on the ground pool is operating in it. Such statements may no longer be made
even if they are true."); Comment, supra note 88, at 630; Cf. Legislation, Federal
Regulation of Securities: Some Problems of Civil Liability, 48 HARv. L. REv. 107, 112
n.36 (1934) ("Subdivision (3) [of § 9(a)] is a purely punitive regulation which does not
involve fraud at all."). But see marginal index notation to § 9(a)(3), 48 Stat. 881, 889
("Circulate false information concerning market operations. . . "). False statements
about market operations may not even violate subsections (3) and (5). Section 9(a)(4)
of the Act independently proscribes false rumors, and the use of the words "informa-
tion to the effect" in clauses (3) and (5) - as opposed to "statement ... false or
misleading with respect to any material fact" in clause (4) - suggest that statements
must be true to be within clauses (3) and (5).
137 Section 9 of the Act, supra note 2, does not forbid making a true statement
about market operations, even for the purpose of inducing trading, unless the state-
ment does in fact induce others to trade.
238 Norman Poser suggests that deception is an element of subsections (3) and (5)
because "these two subsections are in a sense derivative as they can be violated by
truthful statements only if there is a manipulation." Poser, supra note 10, at 702
n.187. But deception is by derivation an element of the subsections only if "market
operations ... conducted for the purpose of raising or depressing the prices of such
security" are deceptive. Such operations are not inherently deceptive, and they can
be so characterized only if investors are entitled to believe no one undertakes such
operations, in which case their deceptive aspect is of little consequence.
2s9 See supra text accompanying note 100.
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them to announce their operations. Whether the meaning of manip-
ulation is to be found in the Act's fundamental purpose of discour-
aging speculation or in the specific provisions of section 9, section
10(b) seems to empower the SEC to regulate the discussion of secur-
ity market operations that cause price changes.
D. Trading and Price - The Control of Disruptive Trading
To the extent that security prices are determined by information,
the pricing mechanism can be regulated by regulating the flow of
information. Prices on any market reflect the value judgments of its
participants, and presumably those judgments will always be a func-
tion of the information that is available to the participants. Thus,
prices will reflect whatever information makes a difference to those
investors who are willing and able to trade. Although it may well be
said that prices should reflect the analysis of whomever is prepared
to participate in the market, Congress in 1934 did not want the
analysis of some investors who could afford to trade to be reflected
in the market. To this end, parts (1) through (5) of section 9(a) for-
bid the use of certain devices in order to execute misinformed or
poorly motivated trades.
Although the reporting provisions of the Act and the parts of sec-
tion 9(a) noted above cannot all be characterized as requiring full
disclosure, they all regulate the flow of information. They require
the disclosure of some items, forbid the communication of informa-
tion about other things, and prohibit communications that may cre-
ate incorrect impressions. If these were the only important provi-
sions of the Act, then it would be difficult to argue, as this article
does, that the residual authority granted to the SEC in section 10(b)
should permit it to regulate more than the flow of information, no
matter how the authority is stated. 40 However, other provisions of
the Act, including some that were seen as quite central by those who
pressed for the Act's adoption, have nothing to do with information
or with full disclosure.
Information does not translate itself into price. Prices are deter-
mined by the decisions of market participants. Information is re-
flected in price only after it influences the behavior of market par-
ticipants, and information influences market participants only after
10 This is not to say that authority to regulate deception would be adequate to the
task of creating a fully informed market. Regulation of deception would not allow for
required disclosure or, as the Court has construed deception, the regulation of inno-
cent misrepresentations.
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they learn and analyze it.241 Ultimately it is trading that sets
pricey.24
Prices on ideal markets are the product of the views of all market
participants on the values of the securities traded in the market,
with each view carrying the weight of the resources its holder com-
mits to it. Thus, prices reflect all of the available information that
market participants consider to be relevant to value. A trade on
such a market changes price only if it leads other participants to
change their views or if it is so large a trade that it exceeds the
amount of the security that other market participants are willing to
buy or to sell at the prevailing price.2 4 3 In a market made up of in-
vestors who draw the same conclusions from the available informa-
tion, trades that are not understood to disclose information will not
affect price. If investors do not agree on the conclusions to be drawn
from the available information, then a trade that exceeds the supply
or demand that is available at the prevailing price may not be possi-
ble at that price, even if it is non-informative. The trade will thus
produce a pressure-induced price change, which is entirely appropri-
ate. The price at which the trade occurs will reflect the judgment of
investors who are willing to risk their own money in the market,
with the change in price simply being the result of the addition of
the new investors' judgment to the mix.
If many investors, each with a great deal of money, are assembled
together, it is extremely unlikely that the trading of any one inves-
tor will affect market clearing prices, unless such trading changes
other investors' views on the values of the securities in question. Al-
though investors may not all feel the same way about all securities,
there are still many investors who are willing to trade most publicly
traded securities at or very near market prices. Even if an investor
buys or sells a great amount of a security for any one person, for
most publicly traded securities the trade is unlikely to be significant
relative to the total supply and demand available at the prevailing
price.
To the extent that the commodity traded on the stock market is
an income stream, the potential supply or demand for a particular
21 Prices will change as investors reevaluate securities in response to new informa-
tion, but until the reevaluation is complete trades may occur at prices different from
the one that will ultimately prevail. At any given time trades will occur at a price at
which buying and selling interest offset each other.
2 Prices may change in response to new information without anyone trading, but
the price change does depend on a change in the price at which investors would be
willing to trade. Cf. Carney, supra note 31, at 880 (reservation prices).
24 See J. WILLIAMS, supra note 208, at 10-41; Levmore, supra note 31, at 651-57.
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security at the market price is, for most purposes, infinite. Investors
who are interested in securities only because they produce income,
will, after all, view two securities they expect to produce the same
income stream as basically identical, even if the issuers are in very
different businesses.
244
Although many people are able and willing to trade most widely
traded securities at market price, they are not always in the market.
A trade may change the price of a security simply because it is so
large that the market cannot instantaneously mobilize supply or de-
mand. The securities markets can handle most trades without such
disruption,2 45 but a large trade can dislocate prices, especially if rela-
tively few investors are interested in trading the security.2 46 The
price at which such disruptive trades occur reflects the appraisal not
of all investors willing to trade, but only of those who are present in
the market when the trade is made. This "incorrect" price will last
2144 Investors will seldom believe that the distribution of probable returns from two
securities are identical. Although many issuers will be affected the same way by most
events that may affect the return on their securities, few will be affected the same
way by all events. However by diversifying her portfolio an investor can substantially
reduce the impact of events that affect the income of only one or a few securities
without sacrificing return. With relatively little diversification an investor can elimi-
nate most such firm-specific risk. No one security will be particularly helpful in
achieving this diversification. R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 23, at 119-54; J.
LORE, P. DODD, & U. KIMPTON, supra note 23, at 108-31; J. VAN HoRNE, supra note
54, at 55-76. Thus any given security and many others will be almost perfect substi-
tutes for each other for the purpose of constructing an appropriate portfolio. See R.
BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 23, at 278-79; cf. Scholes, supra note 31, at 179.
I4l Even large transactions have at most only a negligible pressure effect on price
so long as other investors are convinced that the transaction is not triggered by pri-
vate information. R. BREALEY & S. MYERs, supra note 23, at 278-79; J. LORIE, P. DODD
& M. KiM rON, supra note 23, at 68-73; Carney, supra note 31, at 887; Scholes, supra
note 31, at 211.
216 See Special Study, supra note 27, pt. 2, at 15-18; K. GARBADE, supra note 23, at
419-28 (market depth, breadth and resiliency). Trading by stock exchange specialists
was a "pet target" of stock exchange critics during the debate over the Act. J. FLYNN,
supra note 88, at 228; see also S. REP. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 5
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, item 21, at 23-28; see also supra notes 183-186.
The reason usually given for allowing specialists to trade for their own accounts is
that they can thereby maintain orderly markets with price continuity in thinly traded
securities. S. REP. No. 1455, supra, at 26. The SEC permits exchanges to use special-
ists to assist in the maintenance of fair and orderly markets. 17 C.F.R. § 240.11b-
1(a)(2) (1988); see Special Study, supra note 27, at 88-121; see also Cole, Specialists
Man the Ramparts, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1987, at D14, col. 1; cf. N.Y.S.E. Guide
(CCH) 1 2104.10 (functions of specialist include maintenance of a fair and orderly
market which implies minimizing effects of temporary disparity between supply and
demand).
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only until other investors come to the market,24 but until this oc-
curs, the new trade price may cause problems for those who rely on
market prices.
People interested in changing the price of a security (for purposes
such as triggering a right or avoiding a liability) need not create or
disclose any information to the market, and need not change other
investors' minds about the value of the security. Even if appropriate
resources are devoted to the market by well-informed and well-moti-
vated investors, if market mechanisms are less than perfect, prices
will not precisely correspond to the consensus judgment of value -
and even perfecting the consensus will not produce appropriate
prices. Those who stand to benefit from changes in reported prices
can simply trade in a way that takes advantage of the market's in-
ability to mobilize all "investors instantaneously.4 8 One way that
they can do this is to use carefully timed trades to control prices
temporarily. People with obligations or rights measured in terms of
market prices may be able to profit from a temporary change in re-
ported prices resulting from such trading. Since their profits depend
only on a price being reported and not on their being able to trade
at that price, they can benefit from the pressure effect of their
trades even if they do not inspire others to trade.249 Given the speed
247 See Scholes, supra note 31, at 182. Traders who realize that the new price is the
result of a market defect will not trade until price rebounds. If some traders are will-
ing to trade in the mistaken belief the new price represents an equilibrium market-
clearing price, bargain hunters will eagerly trade with them.
248 The pricing of securities traded on the organized exchanges is affected by
the forces of simple competition only after they have been refracted
through the machinery of the exchanges, a point at which artificial stimuli
can have great immediate effects upon security quotations. Manipulation is
the generic term used to identify the employment of such stimuli for the
primary purpose of controlling the prices or the volume of transactions of
securities traded on the exchanges.
Comment, supra note 88, at 624.
249 Those who change prices by their trading pressure will not be able to trade at
the prices produced by their trading. The pressure effect of their trading will last only
so long as they trade. It does not reflect the supply or demand of those with whom
they would trade. Thus a person can bid up the price of a security by buying but
cannot sell at that price unless other traders hold it up.
Trading that presses price up may lead others to conclude the security is worth the
new price. These others may then be willing to buy from the trader at the inflated
price. The trader succeeds in raising the price at which he or she can sell the security
because his or her trades lead others to reevaluate the security, not because its trades
absorb the supply available at the prevailing price. The ploy only works if the public
is fooled, while contractual rights can be triggered even if the trading public ignores
closing prices. Nonetheless, there have been spectacular instances of such support.
See Genesco, Inc., Prospectus 19-23 (May 10, 1966), reprinted in [1964-66 Transfer
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with which supply and demand will be brought to bear, the prices
that they create may not prevail for long, but they may accomplish
their purposes if they can control the reported prices, even
momentarily.
Often such interested people trade heavily just before the close of
the market in order to control closing prices and thus manipulate
their contractual rights or obligations.2 50 In one scheme, traders
working for a large brokerage firm used concerted trading to inflate
the nominal value of the portfolio that they managed. The traders
ordered large amounts of securities on several exchanges at prices
above market price during the final minutes of trading on Christmas
Eve, resulting in a substantial increase in the closing price value of
the portfolio.25 This trading did not change the price that the bro-
kerage firm could have realized on the sale of the portfolio, but the
firm planned to base bonuses on closing prices, so, had they not
been caught, the traders would have received substantially larger
bonuses as a result of the temporary price inflation that their trad-
ing produced.
It is not clear how such a scheme violates the securities laws.252
The traders did not violate section 9(a)(2) unless they intended the
record of their trades to induce others to trade. There was no evi-
dence that they intended to induce others to trade, and in fact they
traded so late in the day that others would not have had time to act
in response to the publication of their trades.2 3 The SEC charged
some of the traders with violating section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, in
that the trades moved prices away from those that normal supply
and demand would have produced. The traders consented to an in-
junction against violating these provisions. The SEC overreached if
section 10(b) only reaches deceptive devices and contrivances. The
traders purposefully distorted market prices, but even if that is rep-
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 1 77,354 (issuer-controlled entities accounted for up to sev-
enty-five percent of monthly trading in issuer stock during period of substantial is-
suer distributions); See also supra note 36 and accompanying text.
250 The last prices at which trades occur on stock exchanges are clearly defined and
widely published and thus are well suited for use as contractual references.
251 SEC v. Choset, SEC Litigation Release No. 10,036 (June 15, 1983) (S.D.N.Y.
June 14, 1983) (LEXIS, Fedsec library, Rels file) (injunction entered by consent);
Rustin & Putka, supra note 38.
252 As employees of a brokerage firm the traders were subject to sanctions by self-
regulatory organizations that would not have been available against unregulated per-
sons. The exchanges imposed heavy fines on the traders for violations of § 10(b), Rule
10b-5 and exchange rules. Litigation Release No. 10,036, supra note 251.
211 Cf. In re J.A.B. Securities Co., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 15,948, 17 SEC
Docket 1086 (June 25, 1979) (presumption of purpose).
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rehensible, it is not deceptive.2' They did not represent that in
trading they were motivated by normal supply and demand. Nor
were people reading the reports of the trades entitled to assume that
the traders were so motivated, inasmuch as the law neither requires
traders to disclose their motivations nor makes it illegal to trade for
the purpose of changing prices.255
The point of this scheme may have been novel, but people often
trade to support or to depress the prices of securities in order to
trigger rights tied to market price or to prevent the triggering of
duties tied to prices.256 Schemes like this are troubling for several
reasons. Their publication may lead people to believe that the stock
market is a rigged game, thereby increasing the cost of capital to
security issuers who will have to compensate investors for playing.
Moreover, people who would like to base conduct on the price at
which a particular security can be traded cannot use reported prices
as a proxy for available prices without making expensive and impre-
cise adjustments for price aberrations.257 If one party to a contract
trades in order to influence security prices to the detriment of an-
other party, then the other party may be entitled to redress on the
theory that the first party has interfered with the occurrence of a
condition. 58 But even this theory offers no relief to parties
prejudiced by price aberrations resulting from the concerted trading
25 If the brokerage firm's bonuses were fixed by contract it is hard to see who
might have complained of being misled other than investors who thought the value of
their portfolios had appreciated when they read the paper Christmas morning but
were later disappointed to find they had not. See Rustin & Putka, supra note 38, at
4, col. 4 (prices receded after holiday weekend).
"I See Berle, supra note 28, at 272 (no common law obligation to refrain from
arranging trades to unduly influence price).
256 Typical schemes have involved rights to purchase or obligations to sell securities
at market price and attempts to support the price of securities pledged as collateral,
see Proposed Amendment of Rule X-10B-7, Exchange Act Release No. 6127, [1957-
1961 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 76,675, at 80,538 (Nov. 30, 1959).
See generally Ricks, SEC Believes Short-Term Manipulation of Stock Prices Oc-
curred, Official Says, Wall St. J., Nov. 23, 1987, at 4, col. 2 (short-term manipulation
of prices in connection with secondary offerings and acquisitions and to avoid margin
calls).
257 Such persons might protect themselves by defining their rights or obligations by
reference to an average price over a longer trading period, over which it would seem
aberrational prices would be less important. This may be difficult to accomplish how-
ever, and in any event will increase the cost of using market prices as contractual
triggers. See also Levmore, supra note 31 (superiority of market prices to appraised
prices for purposes of governing behavior).
255 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTACTS §§ 225, 245 (1981); McDermott, De-
fining Manipulation in Commodity Futures Trading: The Futures Squeeze, 74 Nw.
UL. REv. 202, 215-25 (1979).
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of wholly unrelated third parties.
Concerted trading is sometimes used to influence the price at
which a future securities trade will occur. Substantial sales of securi-
ties are sometimes announced in advance, with the price to be based
on the reported price at some future date. It is often possible for
someone to profit by influencing that price through concerted trad-
ing. The SEC has addressed such concerted trading in two recent
rule-making initiatives.
One trading scheme that takes advantage of a proposed sale at a
price to be based on a price reported at a certain time in the future
is called shorting a public offering.2 9 It can be used whenever an
issuer or an owner proposes the future public sale of a security that
is already publicly traded, with the price to be that prevailing just
before the sale. 60 The schemers sell short a substantial amount of
the security on the market just before the sale price is to be set,
thereby driving down the market price and with it the price at
which the distribution will be made.26 They then cover their short
sales by buying in the public sale at the reduced price that they
have produced. If they sell enough to force the price down, then the
schemers are sure of a profit, unless the seller calls off the transac-
tion at the last moment. The scheme works not by misleading the
seller about market interest, but by taking advantage of the under-
taking to sell at the future reported price. If the seller goes through
with the transaction, it may sell for less than the price that the mar-
ket would bear, and thus pay an inappropriately high cost for
capital."'
The SEC has expressed concern about shorting public offerings on
several occasions, and it recently adopted a rule, on a temporary ba-
sis, that regulates the practice.23 However, as the SEC seems to rec-
ognize, it may not have the authority to adopt such a rule.26 ' The
2" See J.A.B., supra note 253; Exchange Act Release No. 26,028, supra note 87
(adopting temporary Rule 10b-21 (T)); Exchange Act Release No. 24,485, supra note
87 (proposing Rule 10b-21).
260 The seller may announce this or the issuer may reveal it in a registration state-
ment filed under the Securities Act. See, e.g., J.A.B., supra note 253, at n.il.
2"1 The respondents in J.A.B., supra note 253, did this with three securities that
were traded on the American Stock Exchange, and their sales, which accounted for
about half or more of the trading in the last twenty minutes of the day, drove down
the closing prices and accordingly the prices at which the securities were distributed.
262 Exchange Act Release No. 26,028, supra note 87, at 89,386 (first-hand experi-
ence of commentators).
2' Rule 10b-21 (T), 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,741; Exchange Act Release No.
26,028, supra note 87 (adopting release).
2 6 See Exchange Act Release No. 26,028, supra note 87, at 89,383; Exchange Act
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SEC might regulate short-selling campaigns in exchange-registered
securities under sections 9(a)(6) and 10(a),265 but the problem may
be more severe in distributions of over-the-counter securities that
are outside the scope of these sections..2 6 The SEC can regulate over
the counter campaigns under section 10(b) even though they are not
deceptive if, as suggested in this article, the term manipulative has
independent significance. (Of course, the SEC can argue that short
sales that depress prices mislead the public, ' 7 but given that the
shorters are not concerned with what the public thinks, this argu-
ment once again begs the question of the public's right to believe
that prices reflect only investment supply and demand.)
The converse of shorting into a public offering may be used when
an issuer proposes to trade its stock for assets. If the number of
shares to be delivered is based on their price on a future date, then
the issuer has an incentive to bid up the price of the security before
that date. The SEC's current position on such trading began to take
form in litigation it initiated in 1966.
In the early 1960s, the Georgia-Pacific Corporation ("GP") bought
several businesses and agreed to pay for them with its common
stock. The exact number of shares to be paid in each case was to be
based on NYSE prices at certain times after the date of the acquisi-
tion agreement. In 1966, the SEC charged GP with bidding up the
price of its stock in connection with the acquisition program, claim-
ing that GP thereby violated section 10(b), Rule 10b-5, and in addi-
tion, Rule 10b-6,1as which declares it unlawful for persons participat-
ing in the distribution of a security to purchase it.2 6 9 The SEC
Release No. 24,485, supra note 87, at 88,681.
265 If a shorted security is registered on an exchange, the SEC may be able to pro-
ceed against the shorters under § 9(a)(2) of the Act. The difficulty with a § 9(a)(2)
charge in this situation, as always, is proving purpose to induce others to trade. The
shorters' purpose is to depress price, not to get others to sell. However, their purpose
will be furthered if others join in and depress the price further. The respondents in
J.A.B., supra note 253, argued that their trading late in the day was inconsistent with
a purpose of inducing others to trade. The SEC rejected the argument, noting that
some of the respondents' trades "were early enough to permit others to react," and
finding "the inference compelling that [the respondents' sales that were intended to
depress market price] were also calculated to entice others to effect transactions
which would further lower those prices." Id. at 1091. The SEC underscored the weak-
ness of this inference when it emphasized that it would have imposed the same sanc-
tions even if it had not found a § 9(a)(2) violation. Id. at n.17.
26 Exchange Act Release No. 24,485, supra note 87, at 88,681.
267 J.A.B., supra note 253, at n.13.
268 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1988).
265 SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 91,680 (S.D.N.Y. April 27, 1966).
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alleged that GP and entities that it controlled intentionally pur-
chased GP stock "in a manner which would and did.., cause the
last sale price of GP common stock on the NYSE to rise in order
that GP's obligation to issue additional shares" under the agree-
ments would be avoided or at least reduced.270 GP subsequently
consented to the entry of an injunction against, among other things,
"[b]idding for or purchasing any security of GP for the purpose of
creating actual or apparent active trading in or raising the price of
any security of GP.'' 27 1 Since GP consented to the injunction, the
SEC was never forced to explain how these purchases violated sec-
tion 10(b).17 2
In 1970, the SEC proposed to require all issuers of publicly traded
securities effecting repurchases to comply with most of the terms to
which Georgia-Pacific had consented.2 7 3 The SEC did not explain its
authority to regulate the manner in which issuers accomplish repur-
chases, but it proposed to regulate repurchases under section 13(e)
of the Act, under which it may have greater authority than it has
under section 10(b) .2 4 The SEC never adopted the proposal, but it
specifically addressed issuer repurchases in 1982 when it adopted
Rule 10b-18.17 1 Instead of forbidding non-conforming repurchases,
270 Id. at 95,489. The purchases "were caused to be concentrated near the close of
the market. . . . "Id. at 95,488.
271 SEC v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., [1964-66 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 91,692 at 95,525 (S.D.N.Y. May 24, 1966). Georgia-Pacific also agreed not to
buy its securities during a distribution except as permitted by Rule 10b-6, nor to buy
its securities within ten days prior to any date the market price of any Georgia-Pa-
cific security is to be used to determine the amount of such security to be issued as
consideration for assets acquired by it, nor to buy more than a specified part of the
average daily and weekly trading volume of its securities on the NYSE. Bids and
purchases were not to be made at the opening of the NYSE and orders were to be
executed before the close of the Exchange. Id. at 95,525-26.
272 But see Loomis, Purchase by a Corporation of its Own Securities, 22 Rec.
N.Y.C.B.A. 275 (1967) (address by SEC general counsel). See generally R. JENNINGS
& H. MARSH, supra note 62, at 820-22; Note, Corporate Stock Repurchases Under
the Federal Securities Laws, 66 COLUM. L. REV. 1292, 1298-1300 (1966).
273 Notice of Proposal to Adopt Rule 13e-2 and to Amend Rule 10b-6 Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release No. 8930, [1969-1970 Trans-
fer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 77,837 (July 13, 1970) (proposing Rule 13e-2);
see also Revision of Proposed Rule 13e-2 and Amendment to Rule 10b-6 Under the
Exchange Act, Exchange Act Release No. 10,539 [1973 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 1 79,600 (Dec. 6, 1973); Purchases of Certain Equity Securities by the
Issuer and Others, Exchange Act Release No. 17,222 [1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 1 82,669 (Oct. 17, 1980).
274 See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
275 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-18 (1988).
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Rule 10b-18 establishes a safe harbor from sections 9(a)(2) and
10(b) and from Rule 10b-5, for issuer repurchases conducted within
the terms set forth in the rule. 76 The conditions of the safe harbor,
which are designed to limit the effect of repurchases on price, are
basically that the issuer and related parties may purchase only a
relatively small amount of the security, and that they must accom-
plish all purchases at or below market price. 7
The SEC again failed to explain how issuer repurchases violate
section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5; apparently, the SEC simply assumed
that issuers need a safe harbor s.2 7  The SEC said that it was con-
cerned with issuer repurchases because "investors and particularly
the issuer's shareholders should be able to rely on a market that is
set by independent market forces and not influenced in any manipu-
lative manner by the issuer."217 This sounds good, and perhaps the
SEC should have found a way to protect investor reliance instead of
creating a safe harbor for repurchasers that may undermine it. But
if deception is an element of a section 10(b) violation, as the Court
has repeatedly suggested, then there is no need for a safe harbor,
unless issuer repurchases are deceptive in and of themselves or, if
investors are entitled to assume that issuers have not influenced the
276The rule provides that the purchaser shall not be deemed to have violated the
provisions solely by reason of the timing, price or magnitude of the complying
purchases, leaving open the possibility that the purchaser might violate them for
some other reason, such as a purpose to influence price or induce trading. The adopt-
ing release repeatedly says the rule is a safe harbor, however. The "solely by reason"
language was intended to make clear that the whole transaction was not immunized
from § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. Securities Act Release No. 6434, [1982 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 83,276, at 85,478 n.5 (Nov. 17, 1982).
17 Rule 10b-18(b). One condition is that repurchases may not constitute the open-
ing transaction and must be made before the last half hour of the trading day. Rule
10b-18(b)(2). The SEC informally waived this condition for issuers that initiated re-
purchase programs the day after the NYSE's record October 19, 1987, price break.
Wurczinger, Confusion Follows SEC Reaction to Stock Crash, Nat'l L.J., Nov. 9,
1987, at 20, col. 1; Dorfman, SEC Clarifies Position on Buy-Backs In Potentially
Manipulative Late Trades, Wall St. J., Nov. 16, 1987, at 6, col. 1.
2178 "[S]ince the general language of the anti-manipulative provisions of the federal
securities laws offers little guidance with respect to the scope of permissible issuer
market behavior, certainty with respect to the potential liabilities for issuers engaged
in repurchase programs has seemed desirable." Securities Act Release 6434, supra
note 276, at 85,477.
The SEC also failed to explain the source of its authority to exempt transactions
from § 9(a)(2) of the Act for violations of which the statute provides a private rem-
edy, § 9(e). The adopting release listed the Act §§ 2, 3, 9(a)(6), 10(b), 13(e), 15(c) and
23(a) as authority for the rule, but it did not specify which of these authorizes the
SEC to exempt transactions from § 9(a)(2).
27 Securities Act Release No. 6434, supra note 276, at 85,477.
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prices of their securities with their trading. Issuer repurchases are
subject to criticism on several fronts,28 0 not the least of which is that
they are sometimes used to distort market prices,281 but they are not
inherently deceptive. Nor is it clear why investors are entitled to
assume that issuers have not tampered with market prices. While it
might be argued that it is an improper use of corporate resources to
repurchase stock for the purpose of influencing price, neither com-
mon experience nor any law against trading justifies the assumption
that all reported trades are motivated by investment interest.2 82
The question of whether trades can disrupt the market and affect
prices more than is justified by their information content is also
raised by the debate over program trading. During the last several
years, NYSE daily trading-volume and price-change records have
been approached and broken frequently, and even before the col-
lapse of prices on October 19, 1987, the magnitude of the price
swings had attracted a great deal of attention and concern.28 3 Many
critics complained even before the crash that program trading, espe-
cially computerized arbitrage trading, had increased market volatil-
ity.28 4 Criticism grew after the crash, and if there is not an official
explanation of the crash at least some of the official reports put a
substantial part of the blame on program trading.285 Whether or not
280 See generally, V. BRUDNEY & M. CHMRELSTEIN, supra note 23, at 533-83.
28, See, e.g., Putka, supra note 36 (issuer caused third party to buy its shares to
raise price to make stock-for-stock takeover bid more attractive).
2182 But see Berle, supra note 28, at 274-79.
28I Stocks Plunge 508 Amid Panicky Selling, Wall St. J., Oct. 20, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
284 See, e.g., Division of Market Reg., SEC, Role of Index-Related Trading in the
Market Decline on September 11 and 12, 1986 (March 1987); Lee, What's with the
Casino Society? FORBES, Sept. 22, 1986, at 150; Seligman, Don't Fret About Program
Trading, FORTUNE, Oct. 13, 1986, at 87; Wurczinger, supra note 277; Williams, The
Big Board's Battle to Contain the Damage, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1987, § 3, at 8, col.
1; Cowan, Bitter Lessons During Plunge, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1987, at D1, col. 3, and
at D15, col. 6 (Donald Regan); McMurray, Stock-Index Markets Are Hurt by Rout,
Wall St. J., Oct. 22, 1987, at 6, col. 1; Sanger, Traders Expect Regulatory Action on
Program Trading, N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1987, at 36, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Oct. 22, 1987,
at 35, col. 1; Anders, Stock Price Swings Raise Question: Is Character of Market
Changing? Wall St. J., Oct. 1, 1986, at 35, col. 4; Interest-Rate Worries and Program
Trading Send Stocks Plunging, Wall St. J., Sept. 12, 1986, at 1, col. 6. David Ruder
focused on program trading in his first public address after becoming chairman of the
SEC. Wall St. J., Oct. 7, 1987, at 30, col. 1.
285 See Solomon & Dicker, The Crash of 1987: A Legal and Public Policy Analysis,
57 FORDHAM L. REV. 191 (1988). For a critical summary and review of the reports and
the failure of responsible authorities to respond to the crash in a meaningful way, see
Karmel, The Rashomon Effect in the After-The-Crash Studies, 21 REV. SEC. &
Comi. REG. 101 (1988).
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there actually is a problem, there continues to be pressure to re-
spond to what is seen as a problem, perhaps by discouraging com-
puterized trading or by changing the markets in order to minimize
the effects.
If a security trades for different prices on different markets, then
arbitragers can profit by buying on the low-priced market and si-
multaneously selling on the high-priced market. They will continue
to do so until prices on the two markets come together.86 It is also
possible to arbitrage discrepancies between the prices of futures or
options, and the prices of the securities underlying them. For exam-
ple, if a stock index future sells at a premium to the price of the
stocks that make up the index, after adjusting for the costs and ben-
efits of owning the stocks or the future, an arbitrager can profit by
simultaneously selling the future and buying the stocks. The arbi-
trager can realize his or her profit by buying back the future and
selling the stocks when the future expires, or earlier if changes in
relative prices make it advantageous to do so. 287 By using computers
to calculate premiums and to order trades quickly, arbitragers can
realize significant profits by trading large amounts of securities
which trade at only a small premium to each other.
Program arbitrage trading is simply large-scale trading in re-
sponse to price discrepancies between markets. Although program
trading does not differ in quality from other arbitrage trading, some
observers are concerned about it because of the effects that they be-
lieve to follow from the enormous scale on which it is done. How-
ever, even though the dislocations accompanying the rapid adjust-
ment of market prices to their correct levels may be troubling,2 88
interference with the trading practices that cause such adjustments
runs the risk of leaving prices for related securities out of line with
each other.28 9 There is clearly a problem though, if arbitrage trading
288 Their trades may eliminate the price differential either by disclosing the price
imbalance to participants in the two markets - who will then reevaluate and change
their behavior - or by absorbing the supply available below the final price or the
demand above.
281 This is a simplified example of one of many techniques. See generally Division
of Market Reg., supra note 284.
2" After the market dropped precipitously in October 1987, Alvin Toffier suggested
that computer-driven trading programs now allow the financial system to respond to
change instantaneously, with instantaneous response itself amplifying changes and
accelerating the pace of change. He saw increasing stock market volatility as evidence
that instability has reached a level that threatens the structural integrity of the finan-
cial system. Toffiler, A Post-Panic System, N.Y. Times, Oct. 25, 1987, § 3, at 8, col. 4.
289 Solomon & Dicker, supra note 285 (summarizing criticism of suggested re-
forms); Gilpin, Portfolio Insurance is Growing, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1987, at D6, col.
6; Flynn, Program Trading Is Defended, N.Y.Times, Oct. 22, 1987, at 37, col. 1.
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overwhelms the market, pushing prices further than is necessary to
synchronize markets.
The exchanges and their regulators are responding to this possi-
bility by modifying trading practices and by defining futures and
options in a way that has now made trading less disruptive. For ex-
ample, on October 21, 1987, the NYSE limited the use of computers
to execute trades in the wake of the collapse of prices on October 19.
The Exchange said that it acted to protect its facilities, but it may
also have intended to reduce volatility and to restore confidence.290
Some market structures have also been modified. Some futures and
options are now settled at opening prices rather than at closing
prices, on the theory that supply or demand to offset any imbalance
can be mobilized more easily during the morning (before the market
opens) than during the hectic minutes before closing.291 After the
crash, the Exchange required market-on-close orders on expiration
dates to be entered thirty minutes before the market closed, so that
it could disclose order imbalances.292
The SEC has paid attention to the disruptions caused by tempo-
rary imbalances of supply and demand. It has used Rule 10b-5 to
challenge the purposeful creation of temporary price changes, and it
has considered regulating the trading patterns that are used to pro-
duce temporary price changes. It has sought, through informal ar-
rangements with the exchanges and through various rules, to mini-
mize the disruption thought likely to result from program trading. It
is likely to come under increasing pressure to regulate or even to
forbid such trading.
There remains the question of the SEC's authority over such trad-
ing practices that disrupt prices by creating or exacerbating these
temporary imbalances. The SEC often tries to sidestep this author-
ity problem. Sometimes it ignores the issue and sometimes it ob-
scures it by summarily listing a variety of potential sources of au-
thority without explaining any. Nonetheless, the SEC's authority
210 Sanger, Limits Set on Program Trades, N.Y. Times, Oct. 21, 1987, at D17, col.
4.
201 Garcia, Triple Witching Day Doesn't Roil Stocks As New Trading Procedures
Curb Volume, Wall St. J., June 22, 1987, at 32 col. 1; cf. Amihud & Mendelson, Trad-
ing Mechanisms and Stock Returns: An Empirical Investigation, 42 J. FIN. 533, 538-
39 (1987) (NYSE opening prices).
292 Annual Review of Securities Regulation, Significant 1986 Regulatory and Leg-
islative Developments, 42 Bus. LAw. 827, 865-66 (1987); Karr and Grisdela, SEC Asks
Big Board to Test Proposal Aimed at Curbing Sharp Price Swings, Wall St. J., Sept.
11, 1986, at 45, col. 1.
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often comes down to section 10(b).29 In this area, as in others, the
Court's suggestion that the word manipulation is not independently
significant in section 10(b) may have important ramifications. If sec-
tion 10(b) reaches only deceptive conduct, the SEC cannot regulate
disruptive practices unless they can successfully be characterized as
deceptive.
Inasmuch as disruptive traders seldom make any affirmative
statements, whether true or false, it is hard to say that they are do-
ing anything deceptive. The SEC has occasionally characterized dis-
ruptive practices as deceptive on the familiar ground that investors
should be able to count on prices' reflecting normal supply and de-
mand, or at least on prices' not reflecting supply and demand that is
created solely for the purpose of influencing prices. But the SEC
cannot explain why investors' reliance is binding on traders. It is by
no means clear that investors believe that all traders trade for in-
vestment, nor is it clear that they believe that prices are a function
of investment-motivated trades. In any case, even if investors do be-
lieve that they participate in a model market, that would only show
that investors are mistaken, not that anomalous traders have misled
(or deceived) them. Both at common law and under section 10(b)
the misinformed can prove fraud only by showing that the deceiver
has done something wrong. Aside from the relatively few traders
who affirmatively misrepresent themselves, traders who trade for
non-investment reasons or who affect prices by the way that they
trade are not using a deceptive device or contrivance, unless they
either are trying to mislead other investors or are trading in viola-
tion of some independent rule against their trading.
Program traders and people who move prices in order to avoid
their obligations or to trigger those of others are not intent on mis-
leading anyone. The problem then lies in finding an independent
duty that requires traders who will move prices to forego trading or
to explain themselves. Common law fiduciary principles and sections
13, 14 and 16 of the Act govern trading by issuers, insiders and per-
sons engaged in substantial acquisition campaigns, but otherwise
state law and the federal securities statutes leave most people free
to trade for their own reasons and without telling anyone about it.
The best answer to the SEC's authority problem is to reconsider
section 10(b)'s manipulation language and to give it the independent
interpretive significance that it deserves. The practices discussed
"s The SEC might regulate program trading under § 10(a) of the Act when it in-
volves the use of short sales or as the functional equivalent of a set of stop-loss or-
ders. The NYSE can effectively regulate the practice by controlling access to its
facilities.
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above are considered inappropriate for reasons that have nothing to
do with deception. In fact, they are objectionable precisely because
they move market prices even though they do not disclose informa-
tion. Program traders and short schemers move prices by selling (or
buying) more of a security than other market participants are pre-
pared to buy (or sell) at the prevailing price, or at least more than
those in the market at the time are prepared to trade. Their conduct
is essentially the same as that prohibited or subjected to regulation
under the heading of "manipulation" in sections 9(a)(2), 9(a)(6),
9(b), 9(c) and 10(a) of the Act, and as that conduct labeled "manip-
ulative" in the field of commodities law. Regardless of whether con-
certed trading is deceptive, it is fairly characterized as manipulative,
and accordingly section 10(b) should be understood to forbid its use
or employment in connection with the purchase or sale of a security
in contravention of a rule prescribed by the SEC as necessary or
appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
Three years before the Act was adopted, Adolph Berle wrote that
of all of the objectionable manifestations of stock market manipula-
tion, the freedom to arrange trades so as to unduly influence prices
"arouses public condemnation more than any other single legal ele-
ment in the situation."2 ' Section 9(a)(2), which is at the heart of
the Act,2 5 is the response to this abusive practice. It is true that
section 9(a)(2) does not forbid trades that change prices unless they
are undertaken for the purpose of inducing others to trade, but the
purpose clause was included in section 9(a)(2) only to protect trad-
ers who are not motivated by a desire to affect price, but who know
that their trades will do so. 296 In any case, the point is not that the
Act forbids trading that changes prices, 97 but that it calls the inten-
tional use of trading to influence price "manipulation."2 98
294 Berle, supra note 28, at 272. See also Berle (1938), supra note 88.
191 3 L. Loss, SEcurrIms REGULATION, supra note 8, at 1549.
299 Poser, supra note 10, at 703-05. Those concerted traders who trade for the pur-
pose of changing price are the unintended beneficiaries of this clause. As noted above
the SEC insisted that the proposed Federal Securities Code should make it illegal to
trade for the purpose of changing price. See supra note 230.
297 The pools could not profit merely by creating price changes with their trading
pressure. Under § 9(a)(2) of the Act the pressure effect of their purchases would
merely reflect the money that the pool had spent, and since it would disappear as
soon as the pool stopped buying, the pool would not be able to sell at the inflated
price. Wash sales and matched orders have no pressure effect, being fictitious transac-
tions. A pool's trading profits depended on others trading at the new price, and to-
ward this end pool operators used fictitious trades, price-changing trades and paid
publicity to get others to rethink their conclusions about the value of the security.
298 The predecessor of § 9(a)(2) of the Act in the version of the bill that the Senate
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The last trading practice addressed in section 9(a) is price stabili-
zation. Stabilizing the market in connection with the distribution of
securities is thought to be a necessary and legitimate technique be-
cause of the possibility that a distribution puts pressure on price.
Indeed, section 9(a)(6) seems to be concerned solely with the direct
influence of trading on price.
The sale of a substantial block of a security is often thought to
depress the prices of the security by overwhelming the market. 9
The idea that sales depress price is intuitively attractive, but sales
will have a pressure effect only when they are so large that they
exceed demand at the prevailing price. As discussed above, in large,
well-developed markets, few sales will be so large, and in fact even
the largest distributions have at most only very small pressure ef-
fects on prices.300 Nonetheless, the idea that large sales necessarily
depress price seems to have intuitive appeal, and it is considered
legitimate for those involved in large distributions to support -
that is, to stabilize - the market for the security. This stabilization
entails being prepared to buy the distributed security on the market
during the course of the distribution if the new supply appears to be
depressing the security's price. The theory is that while it is wrong
to push the price of a security up before a large sale, it is acceptable
to offset the downward pressure of the sale with carefully orches-
trated purchases.30'
Congress gave the SEC responsibility for regulating stabilization.
Section 9(a)(6) makes it unlawful to effect any series of transactions
in an exchange-registered security for the purpose of "pegging, fix-
ing, or stabilizing" its price, in contravention of the rules prescribed
by the SEC. The potential for the abuse of stabilizing purchases
that was recognized in this grant of authority exists in the over-the-
counter market as well as on the exchanges, and the SEC has regu-
lated stabilization in both markets. It has done so by declaring it a
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance within the meaning
passed and sent to conference declared it unlawful "[t]o manipulate ... the price of
any security registered on a national securities exchange by means of any series of
transactions in such security effected with the specific intent of raising or depressing
such price." H.R. 9323 (as passed with Senate amendments), 73d Cong., 2d Sess. §
9(a)(3) (1934), reprinted in 10 LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, item 32 at 80; see
also S. 3420, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 9(a)(3) (1934), reprinted in 11 LEGISLATIVE His-
TORY, id. at item 37.
2,1 R. BREALEY & S. MYERS, supra note 23, at 307-08, 439; J. LORIE, P. DODD & M.
KIMPTON, supra note 23, at 60-70; Scholes, supra note 31, at 180-81.
300 See supra notes 243-51 and accompanying text.
311 See Halleran & Calderwood, Effect of Federal Regulation on Distribution of
and Trading in Securities, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 86, 90-91 and 101-03 (1959).
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of section 10(b), to buy or bid for a security for the purpose of peg-
ging, fixing, or stabilizing its price, except in compliance with its
rules.3 02
The SEC thus clearly has the power under section 9(a)(6) to regu-
late the stabilization of exchange-registered securities, but the power
to regulate the stabilization of unregistered securities must be found
elsewhere. Stabilization can with some justification be called inher-
ently deceptive, 30 3 but the fact that it is permitted is evidence that
Congress did not regard it in that way in 1934 and, presumably, that
302 Broadly speaking, Rule 10b-7, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7 (1988), permits persons
making a fixed price offering to keep the market price of the security from falling and
Rule 10b-6 forbids all other purchases intended to peg, fix or stabilize the price of
any security. Rule 10b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-6 (1988), declares it a "manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance" for anyone involved in a distribution of a security to
purchase it. Stabilizing transactions are excepted from Rule 10b-6 if they do not vio-
late Rule 10b-7. Rule 10b-6(a)(4)(viii). See also 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-8 (1988) (rights
offering); 3 L. Loss, SEcuarrns REGULATION, supra note 8, at 1571-1614; Foshay, Mar-
ket Activities of Participants in Securities Distributions, 45 VA. L. R.v. 907 (1959);
Parlin & Everett, The Stabilization of Security Prices, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 607 (1949);
Wolfson, Rule 10b-6: The Illusory Search for Certainty, 25 STAN. L. REv. 809 (1973).
303 As noted above, the demand for most securities is extremely broad, and so the
expansions of supply represented by most distributions should not depress prices.
Market institutions are capable of mobilizing demand quickly, so that even if a distri-
bution is large enough to overwhelm the ready demand, price will quickly recover.
(Advance notice of the distribution would take care of the problem, Scholes, supra
note 31, at 186, but advance announcement will itself depress price if it is interpreted
to mean that the seller knows bad news. But cf. Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1986, at 36, col. 3
(advance notice of large futures orders).)
A distribution may result in a price decline even if it does not overwhelm the mar-
ket. Market participants may interpret the offering to mean that the seller knows
that something is wrong, and may reduce their estimates of the security's value ac-
cordingly. The change in price occasioned by this change in expectations will not be a
transitory problem of a disorderly market, and the pressure effect of supporting
purchases will be of no avail to a seller. The distributors can keep the price up if they
are prepared to buy back everything that anyone sells at the offering price, but they
will not be able to sell at the supported price, since the price will fall back to consen-
sus value as soon as the distributors stop buying. Distributors cannot simply by their
purchases provide the demand for what they propose to sell.
Stabilizing transactions may work because of their information content. So long as
the distributors stand ready to buy, the value of the distributed stock is the price
that they are prepared to pay. If the distributors can convince market participants
that they are prepared to buy, then the market price will not fall. Thus stabilization
will work if the distributors can complete their sales but then withdraw their support
before market participants expect them to. To this extent stabilization depends on
misleading market participants for its effectiveness. See Exchange Act Release No.
2446, 11 Fed. Reg. at 10,976 (March 18, 1940) (separate statement of Comm'r Healy);
cf. J. FLYNN, SECURITY SPECULATION, supra note 88, at chs. 5 & 6 (1934).
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the SEC does not see it that way now. 04 Although the SEC requires
sellers who are stabilizing the market to disclose that they may be
doing so,305 the rules do more than require disclosure. If section
10(b) reaches only deception, then trading in contravention of the
SEC's stabilization rules does not violate section 10(b). Yet stabili-
zation seems to be another practice that is manipulative even if not
deceptive. It seems clear that stabilization in contravention of the
SEC's rules does violate section 10(b). The SEC can regulate manip-
ulative devices and contrivances under section 10(b), and stabiliza-
tion is manipulative wholly apart from any deceptive character that
it may have.30 Congress subjected stabilization techniques to regu-
lation because it was concerned about the misuse of the pressure
effect of purchases. Section 9(a)(6) simply is not concerned with de-
ception, and the treatment of the problem of stabilization under the
rubric of manipulation is evidence that when Congress gave the SEC
the power to regulate manipulation in section 10(b), it contemplated
more than the regulation of communication, that is, more than the
limited scope of authority now conceded to the term by the Court.307
A substantial body of law on manipulation has grown up in the
related and analogous area of commodity trading regulation. To the
extent that securities are nothing more than income producing as-
sets, all securities are potentially substitutes for each other. If secur-
ities were fungible, then the amount that investors would supply
and demand at prevailing prices would dwarf anyone's trading, espe-
cially if investors could trade on credit - that is, if they could buy
with borrowed money and sell borrowed securities. Of course, securi-
ties are more than the income that they produce, and so for some
purposes they are not fungible. Investors are entitled by virtue of
their ownership of securities to participate in controlling the issuer,
and a buyer is entitled to the delivery of the purchased security, and
not merely to the income from it. When the unique aspects of a se-
curity come into demand, for example in a contest for corporate
control or when a short seller has to replace borrowed stock, the
limits on the supply of the stock may manifest themselves in price
'" See Exchange Act Release No. 2446, 3 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 22,541 (Mar.
18, 1940).
303 See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-7(k) (1988).
30 Cf. Exchange Act Release No. 2446, supra notes 303-04, at 16,555-3 ("The Com-
mission is unanimous in recognizing that stabilizing is a form of manipulation. The
statute itself so recognizes."); L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra note 8, at 999.
'o The Court has never tried to fit most of § 9(a) of the Act into its reading of the
word manipulative. Norman Poser, who treats § 9 more fully, simply omits § 9(a)(6)
(and § 10(a)) from consideration. See Poser, supra note 10, at 691, 701-11.
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increases."°
A person who controls the available supply of a security and who
has the right to demand the delivery of more of the security is said
to have cornered the market. Yet corners are not deceptive.30 9 Stock
market corners are not often reported on now and they are not spe-
cifically addressed in the Act.310 However, corners are thought to be
a significant problem in the commodity markets.
The prevention of manipulation is one of the primary purposes of
the federal regulation of commodity trading.3 1' The Commodity Ex-
change Act makes it illegal to manipulate or to attempt to manipu-
308 Cf. Comment, supra note 88, at 627 n.13 ("A security provides an admirable
vehicle for the monopolistic control which is the essence of manipulative operations
since its supply is limited to the outstanding capitalization.").
309 Cf. 5 A. JACOBS, supra note 81, § 2.02 at 1-16 ("An agreement to buy up, or
comer, the entire supply ... of a security is another blatant type of manipulation.").
See generally United States v. Patten, 226 U.S. 525, 538-43 (1913) (cotton corner); W.
HICKERNELL, supra note 184, at 136-41; HIGH FINANCE IN THE SIXTMS (F. Hicks ed.
1929). But see Poser, supra note 10, at 692-93 (deceit was an "essential element" of
pre-Act manipulative operations, including corners); cf. Easterbrook, Monopoly, Ma-
nipulation, and the Regulation of Futures Markets, 59 J. Bus. S103, S106 (1986).
Judge Easterbrook reasons that since no one voluntarily subjects himself or herself to
monopoly, would-be futures-market manipulators (he treats monopoly and manipula-
tion as virtual synonyms, see infra note 71) need secrecy to assemble unpredictably
large positions. "Monopoly [that is, manipulation] in a futures market therefore turns
out to be a species of fraud." Id. As the word is used here, fraud does not seem to
contemplate misrepresentation or silence in the face of a duty to speak. Fraud is
nothing more than taking advantage of secrecy to do something other market partici-
pants do not expect.
310 The predecessor to § 9 in the bill that was eventually enacted as the Act would
have forbidden corners. H.R. 7852, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. § 8(a)(8), reprinted in 10
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 11, item 24; cf. Hanna, supra note 20, at 16 n.15
("Technical corners are unknown today, partly because pools have learned to make
more money without corners, and partly because the stock exchange is likely to sus-
pend a stock from trading if its sponsors permit a comer."). But see Norris, The Case
of the Curious "Corner", N.Y. Times, Jan. 22, 1989, § 3, at 1, col. 2 (rare modem
example of comer, perhaps inadvertent).
' Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 361-62
(1982); 2 P. JOHNSON, COMMODITIES REGULATION, 231 (1982); Bianco, The Mechanics
of Futures Trading: Speculation and Manipulation, 6 HOFsTRA L. REv. 27, 35-39
(1977); Davidson, Squeezes and Corners: A Structural Approach, 40 Bus. LAw. 1283
(1985); Harrington, The Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices, 55 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 240 (1981); Hieronymous, supra note 65; McDermott, supra note 258. The
legislative findings of § 2 of the Act, including its emphasis on the evils of speculation
and manipulation, were modeled on those of § 3 of the Grain Futures Act, which is
now called the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1982). See generally
supra notes 19-22 and accompanying text; Stassen, Propaganda as Positive Law:
Section 3 of the Commodity Exchange Act, 58 CHL KENT L. REv. 635 (1982).
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late the price of a commodity, 12 but it does not define manipula-
tion. The failure of courts and administrators to explain this
proscription has been widely noted, 313 and it is impossible to explain
precisely what constitutes commodities manipulation. However this
may be, abuse of market dominance figures prominently in all defi-
nitions of commodity manipulation.31 4
Participants in commodity futures markets trade standardized
contracts for the purchase and sale of a defined commodity at a fu-
ture date. 15 The vast majority of participants intend to satisfy their
obligations by acquiring offsetting contracts before the delivery
date. The problem is that speculators cannot be sure how much of
the market is made up of other speculators who are planning to off-
set, and how much of it is made up of hedgers who are looking to-
ward delivery. Accordingly, traders intent on making offsetting
trades may not balance at expiration. If speculators cannot acquire
offsetting contracts, then they must perform their contractual obli-
gations. For example, if long traders - that is, traders who have
agreed to buy commodities - want delivery of substantially more of
a commodity than the short traders as a group had intended to de-
liver, then some short traders will have to buy deliverable commodi-
ties or offsetting long contracts at whatever price those who are will-
ing to sell can demand.316 If the deliverable supply is scarce, then
the premium for offsetting contracts may be substantial.1
312 Section 9(b), 7 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1982); see also 7 U.S.C. §§ 7(d), 9, 13b, 9a,
21(b)(7) (1982). See generally 2 P. JOHNSON, supra note 311, at § 5.01.
313 See, e.g., Bianco, supra note 311; Davidson, supra note 311; Harrington, supra
note 311; Hieronymous, supra note 65; McDermott, supra note 258; Perdue, Manipu-
lation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 345 (1987).
314 See, e.g., Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406
U.S. 932 (1972); Volkart Bros. v. Freeman, 311 F.2d 52 (5th Cir. 1962); Great Western
Food Distributors, Inc. v. Brannan, 201 F.2d 476 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 997
(1953); 2 P. JOHNSON, supra note 311, at § 5.03 ("Price manipulation is kindred to the
exercise of monopoly power to dictate prices that would be not achievable in a truly
competitive environment."); Easterbrook, supra note 309, at S107; cf. United States
v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 222-24 (1940) (Douglas, J.) (combination to
"stabilize" market by buying distress gas offered below market price is manipulation
and per se violation of Sherman Act); Board of Trade of Chicago v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1,
12 (1923) (quoting Herbert Hoover's congressional testimony on manipulating com-
modity prices by buying or selling).
315 See generally Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. at 357-67; Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1156-58; P.
JOHNSON, supra note 311.
316 If, on the other hand, speculative long interest is excessive, traders who are long
will have to accept delivery of a commodity that they do not want or will have to buy
an offsetting short contract from someone who had planned to deliver.
31 See generally Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1156-58; Davidson, supra note 311, at 1285-
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It is neither manipulative nor illegal to try to predict and profit
from an imbalance between buying and selling interests; that is the
point of commodity speculation. 18 What is illegal is to gain control
of deliverable supplies on the long or the short side of the futures
market for the purpose of creating this situation, or to use such con-
trol to extract "artificial" prices from speculators. This may be an
unsatisfactorily ambiguous rule, but it is clear that the illegitimate
acquisition or use of market power is the essence of commodity ma-
nipulation. In fact, those who would give manipulation a more pre-
cise meaning in commodities law often propose greater focus on
power and less on motivation. 1 9 Simply put, commodities manipula-
tion is the use of a dominant position in the market for a particular
futures contract and/or for the deliverable commodity, to change
market price or to extract a premium price from traders forced to
turn to the manipulator to cover.3 20
The most telling flaw in the Court's view of section 10(b) is its
failure to account for section 10(a). Short sales are another non-de-
ceptive trading practice that Congress has labeled manipulative.
Section 10(a) of the Act authorizes the SEC to regulate short sales
of exchange-registered securities and the employment of stop-loss
orders in connection with trades in such securities. Short selling has
always aroused a great deal of suspicion, 21 and public hostility to-
ward it was probably the most powerful impetus for the Act. 22
318 Easterbrook, supra note 309, at S117.
319 See, e.g., Davidson, supra note 311, at 1296-98; Hieronymous, supra note 65, at
52-56; McDermott, supra note 258, at 213-25.
320 See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. at
369-71; Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. at 10-15, 37-40.
21 "The prime instrument of perdition on the Stock Exchange [was] supposed to
be short selling." J. FLYNN, supra note 88, at 216; see also 2 L. Loss, SECURrrIES REG-
ULATION, supra note 8, at 1224 ("short selling has been a favorite whipping boy");
TWENTIETH CENTURY FUND, INC., supra note 12, at 95 (volume and intensity of criti-
cism and defense of short selling varies inversely with business cycle); Hanna, supra
note 20, at 11 ("Some persons, concluding that the stock market is evil only when it
registers declines, seek to isolate the cause of the declines and propose to abolish the
short seller or bear.").
22 After the 1929 crash, much of the public concluded that speculators and
profiteers had pushed the market to unreasonable highs and then caused its collapse
with their short sales. R. DEBEDTS, supra note 12, at 12, 17-18; 2 L. Loss, SECcuRrrms
REGULATION, supra note 8, at 1166 (quoting J. FLYNN, supra note 88, at 216); M. PAR-
RISH, supra note 11, at 109-11; cf. W. DOUGLAS, supra note 181, at ch. VI (short sales
contributed to market collapse in 1937); H. HOOVER, MEMOIRS - THE GREAT DEPREs-
SION, 1929-1941, at 125-30 (1952) (short sales by bear raiders retarded recovery). Not
all critics of stock market practices condemned short-selling. See, e.g., TWENT ETH
CENTURY FUND, INC., supra note 12, at ch. 11; Hanna, supra note 20, at 13 (no evi-
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Short selling may not have deserved its notoriety, but it was clear
that any exchange regulation statute enacted as part of the New
Deal would at the very least regulate short sales. The centrality of
the controversy over short selling in the Act's legislative and politi-
cal history shows that many of the proponents of the Act were con-
cerned with much more than full disclosure. Even if sections 2 and 9
and the other provisions of the Act can be ignored or explained in
construing section 10(b), section 10(a) cannot. Any construction of
section 10(b) must accommodate section 10(a), and section 10(a) is
not accommodated by a construction that sees section 10 as directed
at problems of deception or disclosure.
Short-selling and sales triggered by stop-loss orders can affect se-
curity prices by conveying information or by overwhelming demand.
Short sales convey information, as do all sales. In 1929, investors
probably read the tremendous volume of trades at declining prices
to mean that sellers had revised their yield predictions for securities.
Those who were selling short might not have been heard had short
selling been impossible.3 23
Short sales may also depress prices by absorbing demand at pre-
vailing prices. If short sales have this effect, then they will have it
even if they are not publicized. Short selling permits investors to
participate in the supply side of a security that they do not own, so
prices on a market that permits short selling reflect the pessimistic
judgments of short sellers. These judgments might not be reflected
were short selling impossible.s24
Those agitating for the elimination of short selling did not prove
their case, but Congress did authorize the SEC to deal with the is-
sue. The SEC has regulated short selling as a practice that can of its
own weight depress prices, rather than as one that is misleading. s2
The SEC's main rule simply forbids short sales at a price below the
price of the last trade or at the price of the last trade unless the last
dence short sales depress price). See generally Special Study, supra note 27, pt. 2, at
246-94.
.2 A pessimist can also register his or her opinions by trading stock options and
futures, but these instruments were not available for trading in 1934.
"' During the 1930s, apologists for short selling argued that short sellers must
cover at some point and that their covering tends to support the market. TWENTIETH
CENTURY FUND,INC., supra note 12, at 360-61. The point is still made today. See, e.g.,
Wall St. J., July 27, 1987, at 24, col. 1 ("[A] big rally in the market can't occur until
there is heavy short-selling. The stock sold short eventually has to be bought back.").
32 Special Study, supra note 27, pt. 2, at 251-54; L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS, supra
note 8, at 711-17; see Exchange Act Release No. 11,276, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 80,129, at 85,153-54 (March 5, 1975) (criticism of
regulation).
COLUMBIA BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 1988
MANIPULATION UNDER SECTION 10(b)
different price was lower. 26 "The primary purpose of [the rule] is to
prevent manipulative sales of a security for the purpose of accelerat-
ing a decline in the price of such security." 2 ' Thus it distinguishes
among short sales not on the basis of their information content but
on the basis of their likely pressure effects on prices.
It may be possible to characterize short sales, corners and con-
certed trading as deceptive. Despite the restrictive reading that the
Court has given to the word deceptive in its Rule 10b-5 cases, it is
fair to say that the federal securities laws generally, and section
10(b) in particular, have expanded the scope of the law of fraud.2
Perhaps the word deceptive is now broad enough to encompass any
interference with the market. 2 9 Since Santa Fe, many courts have
characterized mismanagement, breaches of fiduciary duty and other
misconduct as deceptive for the purposes of section 10(b).13 0 Con-
certed trading certainly deceives the public if there is some rule
against it and if the public is entitled to assume that all trading is
undertaken for legitimate reasons. But if the word deceptive is con-
strued to include disruptive trading, it is being given a much
broader construction than the Court, or for that matter almost any-
one else, has given it.2 3 1 To extend the word deceptive to encompass
disruptive trading would seem to deprive it of any connotation of
intentional wrongdoing.
Even if it is possible to characterize disruptive trading as decep-
tive, little is accomplished by doing so. Labeling trading that affects
market prices as deceptive incorrectly characterizes the nature of
226 17 C.F.R. § 240.10a-1; see also supra note 258 (proposed Rule 10b-21); cf. 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-4 (short tendering).
227 Exchange Act Release No. 20,715 [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 83,504, at 86,663 (March 6, 1984).
328 Ruder, supra note 10, at 651.
"22 See 6 L. Loss, SECURrrIES REGULATION, supra note 8, at 3757 (Supp. 1969)
(London Stock Exchange rule forbidding members to promote a false market and
defining a false market as one in which prices are moved to a level not justified by
assets, earnings or prospects); Legislation, supra note 236, at 121 (The Act adopts
"the view that transactions to the public."); see Berle (1938), supra note 88.
230 E.g. United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024 (2d Cir. 1986), aff'd, 108 S.Ct.
316 (1987) (securities law aspect of the Second Circuit decision affirmed by equally
divided court without discussion); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 62, at
1087-92.
33 There has been substantial resistance to extending the law or morality of hon-
esty to people taking advantage of others' mistakes or ignorance, see C. FRIED, CON-
TRACT AS PROAUSE 77-88 (1981), and there seems little predicate for requiring traders
to concern themselves with the reactions of unrelated strangers with whom they do
not propose to deal.
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the problem, which is that prices are out of line with those that pre-
vailed immediately before the trades and with those that may pre-
vail again immediately after the trades. If program trading is objec-
tionable it is not because it deceives anybody, but because it
produces damaging dislocations. Supporting the price of a security
in order to trigger a contractual right is wrong because it takes ad-
vantage of a rule, not because it misleads anyone about the market
value of a security. The injured party is affected by the price
change, but it does not act in reliance upon the price created by the
trader; it is already obligated to act.
The real problem with concerted trading that influences prices is
that regardless of the trader's motivation, it may undermine the
proper functioning of the market and injure people who are not even
trading and who have no reason to look at security prices at all.
Concerted trading is inappropriate because it manipulates market
prices away from the prices that would prevail if the market worked
perfectly or if all market participants traded for reasons and in
manners considered appropriate.
CONCLUSION
Section 2 of the Act states that the public interest makes it neces-
sary to provide complete and effective regulation and control of the
transactions conducted on securities markets and related matters.
The specific provisions of the Act regulate communications, corpo-
rate managers and trading practices, toward the end of protecting
the public interest in these markets. Section 10(b) is the provision
that insures that federal regulation and control of the securities
markets is complete.
The SEC's authority to regulate the use of manipulative devices
and contrivances under section 10(b) extends to all practices that
contribute to disorder in the market or that give voice to speculative
sentiment there. This may not be a satisfactory statement of admin-
istrative authority, but it is one indicated by the scheme of the stat-
ute.332 It is also the one indicated by a fair reading of the language
33 One of the first attempts to explore the purposes of federal stock exchange reg-
ulation and to give meaning to the SEC's rule-making authority under the Act
reached much the same conclusion.
The problems with which stock market regulation has had to cope were [in
1934] too new and too little understood. But there appear to be a few...
principles permeating Federal legislation and regulation of the security
markets which if clearly recognized and consistently applied may do much
to lend a certain clarity and directness to the course of stock market regula-
tion . ...
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of section 10(b), for in common usage, manipulation clearly encom-
passes more than deception.3 3
Rule 10b-5 has gotten out of hand. Surely Congress did not intend
a rule to eclipse the statute. Denying private parties the right to
challenge violations of the rule in court would help restore balance
to the statutory scheme, but that avenue is no longer open. Perhaps
the SEC has been so irresponsible in its rule-making that Congress
or the courts should step in. There are limits on the SEC's authority
under section 10(b). A rule does not even bring section 10(b) into
play unless the SEC has prescribed it as "necessary or appropriate
in the public interest or for the protection of investors." Presumably
the SEC cannot regulate manipulative practices under section 10(b)
if Congress has itself regulated them in other parts of the Act. Per-
haps Congress simply delegated too much power to the SEC.
These limitations do not depend on the meaning of the phrase
"manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance." They are of the
general nature of limits under which any administrative agency op-
erates when it promulgates rules.3 34 The Court has not even consid-
ered these administrative law grounds as a basis for limiting the
scope of Rule 10(b)-5. It has never said that the SEC has misused
the power Congress granted it in section 10(b), nor has it said that
Congress acted improperly in delegating that power. Instead, it has
said that Congress only authorized the SEC to regulate deception.
In this the Court has overreached. The language and statutory con-
text of section 10(b) indicate that the SEC may regulate almost any
conduct that influences security prices. The Court has found other-
Woven persistently through the whole fabric of Federal regulation are the
two basic aims of Congress, namely that stock markets should be "fair" and
that they should be "orderly."
What Congress had in mind in its references to an orderly market is not
entirely obvious. Clearly, it was intended in some way to represent a market
which was free from "excessive speculation" ....
R. VERNON, THE REGULATION OF STOCK EXCHANGE MEMBERS 132-34 (1941) (footnote
omitted); see also TWENTTH CENTURY FUND, INC., supra note 12, at 444 (defining
manipulation for purposes of its discussion).
"' Fiflis, supra note 74, at 314-15. Manipulation seems to mean any skillful treat-
ment of the environment toward some end. Even when it has a negative connotation
it encompasses the use of force in addition to the use of deception. See, e.g., F.
HAYEK, THE CONSTrrUTION OF LIBERTY 143-44 (1960), quoted in Poser, supra note 10,
at 686 n.85 ("Deception, like coercion, is a form of manipulating the data on which a
person counts, in order to make him do what the deceiver wants him to do. Where it
is successful, the deceived becomes in the same manner the unwilling tool.").
',' Manne, supra note 10, criticizes Rule 10b-5 in terms of administrative law.
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wise on the basis of nothing more than a flawed vision of the funda-
mental purpose of the Act.
